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TBE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS IN WESTERN 
MILITARY PLANNING FOR EUROPEAN CONTINGENCIES 
Abstract 
The nuclear-conventional nexus is central to many peacetime 
intra-Alliance debates, and it is a critical reference· point for 
military planners. The linkage between nuclear and conventional 
military power also provides a distinctive dimension to the control of 
military operations during crisis and war. The management of this 
nexus is dependent on evolving political and operational factors (such 
as: trans-Atlantic diplomacy and European political developments; the 
modernisation of theatre nuclear forces and doctrine; and the 
prospects for nuclear proliferation). 
It is argued that planning for nuclear and conventional military 
units in and around Europe should be reviewed within the context of a 
shift in doctrine that more clearly addresses the requirements of 
crisis management. For this to occur strategic analysis should 
recognise how regional political factors both reflect:, and help to 
mould, the juxtapositioning of nuclear and conventional military 
power. Such analysis would show that, within Europe, nuclear and 
conventional forces have acquired overlapping but not coterminous 
roles~ 
These ideas are developed within an analytical framework which 
brJngs together: a discussion of the nature of strategy; a history of 
the nuclcar-conve nt ional nexus; and an examination of factors 
affecting the character of the linkage between nuclear aod 
conventional forces in Europe. 
PREFACE 
This thesis was completed soon after the Soviet-American 
agreement of December 1987 to phase out certain types oE nuclear 
weapons. Some of these weapons (such as Ground Launched Cruise 
Missiles) have been surrounded by controversy since their origins~ 
The development, deployment, and planned removal of these weapons kept 
alive a long-standing, ·but tangled, debate over the relationship 
between nuclear and conventional forces in 'Europe .. 
For example, the prospect of reductions in NATO's nuclear arsenal 
prompted many observers to argue that a greater burden would now fall 
onto conventional forces in Western defence planning. This line of 
reasoning reinforced the view that NATO, particularly its European 
members, should significantly increase expenditure on conventional 
mtli tary power. 
It is one purpose of this thesis to offer a perspective from 
which the above ideas can be critically assessed. More broadly, the 
intention is to map-out the strategic context within which planning 
for the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces in Europe has 
evolved, and ~ay perhaps be modified. 
Note 
The rlebate over European defence has been marked by confusing 
terminology. In particular~ nuclear weapons deployed to the Continent 
have been given a range of labels. These have included: Tactica 1 
Nuclear Weapons (TNW), Theatre Nuclear Weapons (T~w), Theatre Nuclear 
Forces (TNF), Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), shorter range 
missiles, and battlefield nuclear weapons. 
This thesis employs the designation TNF. Theatre Nuclear Forces 
may be loosely defined as nuclear weapons deployed to the potential 
theatre of military operations, in this case Europe, in which they 
might be used. All of the above weapons-types (e.g., INF and 
battlefield weapons) fall into the category of TNF. Where 
appropriate, range is indicated. For example 1 long range TNF (S,lch as 
Pershing II missiles) are referred to as LRTNF, and short range TNF 
(like artillery) are labeled SRTNF. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
between nuclear and as an issue 
The contingency that has dominated US defense planning for 
35 years has been •• ~a massive Soviet invasion of Western 
Europe~ Because of that concern ... a strategic nuclear 
exchange has [usually] been envisaged, not as a separate and 
independent phenomenon, but as a part.~.of a much larger and 
more traditional campaign of the kind we had experienced in 
World Nar II. (US Secretary of Defense, Harold Bro,n, 
1980) 1 
(T]heatre nuclear forces ••• should be employed against the 
most threatening of enemy targets in ways which best 
complement the conventional operation~ (US Secretary of 
Defense, James Schlesinger, 1975) 2 
Political purpose, consultation, political decision and 
control, therefore are the key terms characterizing the 
nuclear planning of NATO. The mllitary effect of the use of 
nuclear weapons :ts secondary to its political purpose but 
lndispensable as a component of its pol~tical effectiveness. 
(West German Defence White Paper, 1985) 3 
The relationship be.tween nuclear and conventional military forces 
is central to United States and NATO planning. In the context of 
superpower conflict, and Western Alliance diplomacy, the linkage 
between nuclear and conventional forces lies at the heart of attempts 
to match military power to political objectives. For the h'est this 
pairing of military forces with politJ.cal purpose has been attempted 
pr1marjly within the framework of the "containment:" of Soviet power~ 
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From the beginnings of containment in the 1940s it was unclear 
whether Soviet power posed more of a political than a military 
threat to Western Europe. And it was uncertain what degree of 
reliance could and should be placed on nuclear, rather than 
conventional, forces to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. It was 
realised that both issues were connected. Perceptions of Soviet 
military preponderence on the Continent might aggravate political 
problems in Western Europe. This could lead to greater political 
instability and, conceivably, an opening for Soviet political 
penetration and military advances. It was in this light that United 
States economic aid to Western Europe, its vast conventional 
mobilisation base 7 and its monopoly of nuclear weapons, were seen as 
stabilising factors -almost as a stabilising package. Western Europe 
could get on with post-war reconstruction, shielded and nurtured by 
American power. Skepticism regarding the dangers of immediate Soviet 
att,1ck, and the US possession of the atom bomb, allowed for rapid 
conventional de-mobilisation as politico-economic development was 
given priority over military expenditure. 
Obviously circumstances have changed markedly since the 1940s. 
Even so, the two issues mentioned above (the nature of the Soviet 
threat, and the relative roles of nuclear and conventional forces in 
countering this threat) are still very much alive in political and 
strategic debate. Underlying them is a thhd issue: What should be 
the continuing role of the United States in the security of Western 
Europe? Not surprisingly, American dominance in Western nuclear war 
planning has provided a focus for the discussion of these issues. 
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This, in turn" has led to debate on the type and level of conventi.onal 
forces required to either complement or su~stitute for United States 
nuclear firepower. 
Defence planning withln NATO, and the controversy surrounding it-, 
often pivots around the effect of nuclear strategy on conventional 
strategy and vice versa4 This nexus between conventional and nuclear 
forces is directly relevant to the following long-standing, and 
interlinked, debates on: 
(1) 'Burden sharing' and the appropriate level of United States 
leadership of the Atlantic Alliance. This concerns the 
distribution are.ong members of the costs~ risks, and advantages 
incurred in the defence of NATO. Among other things. burden 
sharing has come to imply the need for ~~estern Europe to increase 
its expenditure on conventional forces while continuing to accept 
American control of rr:ost of NATO's nuc.lear weapons. 
(2) The efficacy and dangers of the :'iATO strategy of flexible 
response~ Flexible response, as adopted by NATO, envisages the 
threat of escalation (e.g .• a move from conventional to nuclear 
operations) to prevent a NATO defeat. At the same time the 
strategy recognises the desirability of limiting conflict to low 
levels. Both the threat of escalation and the wish to keep war 
liml.ted are thought to require 1 imi ted and flexible nuclear 
targeting options. 
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(3) Raisiag the nuclear threshold i.e., lessening the likelihood of 
a conventional war escalating into a nuclear war. 
Strategic linkage between nuclear and conventlonal forces is a 
highly charged pol Hi cal subject. It is also a critical reference 
point for military planners. In addition, J.t provides an important 
dimension to the issue of possible nuclear war. But, despite its 
importance, the relationship bet-ween nuclear and conventional 
strategy has rarely been subjected to sustained systematic analysis. 
Rather, the importance of the relationship is more implied or assumed, 
them exnmined. This area of strategic analysis (where nuclear and 
conventional forces either come together, or are kept apart) is, 
paradoxically perhaps, both central and often neglected. 
One corollary of this neglect is the tendency for those focusing 
on conventional forces to treat the nuclear threshold as being on the 
unti~y fringe of their subject. Similarly, analysts of nuclear 
strategy often treat conventional defence in a cursory or 
platitudinous way. The following chapters wi 11 both support a no 
qualify these ol>servations; for the moment though it will simply be 
stated that there is a disjunction in many published studies. 
Th l s deficiency is carried over, in part at least, into the 
sphere of defence planning. Such a discontinuity in analysis and 
planning (between nuclear and conventional forces) is probably not 
conducive to either good strategic theory or to sensible policy. 
t1oreover, as already suggested, this deficiency in analysis leaves an 
important area of international relations inadequately examined. If a 
Th1rd World War breaks out it may do so as a result of a process of 
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supe<power rival<y played out on the Eurasian periphery. The pairing 
of nuclear threats with conventional forces deployed along this 
perlphery is part of this process. Thus the nexus bet'Ween nuclear and 
conventional strategy may be .a factor in the origins and development 
of armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. At 
the very least~ this nexus is an important issue in intra-Alliance 
diplomacy and therefore (by extension) is also relevant to questions 
of international stability. 
B) Hethodology 
This study examines the relationship between nuclear and 
conventional strategy as reflected in the academic literature and in 
US/NATO planning for European contingencies. 
that: 
The central thesis is 
Strategic analysis has often been marred by an Inadequate 
focus on the relationship between nuclear and conventional 
strategy; this has been paralleled by defence planning which 
dangerously mismanages the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional military forces~ 
A case study showing how the Carter administration dealt with the 
linkage betw-een nuclear and conventional forces is included in the 
thesis. Th-e Carter aC!:!.inistratton has b-een c~osen here tecause it 
attempted to revise areas "1f the lt.'est 's defence posture that are 
directly relevant to the ~oxus between nuclear and conventiona! 
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forces in Europe. The case study therefore illustrates some of the 
issues faced by officials in trying to manage this key aspect 
of reilitary power. The study is set within .a framework of theoretical 
discussion (concerning the nature of strategy), historical background 
(covering the period 1945-1977), a description of relevant Alliance 
political factors, and strategic analysis. 
Following this brief outline of the organisation of the thesis, 
the concept of strategy is discussed. Next, Chapter Two looks at some 
of the ideas developed in the strategic studies literature. Here. 
academic treatreents of the nexus between nuclear and conventfonal 
military forces are outlined. 
Having mapped out some of the relevant conceptuaJ terrain) the 
next part. of the. thesis examines 'Western military planning .. Chapter 
Three is essentially a chronological description of the development of 
American and l'iATO strategy between 1945 and 1977. The chapter ends 
with a description of some of the defence planning issues, and the 
doctrinal responses to them, inherited by the Carter administration in 
1977. 
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Chapter Four examines the ways in which the Carter administration 
tackled so.re of the constraints and opportunities facing United 
States leadership of NATO. The chapter concentrates on the strategic 
reviews of the administration. The 1IDpact of these reviews on 
~onventional, theatre nuclear, and central strategic nuclear forces 
is discussed. Thus the following is9ues are looked at: The Long Term 
Defence Programme, designed mainly to bolster NATO's conventional 
forces; TNF oodernisation (involving Enhanced Radiation 
Warheads/'Ne.utron bombs', Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, Pershing II 
missilies, and short range theatre nuclear forces); an~ the adoption 
of the 'Countervailing' strategy (the administrationts development of 
flexible response). 
Chapter Five describe.s NATO's planning framework. Chapter Six 
examines the nuclear \;:'eapons doctrines of Britain, France} and the 
USSR. It discusses the i.mplications of these doctrines for both the 
l_inkage between nuclear and conventional forces, and for the likely 
degree of US control over escalation in any European conflict. Chapter 
Seven identifies the different levels of strategy as it operates in 
Europe; these levels are psychological, philosophical} political, 
doctrinal, and operational. These chapters place the linkage between 
nuclear and conventional forces into the geopolitical and strategic 
context of the European theatre. 
In conclusion, Chapter Eight briefly restates the rr.ain themes of 
the thesis, draws out some i~plications for strategic analysis, and 
sugg~sts some changes that might be ~ade to improve the canage~ent of 
the nuclear-coove~tional nexus. 
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C) Looking at str":teg)' 
The notion of strategy occupies a central role in this thesis, so 
it is necessary to examine what is meant by the concept. -Str~tegy is 
the use of military power for political purpQses. The ~primary 
elements of strategy are military means, political ends, and the 
connect :tons be tween -then:. 
On an abstract level this appears to be a straightforward and 
rather neat formulation~ Ho"-'ever, in practice strategy is more 
problematical. For example, political objectives may be inadequately 
formulated for direct translation into military planning, and military 
power may be poorly coordinated. In other words) the connection 
between military means and political ends is not necessarily clear-
cut. What may seem like a coherent strategy (flexible response, for 
example) may be little more than an assort~ent of strategies developed 
by different groups. What can appear as a unified strategy 
methodically relating means to ends can also hide inconsistent 
assumptions held by various policy makers and planners; it may also 
obscure bureaucratic muddles or compromises. 
For instance, United States defence planning takes place in an 
arena of constrained anarchy; political pluralism and bureaucratic 
fracture hinder the achievement of a coherent or monolithic defence 
policy. Ball has described so"'e of the decision-making associated 
with the American adoption of flexlble response in the early 1960s as 
occurring amid "intramural bureaucratic bargaining" between "quasi 
I 
sovereignties", in Washington."~ Cnlted States defence policy making 
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is partially fragmented. Given the additional needs to coordinate 
defence policy with foreign policy one might speculate that the United 
States may be incapable of formulating and pursuing a rigorously 
consiste~t national security policy. In addition, American membership 
of NATO adds to the complexity of its defenee posture and resultant 
strategy. Membership of the Alliance involves complex decision-making 
and diplomatic compromise married to far-reaching security 
commitments .. 
To make sense of this complex mix of factors it is useful to 
sharpen the analytical focus onto the relevance of strategy to defence 
planning. Howard has described four "dimensions of strategy" : 5 the 
logistical, ope-rational) social and technological. His starting point 
is C1ausewitz's analysis of 1var and strategy. Clausewitz focused his 
analysis on the operational dimensicn of strategy; that is, he 
concentrated on how military power was actively use,d. The violent 
aspect of war - fighting ~ was central to the very notion of strategy 
as far as Clausewitz was concerned. 
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Howard complements, 1:-ather than rejects, Clausewitz. One of the 
first points Howard makes is that operations may be dependent on 
logistics. The American Civil War is used to illustrate this: 
Ultimately [operational skills] were ground down in a 
conflict of attrition in which tge logistical dimension of 
strategy proved more !ll.gnificant. 
Howard continues his analysis by stating that this logistical 
capacity, 
depended upon a third dimension of strategy, and one to 
which Clausewitz was the first major thinker to draw 
attention: the social, the attitude of the people upon whose 
commitment and readiness for self-denial this logistical 
power ultimately depended. 7 
The fourth dimension of strategy is the technologicaL Here Howard 
quotes Belloc to make the point about the possibility of technological 
dominance: "Whatever happens, we have got the Haxim gun, and they 
have not~ .. S Howard's essay ends with some comments on the relevance 
of his analysis to contemporary issues .. He writes that) in the case 
of nuclear strategy, the social dimension of strategy has, "if one is 
to believe the strategic analysts, vanished completely." He 
continues: 
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Works about nuclear war and deterrence normally treat their 
topic as an activity taking place almost entirely in the 
technological dimension. From their writings not only the 
socio-political but the operational elements have quite 
disappeared. The technological capabilities of nuclear 
arsenals are treated as being ~decisive in themselves. 
involving a calculation of risk and outcome so complete and 
discrete that neither the polit~ical motivation for the 
conflict nor the socical factors involve<) in its conduct -
nor indeed the military activity of fighting - are taken 
into account at all.9 
Howard agrees that "the technological dimension of strategy has 
certainly becotte of predominant importance in armed conflict between 
advanced societies ••• ·· 10 But: 
.•• the question insistently obtrudes itself: in the 
terrible eventuality of deterrence failing and hostilities 
breaking out between states arwed with nuclear weapons, how 
will the peoples concerned react, and how will their 
reactions affect the will and the capacity of their 
governments to make decisions? And what. form will military 
operations take? What, in short, will be the social and the 
oper~tional dimensions of a nuclear war? 11 
It is not simply in terms of warfighting that the social 
dimension o£ strategy may be significant. As amply lllustrated in the 
political controversy surrounding the 1979 decision to modernise 
NAT0 1 s theatre nuclear forces, the social dimension can be criuical to 
peace-time defence planning. 
In chapter seven Howard's analytical framework is modified. 
Different levels of the "social diwension" of strategy are 
identified; these levels are: psychological) philosophical, and 
political. 
sketched-out. 
-12-
In addition, doctrinal aspects of warplanning are 
Thus the different layers of thought, upon which the 
"operational dimension" is built, are brought into the analysis. In 
this tnodified framework the "opet:ational dimension" refers to military 
preparations for arF-ed confrontation. and to the conduct of war. 
(Logistical and technological aspects of military planning are 
therefore subsumed within this definition of the operational dimension 
of strategy.) In this study it is the content of warplans, and the 
guiding ideas behind them, that provides the focal point of analysis. 
The interfaces between politics and strategy, and strategy and war, 
are therefore key areas of investigation. 
i) Strategy and war 
Probably the best place to begin an exaa:ination of the 
relationship between strategy and war is the work of Clausewitz. For 
Clausewitz, it is war which provides strategy with its central 
reference point; albeit in the context of politics. The starting 
point is that war is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will. " 12 According to Clausewitz, war has three elements that 
interact in a dynamic way: war consists of violence) military decision 
making, and political purpose. 13 Strategic theory therefore needs to 
exarr.ine the relationships between social forces, organised and violent 
means, and policy. 
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For the sake of analytical sharpness, Clausewitz identified two 
major forms of war: Absolute war and Real war. Absolute war is total 
war, war carried to extremes of viole.nce. According to Claust::witzl 
Ahsolute war has a central theoretical role to play in that it forms a 
core or focal concept with whi.ch Real war can be compared and partly 
explained. Blind unlimited violent conflict is the 'Ideal 1 form of 
war - war closest to its 'essence'. This absolute form is disguised 
or whittled down when one moves from theory to practice for a number 
of reasons (which will be cealt with below). But while Real war might 
be limited, it has within it the germ of Absolute war. 
From his simple statement that war is "'an act of force to compel 
our enemy to do our will",. Clausewitz derived the idea {similar to 
contemporary concepts of escalation) that ~Jar had a::1 inherent tendency 
to increase in intensity. In theory the intensity of fighting might 
even eventually approxin:ate Absolute war. In practice ffriction', 
historical patterns, and pol~tics would almost certainly temper this 
tendency towards the Absolute. However, (following Gallie's 
i.nterpretation) the idea of Absolute war would remain "the most 
important fact about war. .. 14 Thus, in a limited war, statesmen and 
the military had to be prepared for a possible transition to unlimited 
war. 
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While On War is often quoted for its references to Absolute war, 
the substance of the work heavily qualifies the practical relevance of 
the" concept.. As mentioned earlier, moderating factors are evident in 
th" real world., Thus, Clausewitz argues: " we must face the fact that 
war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, and cond:ltions 
prevailing at the time.· 15 The concept which more or less 
corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on 
paper'' is ''friction''. This is a "force that theory can never 
quite define." Clausewitz discusses friction in the following way: 
Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just 
as the si:nplest and most natural of movements, walking, 
cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it js 
difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate 
results~ .. Moreover. every war is rich in unique episodes~ 
Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs. 16 
If Absolute war was a focal point for theorising about war, war 
as a political instrument was an anchor helping to relate and moderate 
the abstract notion of unfettered violence with what normally 
happened. According to Clausewitz, war is: 
A continuation of political intercourse, carried on with 
other means.~~War in general, and the commander in any 
specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and 
designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these 
means~ That, of course 1 is no small demand; but however much 
it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never 
do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, 
war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be 
considered in isolation from their purpose ••• 
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The political object - the original motive for the war -
will thus determine both the military objective to be 
reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political 
object cannot, howeverJ in itself provide the standard of 
measurement. Since we are dealing with reali t.ies, r.ot with 
abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two 
states at war. The same political object can elicit 
differing reactions from :different peoples, and even from 
the same people at different times. We can therefore take 
the political object as a standard only if we think of the 
influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move~ 17 
So, the most effective brake to unlimited war might well be limited 
policy objectives. Even so, the spectre of Absolute war would 
continue to exercise an inflt1ence: 
If war is part of policy, policy will determine its 
character. As policy becomes [!lOre ambitious and vigorous, 
so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains 
its absolute form .•• 
That, however, does not imply that the poli.ttcal aim is a 
tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process 
which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains 
the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all 
military operatlons, and, in so far as their violent nature 
will admit, it wiJl have a continuous influence on thelf'. 
(Emphasis added.) 1 
Of course, controlling the violent nature of war, and its 
reperCliSsions, presents problems. It is this that makes war both more 
of a &anger and more of a gamble than peace. The idea that war is 
a continuation of political Intercourse was not meant to suggest that 
there is little difference between peace and war~ For Clausewitz war 
was about fighting. Military engagements were, for Clausewitz (as 
Howard says), "the constituent elements out of which strategy was 
d .. 19 cons trur~te . 
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Thus, peacetime posturing as in intra-Alliance bickering over 
force levels and some views of deterrence and arms control - is not 
central to this conception of stra-tegy) however critical to domestic 
or foreign policy it may be. Str"ategy works chere primarily in the 
context of war rather than peace. 
It is now necessary to look at the impact of contemporary ideas 
of deterrence on the classical Clausewitzian perspective outlined 
above .. This is because the demands of deterrence have been put on 
centre stage in oany strategic and political debates. Deterrence in 
the nuclear era is sometimes seen to require the rejection of the 
'Clausewitzianf 
20 dangerous .. 
approach, which is seen as anachronistic and 
This reject ion is t v! ew has important political and strategic 
repercussions. Controversy over the relevance of classical strategy 
contributes to problems in achieving an Alliance consensus on security 
issues and leads to some incoherence in planning. Perhaps the biggest 
single strategic problem in NATO is arriving at an agreed and coherent 
way in which to translate deterrence into warplans. It is within the 
context of this problem (of relating deterrence to plans) that the 
nexus between nuclear and conventional strategy_ can becmae a central 
issue~ This is partly becausel in the realm of perceptions, 
conventional forces are 0ften seen in terms of defence, whereas 
nuclear forces are seen more in terms of deterrence.. wr.en these roles 
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are believed to be reversed - as in some expositions of flexible 
response - political controversy can surface. The idea of shifting 
the burden of deterrence to conventional forces, and of further 
develop:i.ng plans -for the use _of nuclear weapons in defence,-- makes some 
people uncomfortable. 
The basis of controversy is often disagreement over the nature of 
deterrence. 
psychology. 
Deterrence is essentially a matter of perception and 
Thus Western deterrence must work in the minds of the 
Politbureau in Moscow~ This cognitive element makes it difficult to 
give a precise explanation of the relationship between deterrence and 
strategy. In broad terms it can be said that deterrence is about the 
threat of strategy as well as an ill-defined image of total disaster 
(and this image may well be fundamentally .!J:Strategic), In other 
words, one may see deterrence as resting on two apparently 
contradic.tory pillars. The first pillar is a plausible strategy for 
using military forces in a politically purposive way. This is needed 
to make the threat of war credible and it requires rational planning 
for using nuclear weapons in a restrained manner and in a way that has 
relevance to conventional operations~ The second (~.strategic) pillar 
is the prospect of mindless destruction; the politically blind, self-
defeating, use of military power. This would not require particular 
warplans. Some formulations might divorce these two pillars in an 
'either/or' proposition: deterrence, it might be argued, either works 
in one way (strategic) or in another way (~strategic). However, for 
the purposes of this introduction the two pillars will be treated as 
different aspects of deterrence; they are not mutually exclusive and 
may be complementary. 
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Even so, it stands repeating that differences of view on this 
matter can have serious political implications. A generalised, 
~strategic view of deterrence (based on horrifying images) leads to 
considerable skepticism over both the value of changes to warplans and 
·calls to raise defence expenditure~ Conversely, a narrow, explicitly 
strategic view of deterrence could lead to great concern over the 
details of warplans and the size of defence budgets. The non-
strategic perspective tends to vl.ew war as inevitably catastrophic: 
war, and warplanning, may be considered unthinkable. On the other 
hand, the strategic perspective suggests that effective warplanning is 
both feasible and enhances deterrence. 
Within NATO tension has arisen over the extent to which 
operational strategy can (or should) either reinforce or escape from 
the ~strategic visi.on of deterrence. Should NATO planning emphasise 
the .. unthinkable .. or the possibly calculable and rational? Generally 
speaking, European attachment to symbols of disaster has been 
balanced by American interest in minimising the consequences if 
deterrence fails~ Europeans have stressed the rhetoric of deterrence, 
while Americans have tended to focus on the content of strategies~ 
One way of minimising the consequences of deterrence failing is 
to try to reimpose deterrence after war has broken out. This intra-
war deterrence is directly related to strategy to a way that 
peacetime. ante bellum, deterrence is not. Intra-war deterrence is 
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about the withholding, and impending threat, of increasing violence 
within the context of extant war. It is the other side of the coin of 
escalation. 
Intra-war deterrence and ante bel1um deterrence are qualitatively 
different. It is misleading to think of them as merely different 
points on a continuum, this is similar to clouding the difference 
between peace and war a To an extent this is, perhaps, an ethical 
prejudice being imposed on an awkward theoretical issue; but it rests 
on an assumption that the peace-to-war threshold is of a different 
order to subseque.nt thresholds. This is what makes ante bellum 
deterrence essentially a foreign policy matter while intra-war 
deterrence is also an urgent military concern. As Howard has 
written: 
Hhereas in Clausewitz' s day human effort had been necessary 
to transcend the limitations imposed on the conduct of war 
by the constraints of the real world, no"' that effort is 
needed to impose such limits. 21 
iii) Strategy, Intra-Allian":"_diplomacy and defence plannin& 
Strategy is unintelligible unless its political context is 
appreciated. Here the relationshio between strategy and NATO politics 
is outliued, as are the broad impl !cations for defence planning. The 
previous section has already highlighted one way in which Alliance 
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considerations modify the 'Clausewitzian' perspective~ namely, by the 
salience attached to deterrence~ This attachment is woven into most 
NATO policy decisions, including those dealing with how to plan to 
fight a war. 
Perhaps the first po.int to be made concerning the interaction of 
politics and strategy in NATO is that Alliance strategy is essentially 
a compromise of American and European views. It is, however, an 
unequal compromise~ It is often pictured as an exercise in European 
recalcitrance and resistance to American initiatives. 
This view seems to hold true in the case of the NATO adoption of 
flexible response. It is one reason why the NATO version of flexible 
response (formally adopted in 1967) falls short of the preferred 
American version (articulated in the early 1960s and periodically ever 
since). The American version - prompted by the prospect of Soviet 
parity in nuclear weapons - placed greater stress on the nuclear-
conventional firebreak, called for a greater concomitant improvement 
in conventional force levels, required more flexibility lo nuclear 
warplanning, and was premissed on a more tradi_ tional view of 
warfighting. The fuse to all-out nuclear war was to be lengthened by 
a build-up of conventional forces and the establishment of a limited 
nuclear war option~ This type of thinking was clearly worrying to 
many Europeans; it appeared that the American definition of limited 
war ~as war in some one else's country) Germany for example. 
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It is necessary to place United States policy on NATO into a 
broad national security context. Containment has, among other things, 
provided the geopolitical and ideological framework for the attempted 
implementation of flexible response. As seen from WashingtOn 1 
flexible response is an exercise in combining American power 
projection with damage limitation. Power projection is integral to 
containment. Damage limitation normally refers to the ability to 
destroy enemy missiles before they hit you, and to civil defence, to 
minimise damage resulting from those enemy missil-es which do get 
through. Here it also means containing war (e.g., to conventional 
operations). The need for damage limitation became more urgent as the 
lJSSR built up its own nuclear arsenal from the 1950s. 
An early requirement of flexible response was tight central - in 
effect Washington - control of Western nuclear options, together with 
increased reliance on rs and allied conventional forces. The political 
advantages of extending American deterrence to Europe (such as 
enhanced lJS leadership of the Alliance) were to be balanced by the 
need to limit damage to the American homeland should deterrence fail. 
This called for a theory of escalation, the establishment of 
fire breaks, and a counter-military strategy. It argued against a 
conventional 1 tripwire' to automatic mass1ve nuclear strikes • and 
against European nuclear pro life ration. 
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Differences of view within NATO have many other complex causes. 
These include differences in the following: perceptions of the Soviet 
threat; economic and social priori ties and their impact on defence 
expenditure; and judgements about the efficacy of proposed changes to 
NATO's defence posture (such as raising the nuclear threshold). In 
addition,_ there are various nation81 idiosyncrasies such as those 
reflected in French Gaullism and German Ostpolitik. NATO also 
provides an arena for the play of different strands of the Atlantic 
coalition, such as: the 'Special Relationship' between the United 
States and the United Kingdom; the French critique, and qualified 
support, of the American role in European security; and the 
Washington-Bonn axis (which, arguably, provides the core of ~he 
Atlantic Alliance). 
One result of this contextual complexity is that some NATO 
defence 'Rlanning is not directly related to the relatively narrow 
requirements of operational strategy but is tailored more to political 
symbolism. One example of this was the 1979 NATO decision to 
modernise its Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) which led to 
the deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Hissilies (GLCM) and 
Pershing II. The decision was justified in quasi-operational terms -
the need to counter Soviet LR7NF (especially SS20 missiles) and couple 
NATO TNF targeting with I.Jnited States central strategic targeting. 
But the degree to which this coupling was (and is) a planning problem 
1s moot. Psychological factors were dominant: "coupling was whatever 
G .d j " 22 the ,errnans sa1 .t was. 
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One reason for this attachment to symbolism as a factor in 
defence plann-ing has already been suggested in the discussion of 
deterrence .. The widespread view of war as ethically repulsive and 
politically disastrous is critical here. This view ~grew out of 
Europe's internecine history, and became entrenched by the spectre of 
nuclear ruin. West Europeans, among others, tended to stress the 
following: 
In terms of security Europe has achieved a status sui 
generis. An approach which looks at this region as just 
another theatre of military operations misses the essential 
point. 23 
It was just this 'esse.ntial point' that some Americans appeared 
to be missing by advocating a strategy of flexible response premiS-ed 
on semi-traditional rationales of 'warfighting'. West Europeans have 
generally been reluctant to increase expenditure on 'useable' 
conventional forces and have been ambivalent about making nuclear 
warplans more 1 credible' ~ The preference has often been~ 
ignore serious discussion of security issues or to rely on the 
'unthlnkablef the threat of prompt, masstve, use of American nuclear 
firepower~ This has made US administrations uncomfortable with the 
prospect of mutually suicidal nuclear strikes and irritated with 
European backsliding over conventional force leyels. 
Areas of disagreement over NATO planning are significant but, 
ultimately, they are of secondary political importance. The raison 
d'etre of NATO is the United States' presence on the Continent and the 
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stabilisation of inter-state relations within Europe. This, coupled 
with the view of World War Three as unthinkable and improbable, 
detracts from efforts to improve defence planning. This is especially 
so if such 'improvement' leads to a disruption of the underlying 
political basis of the Alliance. The overriding objective has been to 
maintain the Alliance, if necessary by fudging some issues and making 
a virtue out of compromise .. The alternative, such as an American 
drive to impose a rigorously coherent strategy based more explicitly 
on US interests, might break the coalition. 
Earlier it was stated that strategy is the use of military power 
for political purposes. 
can be understood as 
It is now suggested that, for NATO, strategy 
the balancing of nuclear options with 
conventional capabilities to achieve Alliance political and military 
objectives~ These objectives are: 
(l) The stabilisation of European politics. This involves: 
a) American reassurance of ~estern Europe. 
b) Maintenance of a balance of power on the Continent. 
c) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
d) Pursuing detente within the context of collective 
security. 
(2) The deterrence of Soviet attack. 
(3) The defence of NATO. 
(4) Burden sharing. 
These objectives underlie the present relationship between nuclear and 
conventional forces in NATO~ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRATEGIC STUDIES LITERATURE AND THE NEXUS 
BETWEEN NUCLEAR ANU CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY 
Introduction 
This chapter shows how the nexus between nuclear and conventional 
forces has been treated by the mainstream of the strategic studies 
lite_rature~ This is not an exhaustive survey of the field) such an 
undertaking is unnecessary for the purposes of the thesis. The 
objective is to describe how some of the major themes in the 
literature have been identified and articulated by their most 
prominent expositors. 
* * * * 
It would be useful here if the issues raised in the previous 
chapter are briefly related to the following survey. Three of these 
issues are salient: the strategic element to containment; the 
relevance of the Clausewitzian or classical perspective on strategy; 
and the particular clrcumstances of European seeurity. Strategic 
analysis has frequently concerned itself with prescription and policy 
advice, 1t bas rarely been simply descriptive. Except for some of the 
very first attempts to draw out the implications of atomic weapons~ 
Western strategic studies h~ been preoccupied with the putative 
Soviet threat and ways to counter it~ In general, containment has 
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been taken as a given and debate has been on how best to achieve it. 
With regard to nuclear strategy, this debate has often focused on how 
to tie nuclear warplanning to theatre cont~ngencies in Europe. In 
short, strategic analysis ha.s frequently been about extended 
deterrence. 
Thus the geopolitical circumstances of the West provide the 
common basis and theme for much speculation on nuclear strategy. 
Among other things this has entailed examination of how American 
nuclear firepower could augment regional conventional forces on the 
Eurasian periphery (especially, but not exclusively, in Europe). It 
was considered necessary to do this in order to establish an 
interlocking balance of power with the Soviet Union that would link 
the "central strategic" balance with regional balances. This overall 
balance was to be based on: a forward defence of the United States; a 
liberal-democratic core of an extensive alliance network; a dynamic 
Western oriented capitalist trading system; 
coalition war against the USSR. 
and provision for 
The strategic studies literature necessarily concerns itself with 
the more military aspects of security. Thus, l_n terms of the above 
sketch, the literature has tried to grapple with ways of taUoring US 
military power to an ambitious foreign policy. The literature has 
usually been about means rather than ends. Nore particularly, there 
have been efforts to steer United States strategy towards a defence 
posture that approxJmates a Clausewitzian model where military means 
are clearly related to political ends. These efforts were largely a 
reaction to eKtrem~ interpretations of massive retaliation and 
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~utually assured destruction. It seemed unlikely that any political 
objective could be worth all-out nuclear war; the matching. or 
gradation of military means to specific political ends was therefore 
an urgent policy requirement, not merely a theoretical nicety. 
The rediscovery of, or continuing attachment to, classical ideas 
of strategy paralleled attempts to formulate and rationalise schemes 
for (a) limited war, and (b) elaborate nuclear targeting concepts for 
both limited and general war. Some of these attempts became entangled 
in the idea, developed during the 1960s, that nuclear strategy was 
essentially a form of signalling and bargaining; others were 
associated with ideas of warwinning. As this chapter will show, 
strategic analysis has become marked by two overlapping approaches. 
One of these (the "deterrent" approach) sees nuclear strategy as 
essentially a process of bargaining in the context of mutually assured 
destruction, although sometimes it is not clear whether the exponents 
of this approach give much consideration as to what should happen in 
the event of a break down of deterrence. The other approach 
("warfighting") suggests the incorporation of nuclear weapons into a 
more traditional notion of strategy and warfighting, 
The next three sections describe the development of these ideas in 
more detail. The format adopted here is essentially chronological. 
This is followed by an examination of some treatments of the nuclear 
threshold in Europe. The chapter ends with a summary of the 
contribution of the strategic studies literature to the analysis of 
the nexus between nuclear and conventional forces~ 
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From the start of the nuclear era it was clear that the atomic 
bomb allowed a drastic increase in the-_ destructiveness of war. Not 
only did the bomb appear to reinforce a historical trend towards total 
war, it was also realised that 1t added a new dimension to conflict -
a qualitative break with the pre-atomic age. However the precise 
implications for the future of war and the development of strategy 
were not so immediately evident- Nevertheless, it did not take long 
for analysts to make general propositions about how the atomic bomb 
made deterrence both an urgent requjrement and a pivotal aspect of 
future defence planning. 
An early exposition of this view was provided by Brodie who wrote 
in l91•6: "Everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin 
facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically 
great ... l Brodie saw that although atomic weapons increased the power 
of military forces, this did not automatically translate into 
politically usable power: "the bomb is well adapted to the technique 
of retaliation", so the "prize" of war "would be ashes." 2 Tbis 
condition of mutual vulnerability, noted Brodie, opened the way to 
deterrence. 3 Deterrence would rest on the fear of retaliation~ 4 
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For Brodie the implications of all this were, in general terms, 
quite clear, 
[T)he first and most vital ste{> in any American security 
program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to 
guarantee to ourselves in case o~ attack the possibility of 
retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is 
not for the moment concerned about who will win the next war 
In which atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose 
of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now 
on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose • 
. . . Reducing vulnerability is at least one way of reducing 
temptation to potential aggressors. And if the technological 
realities make reduction of vulnerability largely synonymous 
with preservation of striking power, that is a fact which 
must be faced.s 
Eut the urgency and salience of deterrence did not make war 
impossible. The military still needed to think about how to fight 
wars if deterrence broke down. This might require a radical approach 
to military planning. As Brodie noted, 
Whatever may be the specific changes indicated, 1t is clear 
that our military authorities will have to bestir themselves 
to a wholly unprecedented degree in revising military 
concepts inherited from the past. That will not be easy, 
they must be prepared to dismiss, as possibly irrelevant, 
experience gained the hard way in the recent war ... 6 
Military judgereent would still be required as "scarcity [of atomic 
weapons] is likely to be sufficiently important to dictate the 
selection of targets and the circumstances under which the misstle is 
hurled." 7 The existence of atomic weapons would have a pervasive 
in:luer:ce on strategy even if they lay unused: 
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It is of course always possible that the world may see 
another major war in which the atomic bomb is not used. The 
awful menace to both parties of a reciprocal use of the bomb 
may prevent the resort to that weapon by eithe-r side, even if 
it does not prevent the outbreak of hostilities. But even 
so, the shadow of the atomic homb would so govern the 
strategic and tactical dispositions of either sl.de as to 
create a wholly n_ovel :form of war •• ~The conclusion is 
inescapable that war will be vastly different because of the 
atomic bomb whether or not the bomb is actually used. 8 
For one thing, 
[H]overing over the situation from beginning to end would be 
the intolerable fear on each side that the enemy might at any 
moment resort to this dreaded weapon> a fear which might very 
well stimulate an anticipatory reaction.9 
Brodie saw little reason to believe in large scale non-nuclear war 
between the superpowers, "it is difficult to see why a fear of 
reciprocal use should be strong enough to prevent resort to the bomb 
without being strong enough to prevent the outbreak of war in the 
f~i 1 .. 10 rst p ace. However, .. the bomb may act as a powerful deterrent to 
direct aggression without preventing the political crises out of which 
wars generally develop ... ll 
Despite the dominance of the atomic bomb, Brodie still believed 
that conventional force-s were needed~ 
[E]ven apart from the question of direct retaliation with 
atomic bombs, invasion to consolidate the effects of an 
atomic bomb attack will be necessary. A nation which had 
inflicted enormous human and material damage upon another 
would find i.t intolerable to stop short of eliciting from the 
latter an acknowledgement of defeat implemented by a 
readine.ss to accept eontroL Wars, in other words~ are 
fought to be terminated~ and to be terminated definitely. 12 
-33-
One of the earliest studies to focus on the ~arfighting 
implications of atomic weapons was also written in 1946. In There 
Will Be No Time, Borden elaborated on the offensive power of atomlc 
weapons. Borden (while accepting the need for occupation troops) saw 
the atomic revoluti_on as heralding the demise of conventional forc~s 
as traditionally understood: "G.I. Joe, with his beard and muddy 
boots, is the symbol of an age gone past. •· 13 Borden argued that, 
Normandy was a superb example of what has been called 
tridime-nsional warfare) involving land~ sea, and air forces 
co-ordinated together. The growing irrelevance of ground 
armies, together with unlimited potentiality of rockets, 
denotes a trend toward one-dimensional warfare - that is, a 
struggle solely for sovereignty over the skies. 14 
The struggle for "sovereignty over the skies" would involve atomic: 
strikes against the enemy's ability to retaliate: with atomic weapons. 
Borden was articulating an early version of what would later be 
called a counterforce strategy. He can therefore be considered an 
early exponent of the warfighting school. 
(T]here are cogent reasons for believing that an atomic bomb 
dropped squarely in the middle of an Alaskan air base would 
profit the aggressor more in his initial attack than one 
dropped squarely in the middle of Radio City, New York. 
Destruction of an air base would prevent the Cnited States 
from delivering scores of retaliatory bombs to the aggressors 
vital installations, while chaos in New York City might have 
little practical effect upon the war's outcome. Since the 
use of one atom bomb to immobil:i.se many of the opponents 
bombs is obviously worth while, an airfield is not the 
uneconomical target it at first seems ... 
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Why squander the precious assets of surprise and the 
initiative in attacking cities, a mission which can so easily 
be carried out later, when the main obstacle to a lightning 
victory is American forces in being? 15 
So, in spite of the vtdnerability of cities, atomic war could, 
according to Borden, offer the chance of military advantage; the 
effect of an initial success "would rapidly become cumulative." 16 
The security implications for the United States were connected to 
what Borden termed the "twilight of Geopolitics" brought about by the 
atomic revolution: "The atomic bomb shatters this particular frame of 
[geopolitical] reference ••• 
[T]he gigantic Red ground army has become relatively useless. 
The balance of power in Europe and Asia is being maintained 
far less by American forces overseas than by the uranium 
produced in Oak Ridge, Tennesse ..• A whole armoured division 
in Germany will probably influence Soviet policy less than 
three atomic bombs in California.l7 
C) The refinement of theory 
It is clear from the above that by the end of the 1940s the 
significance of nuclear deterrence had been recognised (although not 
universally accepted). There had also been tentative attempts to 
analyse how a nuclear war might be fought. Some of the deterrent and 
warfighting potential of nuclear weapons was explicitly adopted by 
the Eisenhower administration during the 1950s in its policy of 
-----------------------------------------------------
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massive retaliation .. This "New Look." placed the emphasis in United 
States military planning on Strategic Air Command while conventional 
forces were downgraded in relative importance. The major American 
warplan suggested by ~assive retaliation was an all-out nuclear attack. 
against the "Sino-Soviet bloc". The role of conventional forces, 
backed up by tactical nuclear weapon~ was to be to hold ground 
(incuding SAC air bases) while the nuclear bombing onslaught took its 
toll.. One of the incentives for massive re.taliation was the prospect 
of using American nuclear strike power to redress local conventional 
weaknesses ... The policy was intended to support the objective of 
extending deterrence to regions adjacent to the Communist bloc~ 
Freedman has written that, 
Contemporary strategic studies developed in the 1950s as part 
of the reaction to the Eisenhower administration's policy of 
massive retaliation". This policy appeared to threaten 
nuclear hostilities in response to quite modest provocations. 
Once the Soviet Union acquired an equivalent capacity to 
deliver nuclear ~eapons, for the United States to implement a 
strategy of "massive retaliation .. would be suicidal and so to 
threaten it would be incredible. The resultant combination 
of illogicality and recklessness was almost designed to 
incite academics ••• l8 
The critiques of 1 and alternatives to~ massive retaliation were often 
framed in Clausewitzian, or at least quasi-Clausewitzian~ terms. They 
were also geared to the requirements of extended deterrence. A common 
theme in the reaction to the "New Look" was the need for an 
understanding of the. possibilities and advantages of war limitation. 
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Nitze provided a noted response to massive reta_!iation in early 
1956; he argued that, 
It isc obviously to the interest of the Weat that war, and 
especially atomic war in any form, be avoided if that is 
possible without submitting to even greater evils. 
Futhermore it ls to the West's i_nterest) if atomic war 
becomes unavoidable, that weapons of the smallest sizes be 
used in the smallest area, and against the most restricted 
target systems possible, while still achieving for the West 
the particular objective which is at issue .•. it is to the 
interest of the West that the means employed in warfare and 
the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum level 
which still permits us to achieve our objectives. Our 
basic ••• policy must therefor~ be one of "graduated 
deterrence". (Emphasis added.) 1 ~ 
The injecting of rationall.ty into nuclear war required a shake-up 
of ideas of winning (and, indeed, of rationality itself): 
[T]he word "win" is [one] of our leathery words which can 
stand reexamination for precision of meaning. In one 
connotation the word "win" is used to suggest a comparison of 
the immediate post,.ar position of a country with its prewar 
position ••• 
In another connotation the word "win" is used to suggest a 
comparison of the postwar position of one of the adversaries 
with the post,.ar position of the other adversary. In this 
sense it is quite possible that in a general nuclear war one 
side or the other could '"win" decisively. Even a small 
initial imbalance in relative capabilities, other things 
being equal, could grow rapidly into a decisive imbalance as 
the war progressed ••. 
(I]t is .•. of the 
sufficient margin 
war we-re to occur 
utmost importance that the West maintain a 
of superior capability so that if 18neral 
we could "win" in the second sense. 
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This was made easier than it might at first appear because "the 
geographic factor should give the West the possibility of a continuing 
and decisive margin of superiority. " 21 The need was for an Alliance 
strategy that exploited geographical advantages and reduced dependence 
on nuclear weapons. Such a "common policy" might require the 
following: 
We should endeavour to meet aggression and restore the 
situation without the use of atomic weapons wherever this 
is possible. 
We should extend hostilities to other areas only if there 
is no other way effectively to restore the situation. 
Even if it becomes necessary to engage the USSR in atomic 
warfare, we should limit ourselves to military 
objectives, primarily to those which are necessary to 
achieve control of the air. We should not initiate the 
bombing of industrial or population centres. 
We should attempt to build non-atomic elements of 
strength and to encourage our allies to do likewise so 
that the residual reliance which must be placed upon 
nuclear weapons for our common securit2 is reduced as far 
as may be feasible. (Emphasis added.)2 
This conceptual framework for alliance security was an early public 
exposition of flexible response. As such it both noted the need for 
nuclear counterforce targeting and called for a policy of city 
avoidance; it also pointed to the possibly pivotal role of 
conventional forces in the raising of the nuclear thre~hold. But this 
did not mean that pre-nuclear ideas of war could govern conventional 
operations: 
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[W]hether or not atomic weapons are ever again used in 
warfare, the very fact of their existence, the possibility 
that they could be used, will affect all future wars. In 
this sense Korea was an atomic war even though no atomic. 
weapons were used.. In this sense even the cold war is an 
atomic cold war.23 
Moreover, it was clear to Nitze that nuclear weapons had a key role to 
play in European security which could not be easily removect. 24 
The nascent concept of flexible response received a further 
stit!l.ulus from writers who tried to add precision to the notion of 
limited war. Once again Clausewitzian ideas were either the indirect 
t~~ 
or}._ direct inspiratton for many of these attempts .. Osgood, for 
example, wrote: 
[T]he princiFIJ.l justification of limited war lies in the fact 
that it maximises the opportunities for the effec~\ve use of 
military force as a rational instrument of policy. 
The following framework for limited war thinking was outlined by 
Osgood, 
l. Statesnen should scrupulously limit the controlling 
political objectives of war and clearly communicate the 
limited nature of these objectives to the enemy,.~ 
2. Statesmen sho.uld make every effort to maintain an active 
diplomatic intercourse toward the end of terminating the 
war by negotiated settlement on the basis of limited 
objectives ... 
3. Statesmen should try to limit the physical dimensions of 
war as stringently as compatable with the attaint:tent of 
the objectives at stake, since the opportunities for the 
political control of war .•. tend to decrease as the 
dimensions of war increase and tend to increase as tbe 
dimensions of war decrease .. ~ 2 6 
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This last requirement was based on the idea that massive violence 
could undermine the rationality that is supposed to rule the use of 
force. 27 
Osgood was trying to educate American policy makerS· For, as he 
stated in his preface to J,1tpited War, 
[B]efore there can be an American strategy enabling the 
United States to employ military power rationally and 
effectively within a framework of feasible political 
objectives 1 there must also be a fundamental rethinking of 
traditional American attitudes concerning the nature of war 
and the relationships between force and po 1 i.cy _28 
The need was for a philosophy of war that was comj)'4t ible with 
America 1 S role in international relations, 
The problem of limited war is not just a problem of military 
strategy but, more broadly, the problem of combining military 
power with diplomacy and with the economic and psychological 
instruments of power within a coherent national strategy that 
is capable of supporting the United States' political 
objectives abroada •• To the extent that American strategy is 
supported by a diversified military capacity, capable of 
countering Communist aggression under a variety of 
contingencies the nation will enhance the flexibility of its 
diplomacy and promote favourable political positions. To the 
exte.nt this diversified capacity is lacking, the nation will 
incur the serious political and pyschological disadvantages 
that a rigid diplomacy is bound to impose in competition 
with the flexibl{
9 
and resourceful diplomacy of an 
unscrupulous power~ 
Osgood expanded on this analysis by arguing that the "logic of 
cold war" and Americats international role pointed to a requirement 
for implementing containment with ''a variety of means under a variety 
of circumstances ..... Indeed, Osgood could "readily Imagine" US 
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involvement in limited wars in "the Formosa Straits, the jungles and 
swamps of Southeast Asia, the mountains of Afghanistan, or the deserts 
of the Middle East ••• " This vision of containment required forces 
for both limited and total war: "The capacity to wage one kind of war. 
is insufficient without the capacity to wage the other ... Jo ~t was 
clear to Osgood that conventional forces could be valuable instruments 
of policy. They might be useful in total war, but, the greatest 
"dividends" from an expansion of ground forces would lie "in the 
direction of preparing the free world for the contingency of limited 
war, .. Jl 
The value of nuclear weapons was not restricted to total war as, 
for Osgood, 
nothing inherent in a wide range of atomic weapons renders 
them incompatible with limited war apart from the targets 
towards which they are directed and the political context in 
which they are employed'" For this reason it is a serious 
mistake to equate nuclear warfare w:i.th total warfare and 
oppose them both to "conventional" warfare ••• 32 
According to Osgood, the US government had a role to play in educating 
people to the potentially positive part that nuclear weapons might 
play in American foreign policy. The "stigma" of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki could, wrote Osgood, be era sed and the "widespread 
misunderstanding" of nuclear weapons effects could be countered by 
adopting tactical nuclear weapons to "a well conceived strategy of 
limited war, based upon a policy of graduated deterrence." The trick 
was to use nuclear weapons "within a carefully defined political 
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context of limited objectives, 
diplomatic accommodation ... 33 
susceptible to the process of 
Osgood recognised that the applicability of concepts of 
limited war to Europe was problematic. As he noted: 
[T]he most serious obstacle to limited war in the [NATO] area 
is the vital immediate importance of the political objectives 
that would be at stake, combined with the inability of the 
NATO powers to check Communist aggression effectively on a 
local basis ••• 
Under present c.onditions .•• it is difficult to imagine a 
lirni ted war in the NATO area, and it is almost equally 
difficult to imagine a total or nearly total war remaining 
confined to this area. Nevertheless, the catastrophic 
consequences of all-out nuclear war compel us to examine 
every opP.ortunity, however meagre, for limiting warfare in 
any area. 34 
It was Kaufmann who focussed the spotlight on the role of 
conventional forces in limited war~ In common with other analysts his 
starting point was the suicidal nature, and thus incredibility, of 
massive retaliation. Again~ the emphaSis was on the expansion of 
military (and hence diplomatic) options available to the United States 
in its policy of containment: 
It is probably hopeless to expect that a single deterrent 
will cover the entire range of contingencies and still 
satisfy the criteria of credibility. The attempt to devise 
such a deterrent is likely to result in either a sparrow hunt 
with a cannon or an elephant shoot with a popgun ••• 35 
America must "try to fit the punishment to the crime. '" 36 The 
overriding requirement was to be able to project United States power 
while minimising the probability of nuclear catastrophe: 
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Because the possibility of such [catastrophic] destruction 
now exists, it becomes necessary to examine· more closely the 
problems of limited war, for conflicts of this character do 
have a powerful rati.onal under present conditions. They may 
not be adequate substitutes for victory - although victory is 
a word with many meanings - but, in principle at least, they 
enable us to escape from having to choose between retreat and 
the nuclear holocaust. They preserve us from the 
revolutionary and disorienting changes that are the products 
of great wars. They offer the prospect of bringing military 
means and policy aims into much closer relationship than they 
have enjoyed for many years. And limited warfare affords all 
these benefits, not at a trifling cost by any manner of 
means, but at a cost far smaller than a modern nuclear 
conflict would entail. Korea was a tragic and painful 
experience; with its 137,000 (American] casualties, it 
scattered suffering and grief throughout the country. But 
e.ven so, a hundred Koreas would still be eheaper than an 
American-Soviet exehange of atomic and hydrogen blows. 37 
But Kaufmann was careful to warn that it might be very difficult 
to keep war limited. 38 "'The solution", it seemed to Kaufmann, "'would 
appear to lie in playing upon the cost-consciousness of the 
belligerents", and a "policy which cowmunicated ••• messages to the 
other belligerent."39 Such a strategy would hinge on the dampening 
effect of American strategic nuclear firepower, even though it was 
likely to be actively implemented by conventional forces. As Kaufmann 
wrote, 
SAC, whether it is used or not, is the keystone of the 
American defense system. Armed with nuclear weapons, it is 
not only the great instrument of last resort; it is also an 
absolute prerequisite to the conduct of limited war. It has 
the dual role of umpire and potential belligerent. As such 
it permits of military action on a lesser scale. 
In 1957 Kissinger attempted to answer the question: "'does the 
nuclear age permit the establishment of a relationship between force 
and diploreacy?'' 4° Kissinger's answer was ''yes", and it was centered 
on the putative efficacy of tactlcal nuclear weapons and ground rules 
covering their use. Kissinger added little to the theoretical or 
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intellectual insights of strategic analysis, he basically built on 
the concept of limited war articulated by others. His book attracted 
attention more because of its allegedly practical: suggestions 
regarding tactical nuclear war. Once again, the threat of escalation' 
provided the reason and, in part, the means for ~imiting war~ 
Kissinger believed that, 
limited nuclear war is ... a strategy which will utilize our 
special skills to best advantage and•••\} may be less likely 
to become all-out than conventional war. 
The need was to change from the "'rigidity of traditional tactics". 42 
According to Kissinger, 
The tactics for limited nuclear war should be based on small, 
highly mobile, self-contained units, relying largely on air 
transport ... The proper analogy to limited nuclear war is not 
traditional land warfare~ but naval strategy, in which self-
contained units with great firepower gradually gain the upper 
hand by destroying their enemy counterparts without 
physically occupying territory or establishing a front-line. 
While it is impossible to hold any given line with such 
tactics, they offer an excellent tool for depriving 
aggression of one of lts objectives: to control territory .. 
Small~ mobile units with nuclear weapons are extremely useful 
for defeating their enemy counterparts or for the swift 
destructJon of important objectives. They are not an 
efficient means for establishing political control. 43 
To keep the level of destruction down required a "framework of war 
limitation". 44 This could be made easier than it seems at first sight 
because, according to Kissinger, "the target systems of nuclear war 
may lend themselves more eas lly to an effort at lirni ti..ng war~ ,45 
Establishing the rfght ''framework'' would require, ''a diplomacy which 
seeks to break down the atnosphere of special horror which now 
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surrounds the use of nu_slear weapons ... -46 Among other things, this 
diplomacy would have to work out ground rules for the use of nuclear 
weapons (for exa~ple, dealing with weapon yields and targets). 
of these rules seem a little fanciful.47 
Some 
Further discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy 
followed theoretical elaboration of the nature of limited war. 
Schelling, in 1960, referred to limited operations as a "threat that 
leaves something to chance". 48 This was an attempt to get away from 
the traditional "warfighting" perspective - while nonetheless keeping 
nuclear weapons as instruments of poli_cy.. Schelling wrote about using 
threats to enhance credibility, and about limiting war by threatening 
escalation. For Schelling an enemy could be further deterred if he 
realised that the United States might not be in complete control of 
events: 
The key to these threats is that, though one may or may not 
carry them out if the threatened party fails to comply, the 
final decision is not altogether under the threateners 
controL The threat is not quite of the form "I may or may 
not, aecordi.ng as I choose", but has an elemenf of, .. I may or 
may not, and even I can 1 t be altogether sure"~ 9 
This could involve brinkmanship "the deliberate creation of a 
recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely 
control. .. SO For Schelling, "limited war as a deterrent to aggression 
also requires interpretation as an action that enhances the 
probability of a greater war. " 51 The danger of escalation can be used 
because "a limited war can get out of hand by degrees ... 52 
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Clearly the existence of nuclear weapons raised the stakes and 
sharpened the threats. But this did not mean that they should he 
readily resorted to; the "tradition for their nonuse .. was valuable. 
Even so, limited nuclear war was possible and so had to be thought 
about in advance. For~one thing, 
We should recognise that - at least on the first occasion 
when nuclear weapons are used in limited war the enemy too 
will really be engaged in at least two different kinds of 
li.mited-war activity at the same time. One will be the 
limited struggle over the original objectives; the second 
will be the tacit negotiation ~r gamesmanship over the role 
of nuclear weapons themselves .. 5 
The strategists' coneeptual armoury was enhanced in 1961 
Snyder. His starting point was that: 
The central theoretical problem in the field of national 
security policy is to clarify and distinguish between the two 
central concepts of deterrence and defense.. Essentially) 
deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military 
action by posing for hi~ a prospect of cost and risk 
outweighing his prospective gain. Defense means reducing our 
own prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence 
fails~ Deterrence W'orks on the enemy 1 s j ntentions-••• Defense 
reduces the enemy's capability to damage or deprive us ... 55 
For Snyder, "the need to choose between deterrence and defense''• 
is largely the result of the development of nuclear •.. weapons 
and long-range a i rpower. Prior to these developments, the 
three primary functions of military force - to punish the 
enemy, to deny him territory (or take it from him), and to 
mitigate damage to oneself- were embodied~ more or less~ in 
the same weapons. 
[T]he most striking difference between nuclear and pre-
nuclear strategy [is] the partl.al separation of the functions 
of pre-attack deterrence and post-attack defense. and the 
possibility that deterrence may now be accomplished by 
weapons which might have no rational use for defense should 
56 deterrence fail ... 
by 
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However,. deterrence might extend into war as a process of bargaining; 
Snyder believed that, 
in the modern concept of limited war ••• force may be 
threatened and used partly, or even primarily, as a 
bargaining instrument to persuade the opponent to accept 
terms of settlement or to 'observe certain limitations. 
Deterrence in war is most sharply illustrated in proposals 
for a strategy of limited retaliation, in which initial 
strikes, in effect, would be threats of further strike!l_ to 
come, designed to deter the enemy from further fighting. 51 
The way that different levels of force were linked require.d 
careful, and qualified, examination. Snyder offered the following 
framework for such a study: 
The traditional balancing process continues to operate as a 
balance bet'Ween conventional forces .... in all situations in 
which there is no significant possiNlity that nuclear weapons 
will be used •.. 
fl.t [I)n the strate.gic balance, quanti~ively matching the enemy's 
capabilities is virtually irrelevant as a criterion for 
balance. A balance of terror exists when neither side can 
eliminate enough of the other's forces in striking first to 
avoid an unacceptahle retaliatory blow •.• 
In the tactical balance, the requirements for deterrence and 
for effectively fighting a war more or less coincide; this is 
not the case in the balance of terror ••• 
[However,] the strategic and 
not function inde.pendently, 
various ways .. 58 
tactical balancing processes do 
but impinge on each other in 
Snyder formulated concepts that could later be applied to flexible 
response.; for example he wrote of a ''spectrum of vlolence" leading 
from low-level limited conflict to all-out war. 59 This echoed Nite.e 
in its idt:'!AS o~ graduated deterreflce; however, the implications for 
defence planning were closer to the ideas outlined by Schelling: 
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[M]ethods of communicating intent have become more important 
means in the balancing process than they have been in the 
past ••• [T]he function of military forces themselves may be 
shifting in the direction of a demonstrative role: the 
signalling of future intentions to use force in order to 
influence the enemy 1 s intentions, as opposed to being ready 
to use or using, force simply as a physical means of conquest 
or denial •.• Warfare itself may in the future become less a 
raw physical collision of military forces and more a contest 
of wills, or a bargaining process, with military force being 
used largely to demonstrate one's willingness to raise the 
intensity of fighting, with the object of inducing the enemy 
to accept one's terms of settlement.60 
Snyder attempted to apply his ideas to NATO security issues in the 
following way: 
Under ••. conditions of stalemate at the massive level and 
inadequacy at the tactical level, threats of limited 
retaliation may take on increasing importance in the power 
struggle, restoring to strategic nuclear power a more 
positive or active function than merely deterring the massive 
use of strategic power by the opponent ••• Although the notion 
of combining diplomatic bargaining with the slow-motion 
lobbing back and forth of nuclear missiles seems a rather 
bizarre application of the Clausewitzian dictum about war 
being the continuation of politics with an admixture of other. 
means, it at least does inject an element of rationality and 
politics into the conduct of strategic nuclear war. 61 
The need would be for some kind of escalation map. or escalation 
ladder, tied to both military needs and - more importantly - the 
requirements of bargaining: 
Limited reprisals against tactical military targets inside 
the boundaries of the Soviet Union would seem more "natural" 
than strategic strikes, in that they could be considered 
simply an extension of a limited nuclear war which was going 
on in the forward ground combat zone. The targets would be 
traditional "interdiction" targets, attacks upon which 
would contribute directly to weakening the enemy's 
strength in ground combat ..• 
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[B]ut the primary reason for starting limited reprisals 
against the enemy's forces rather than against his cities is 
not to wear down his forces •.• but to signal an eventual 
willingness to inflict more severe damage, with minimum 
immediate cost and risk to our~elves. 62 
This strategic bargaining might largely hinge on the "interdependent 
utilities" of nuclear and conventional forces.6 3 
These sorts of ideas were taken a step further by Read in 1962. 
Read argued that: 
Much of the analysis of tactical nuclear war is an 
extrapolation from experience with conventional war. Such 
extrapolations from experience are useful in the degree that 
the number of available weapons is severely limited so that 
nuclear detonations constitute a perturbation superimposed on 
a primarily conventional combat •• ~But it is hazardous to 
extend such analyses to the case where nuclear weapons 
provide the bulk of the firepower •.• [W]e must look beyond the 
special subject of battlefield tactics and consider limited 
nuclear w~;r in the context of a general theory of 
conflict. 6 
Tactical nuclear war is a "radically different form of conflict" from 
. 65 
convent1onal war~ For one thing the levels of destruction may be 
much greater; moreover, tactical nuclear war has a "built in 
escalation mechanism". 66 Nevertheless, if nuclear weapons were to be 
used, such use, stated Read, should follow a bargaining strategy 
backed by strong conventional forces, 
if the Soviets had pushed us back, they would prefer to 
settle for the status quo and retain their gains. We, on the 
other hand, would want a return to the original boundaries. 
The closer these two solutions are to one another the 
easier it would be to reach agreement. In short, a 
strategy of limited strategic reprisals is not a substitute 
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for conventional ground forces. Rather, l.ts usefulness 
depends on having a strong conventional shield that 
could limit, and if possible prevent, Soviet 
territor_ial gains while the bargaining went on •.• 
Furthermore, a willingness on our part to leave 
territory undefended indicates a lack of interest in it that 
is incompatible with a determination to suffer and inflict 
heavy punishment on anyone who takes it. (Emphasis added.)67 
For Read, tactical nuclear weapons ought to be used. in ways that 
paralleled the use of strategic systems. Indeed, it might even be 
better to use strategic systems for theatre bargaining as command and 
control problems would be eased (relative to TNF). 68 The tactical 
implications for conventional forces were not easy to precisely 
define; according to Read: 
Perhaps the role of nuclear weapons in future ground combat 
will be to establish ground rules for conventional combat and 
especially to rule out massive concentrations •.. 
[But] conventional war with troop concentration limited by 
the nuclear threat is subject to all the ambiguity, 
arbitrariness, and instability of tactical nuclear war. The 
1 imi ts that the nuclear shadow could impose on conventional 
war are no l,'~re clear or viable than the limits in limited 
nuclear war .. 
NATO presented a special case which made the requirements of 
strategy particularly stringent. For example, Read stated that, 
the concept 
meaningless 
allowing the 
for NATo.7° 
of victory in 
at high levels of 
war to reach such 
Europe becomes politically 
nuclear violence. and even 
levels is a political defeat 
Put plainly,. nuclear weapons should be weapons of deterrence and 
reprisal not weapons for winning a war~ The implications for 
nuclear deployments were described by Read as follows: 
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If the doctrine is not to play the game of tactical nuclear 
war, but to concentrate on deterrence and reprisal) there :ts 
no requirement for ~arity, much less superiority, over a 
spectrum of nuclear weapons~ Rather, it is sufficient to 
have enough total destructive power and enough variety in 
weapons to carry out reprisals for any level of nuclear 
attack. This requirement leaves enough flexibility so that 
the exact distribution and deployment of weapons could . .take 
into account considerations such as security from attack, 
effective command and control, the attitudes of local 
populations and governm~nts, and arms-control agreements, 
either explicit or tacit. 11 
The relationship between nuclear and conventional strategy is 
obviously central to many questions about escalation. Kahn wrote a 
widely read analysis of escalation in 1965, which achieved some 
notoriety as it allegedly put too much emphasis on the possiblity of 
controlling nuclear escalation~ However) Kahn, in his analysis, noted 
the significance and value of the firebreak between conventional and 
nuclear operations and advocated a policy of no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons. Kahn believed that the United States should 
not try to get any "positive" benefits from its nuclear 
weaponry, but be content to use this weaponry only as nuclear 
deterrence, not attempting to exploit it to redress 
differences in conventional capability. 72 
Kahn recognised that firebreaks could be valuable and should not be 
crossed hastily. 73 In any case, Kahn believed that, ··there do not 
seem to be any ••• very pressing reasons for us to depend on initiating 
the use of nuclear weapons~·· 74 However, 
we must not neglect the possibility that a sustained military 
use of nuclear weapons might present the side that was 
prepared to fight this kind of campaign \oltth a very large 
advantage~--[TJhat side which is more willing to escalate, 
and most capable of winning at the higher levels, may have a 
great advantage. 7 5 
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Kahn was interested in askl.ng: how should escalation be looked at, 
how could the LS manage or use escalatory pressures, and what are the 
alternatives to looking at escalationZ The perspective he offered was 
that, within the framework of esc,3lation, thresholds are real, 
important and potentially useful. By the same tpken the process of 
escalatf.on, or of threatening or deterring escalation, might be an 
important instrument of strategy* Accordingly, the ability to 
dominate or control the process of escalation might lead to political 
and military advantages. Escalation dominance suggested the need for 
military superiority; however) 
mere military superiority will not necessarily assure 
"escalation dominance". Escalation dominance is a complex 
concept in which the military calculations are only one 
element. Other elements are the assurance, morale, 
commitment, resolve, internal discipline, and so on, of both 
the principals and their allies. 76 
Kahn ~entioned forty-four levels of superpower conflict, leading up a 
ladder from "ostensible crisis" to "spasm war".7 7 
According to Kahn, limits in warfare might be imposed by 
escalation dominance. One side in a confrontation might be able to 
dictate the scope of conflict by its superiority at various 
hypothetical levels of hostilities. War limitation appeared to 
require a conceptual framework outlining potential levels of 
escalation. Within this framework, thresholds might provide reference 
points for military operations. This idea was taken up by Schelling 
and married to his earlier work which suggested that war was 
essentialiy a bargaining process. This process might be characterised 
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by the manner in which the nature of particular thresholds (e.g. their 
salience) could be manipulated.78 
By the mid-1960s strategy had been equated by some analysts with 
the idea of bargaining within the framework of potential escalation. 
The notion of tieing bargaining to escalation was used to link 
deterrence to defence. Questions over this linkage were perhaps 
sharpest with regard to deterrence and defence in Europe. 
For Schelling bargaining was - or ought to be - the dominant element 
in a strategy intended to couple local war with the prospect of 
central strategic conflict. 
According to Schelling, international relations "often have the 
character of a competition in risk-taking;" an important dimension to 
military relations was the "manipulation of risk". 79 The implications 
for NATO_ planning were clear: destroying the enemy 1 s forces was a 
secondary objective, the requirement was to affect his calculations of 
risk; 
Once nuclear 
any longer. 
governed the 
now a war of 
weapons are introduced, it is not the same war 
The tactical objectives and considerations that 
original war are no longer controlling. It is 
nuclear bargaining and demonstration •. + 
The life expectancy of the local war may be so short that 
neither side is primarily concerned with what happens on the 
ground within the next day or two. What each side is doing 
with its strategic forces would be the main preoccupation .. 
It is the strategic:: forces in the background that provide the 
risks and the sense of danger; it is they whose disposition 
will preoccupy national leaders as much as anything that is 
going on in Europe itself. It is the strategic forces whose 
minute by minute behav.iour on each side will be the main 
intelligence preoccupation of the other side. 
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Limited and localized nuclear war is not, therefore, a 
"tactical" war.. However few nuclears used, and however 
selectively they are used, their purpose will not be 
"tactical" because their consequences will not be tacticaL 
With nuclears,. it has become more than ever a war of risks 
and threats at the highest strategic leveL 8°" 
Such bargaining would require local conventional forces. These forces 
would not be wanted to win a war,. but to support nuclear bargaining, 
to "create and prolong a genuine sense of danger, of the potentiality 
of general war. " 81 
Ql_A continuing debate. 
By the end of the 1970s the strategic studies community appeared 
to be roughly divided into two broad, pluralistic, and overlapping 
schools of thought - "deterrers" and "warfighters". As shown above, 
elements of both approaches can be found in earlier writings; however, 
they became more easily defined during the 1970s. Both were premi~d 
on deterrence but each apparently had different views as to how best 
aebieve it. At times the debate between the two was quite heated, it 
was certainly politically loaded. As Freedman put it: "In the 1970s 
the strategists became populists", 
The strategists~ or at 
have appeared on the 
movements rather than as 
least forms of strategic analysis, 
expert wings of broad poliB~cal 
independent servants of policy. 
The "warfighting" school tended to advocate an ambitiously large 
and flexible US force structure that) when married to suitable 
doctrine and plans, might enable America to win a general war with the 
-54-
USSR. Such a posture) it was argued, would be the best means of 
achie.ving deterrence. This approach suggested the need to maintain a 
balance (or preferably superiority) across a range of forces 
corresponding to different levels on a hypothetical escalation ladder. 
The ·"deterrers" on the other hand, associated themse1 ves with 
Mutually Assured Destruction; they stressed the novel and awesome 
nature of contemporary deterrence .. This, it was suggested, brought 
into question (a) the need for very large forces, (b) the feasibility 
of winning a large-scale war, and (c) the realism and desirability of 
elaborate war plans. The implication was that - given HAD - some 
asymmetries in force posture between the Soviet Union and the United 
States were tolerable. 
Perhaps the best representatives of these two schools are Brodie 
and Jervis for the "deterrers", and Nitze and Gray for the 
"warfighters ... Ni tze has already been quoted from a 1956 article 
advocating an early form of flexible response. The need to maintain a 
spectrum or range of forces able to fight and win a war at various 
levels of intensity remained a concern for Nitze through the 1970s and 
1 nto the 1 980s. For Nitze, an assessment of projected war outcomes 
provided a useful guiding principle for force structuring and 
warplanning. After all, 
the objective of military strategy under the circumstances 
of actual conflict would be to bring the war to an end ~nder 
conditions less disastrous than other possible outcomes. 3 
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Even if it was difficult for the United States to win, it was 
necessary to disabuse hawklsh Soviet planners of the notion that the 
USSR might be able to win. There was also a need to structure US 
strategic forces so as to maintain the West's geopolitical position; 
in particular, strategic forces could "offset Soviet military 
superiority at the periphery [of the Soviet bloc] and ••• d.eter its 
offensive employment ... B4 Nitze therefore recognised an important 
linkage between US central strategic forces and American foreign 
policy and defence goals in Eurasia. An important component of this 
linkage, according to Nitze, are Theatre Nuclear Forces.85 The 
essence of the argument was that, "any significant level of deterrence 
left largely uncovered constitutes an invitation to one's opponent to 
exploit the gap. " 86 In addition to the requirement for plugging as 
many gaps as possible, such as in TNF, it was important to "always 
keep in mind that the central task of an effective US defense is to 
maintain stability and overall equivalence within the intercontinental 
countervalue and counterforce levels .... 8? One reason for an emphasis 
on central strategic counterforce was that: 
By and large, 
relationship 
it can he said that the Soviets look upon a 
favourable to them at the intercontinental 
nuclear levels ••• as being the fulcrum upon which 'Bll other 
means of influence, coercion, or deterrence depend. 8 
Gray echoed many of Nitze's points; one of his premi&-es was that: 
"One of the essential tasks of the American defense community is to 
help ensure that in moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff 
cannot brief the Politburo w!th a plausible theory of military 
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victory ... g9 According to Gray there was a requirement to target the 
Communist Party's control of the USSR. Deterring the USSR, wrote 
Gray, requires the prospect of a Soviet defeat, and defeat "has to 
entail the forcible demise of the Soviet state" - as well as the 
·effective countering of Russian military campaigns.90 (Gray also 
:argued that stability might best be assured by Western military 
superiority. 91 ) Gray's hawkish views came in for criticism, to which 
he replied that his critics' analyses were deficient in that they 
appear "to stop when the buttons are pushed~·· He continued: 
The point of stressing the need for a theory of victory is to 
provide some overall political integrity to strategic 
planning -in short, we need a vision of the end game as well 
as of the opening moves.92 
The provision of some overall political integrity to strategic 
planning" sounded like an attempt by Gray to invoke Clausewitz. 
Indeed, the "warfighters" tended to lay claim to being proper 
strategists, while suggesting that their critics were essentially 
astrategic. 
But the "deterrers" could also draw on Clausewitz. Brodie, for 
example, wrote that: 
On the simple Clausewitzian premise ... that a war must have a 
reasonable political objective with whicb ..• military 
operations must be reasonably consonant, we have to 'Work back 
from the assumption that "general war" with the thermonuclear 
weapons must never be permitted to begin •.. 
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Clausewitz 's meaning, which is in fact basic to everything 
that one thinks about nuclear deterrence ••• amounts to the 
idea that war would be only senseless destruction if it were 
not in pursuit of some valid political objective. It is 
precisely the fact that one finds it difficult if not 
impossible to find a, valid political objective that would 
justify 'the destruction inevitable in a strategic nuclear 
exchange that makes the whole concept of nuclear deterrence 
credible.93 
Brodie and Jervis believed that nuclear weapons could deter not only 
full scale nuclear war but also armed conflict that seemed likely to 
lead to such wars. In short, there was little need to be superior at 
every level of potential conflict. 
In the late 1970s strategic debate in the United States spilt-over 
(not for the first time) into Europe. What started as a debate over 
the warfighting/deterrent role of central strategic systems and the 
implications of parity for extended deterrence, became mixed up with 
the reodernistation of NATO TNF and settled into questioning of the 
Alliance '.s policy of possible first-use of nuclear weapons. 
E) The strategic studies literature and the nuclear threshold in 
As the previous sections have shown, the defence of Western Europe 
has attracted much attention from analysts. It is no coincidence that 
it is in Europe where the linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces is seen as a critical defence planning issue. As former US 
Defense Secretary ;,jcNamara has stated: "Questions of the military 
utility of nuclear weapons are addressed most realistically in the 
context of the possibility of warfare in Europe." 94 
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Debate on the nuclear threshold in Europe has usually turned on 
the nature, feasibility, credibility and desirability of the NATO 
threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to a Warsaw Pact 
conventional invasion. Concern over the NATO policy of possible 
first-use of nuclear weapons goes back a long way. For example, it 
was a source of worry in the Kennedy administration of the early 
1960s. Attempts were then made to raise the nuclear threshold by 
strengthening conventional forces. More recently, the controversy 
over the TNF modernisat:lon decisions of the late 1970s sparked off a 
renewed debate. The entrenched nature of NATO's first-use option 
attracted a good deal of attention: 
The concept of [first-use] .•• has become so imbedded in NATO 
doctrine and military posture, and has acquired such supposed 
sanctity in the US-Allied relationship that it is too 
sensitive a subject for official analysis by the US 
government ••• The government never has and probably never will 
seriously analyse the No First Use issue. Thus, any serious, 
honest analysis must be inig~ated and conducted outside the 
formal government structure~ 
One of the first articles in this renewed debate was written by Ikle 
in 1980. Ikl~ focussed on the politically corrosive effects of NATO's 
reliance on first-use, particularly as it might affect the Alliance in 
a crisis. According to Ikl~. conventional war could 
... bring into consciousness the terror of nuclear war. 
Enormous pressures would be mobilized and brought to bear on 
government leaders.~.to avoid at almost any price the risk of 
large-scale nuclear war. 
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[This] could shatter the political foundations of NATO. The 
long standing reliance of NATO governments on the nuclear 
back-up to a conventional defense would suddenly turn from an 
asset into a liability ••• Far from bolstering a full-scale 
conventional defense" NATO's nuclear threat of "first use" 
could turn inward to unravel the Alliance in the hour of 
crisis. 96 
What was needed was to "make more out of the deterrent effect of a 
conventional d~fense". 97 The role of TNF could then be narrowed to the 
deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack rather than the broader and more 
demanding deterrence of a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion. 
Another important contribution to the debate was made by four 
prominent former American defence officials (Bundy, Kennan, ~cNa~ara, 
and Smith) in 1982. Their starting point was that, 
no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason 
to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the 
smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited. 
Every serious analysis and every military e~ercise} for over 
25 years, has demonstrated that even the roost restrained 
battlefield use would be enormously destructive to civilian 
life and property •.• Any use of nuclear weapons in 
Europe ••• carries with it a high and inescapable risk of 
escal~t ion into the ~gneral war which would bring ruin to all 
and v1ctory to none. 
There was therefore a perceived need to move away from reliance on 
nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a conventional attack. It was 
areued that this reliance on nuclear threats was danger_ous and 
incredible: Who would really carry the threats out, and who would 
believe that they would? Increased emphasis on conventional forces 
would help deterrence, crisis management and nuclear planning. 99 
Indeed, the idea that irnpro,/ed conventional forces could substitute 
for some nuclear forces and nissi.ons spawned a separate genre in the 
/00 
strategic studies literature. 
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McNamara continued the debate in 1983 with another article in 
Foreign Affairs. Once again the argument was made that the US 
strategic nuclear umbrella over Western Europe was incredible and thus 
unreliable as a-deterrent. 1 ~ 1 And, McNamara continued) it was not at 
all clear that a doctrine and posture for limited th-eatre nuclear war 
could help the All1ance. 102 Moreover, NATO plans for first-use might 
encourage Soviet pre-emption. 103 But the main point for McNamara was 
that .. nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are 
totally useless except only to deter one*s opponent from using 
th .. 104 em. 
The case for maintaining a NATO first-use option, as articulated 
in the literature, rests largely on the arguments that (a) it lowers 
the probability of war breaking out, (b) that it is necessary to keep 
the Alliance together, and (c) that the West cannot defend itself with 
conventional forces only. These arguments were made in an article 
specifically written to counter the points outli.ned by the American 
"Gang of Four" quoted above. Signi.ficantly, this rejoinder was 
formulated by West German thinkers on defence issues. These defenders 
of the first-use option opined that, "what matters most is to 
concentrate not only on the prevention of nuclear Yar) but on how to 
prevent any war, conventional war as well. " 105 The authors stressed 
the "war-preventing effect of nuclear weapons ... l06 This argument was 
based on the idea that: 
Wherever nuclear weapons are present. war loses its earlier 
function as a continua~ion of politics by other means .•• 
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The coupling of conventional and nuclear weapons has rendered 
war between East and West unwageable and unwinnable up to 
now.l07 
In any case, according to these Europeans, advocates of no-first-use 
considerably underestimate the political and financial 
difficulties which stand in the way of establishing a 
conventional balance through inc~eased armament by the 
West ••. [And] there would always be the possibility .•• that, 
depsite no-first-use. conventional war could in an advanced 
phase degenerate into nuclear war.l08 
Earlier, in 1966, Brodie had also criticised attempts made to 
raise the nuclear threshold. Brodie outlined the possible advantage 
of a first-use posture in stopping a crisis or conflict in its tracks. 
He argued that: "We are interested ••• in tactical nuclear weapons 
primarily as a deterrent and, if they fail in that function, as a de-
escalating device." 109 Among other things this required that: 
For the sake of deterrence, and also to reassure our allies 1 
it would seem appropriate to re.late flexibility of response 
to discrimination of enemy intent. 110 
According to Brodie a massive attack would deserve a nuclear 
response. 111 And to defer nuclear use to the stage of large scale 
conventional war, 
~ould be the best way to ensure that if nuclear weapons were 
indeed used they would be used on a large and extremely 
destructive scale rather than on a controlled demonstration 
scale. 112 
A lesser attack needed to be stopped from escalating, and, for Brodie, 
''The control of escalation i.s an exercise in deterrence"~ 113 Nne lear 
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threats might dampen-down adventurism. No-first-use, on the other 
hand, had problems in this regard: 
One of the great drawbacks of following the so-called 
firebreak theory is that the more that confidence in the 
firebreak is built up, the less is each side restrained from 
committing larger and larger conventional forces within the 
limits of its capabilities. In other words, the effect is to 
stimulate e13calation on the conventional side of the 
b . 114 arr~er~·· 
Moreover, at high levels of conventional conflict the nuclear 
threshold could be under greater strain than at lower levels. 115 
Building up conventional forces did not therefore automatically 
translate into a raising of the nuclear threshold, 
one cannot get away from nuclear weapons so easily. And 
because one cannot, their existence poses crrgain 
compensatory advantages that might as well be accepted. 
Brodie rejected the idea that parity had neutralized nuclear 
weapons> sealing them off from wider issues of international relations 
(such as the balance of power in Europe): 
[One hears the idea that] nuclear weapons, being as obviously 
unfit for military use; have become effectively "decoupled" 
from diploreacy. They may be effectively decoupled from many 
kinds of problems that traditionally concern difl9matists, 
but hardly from problems concerning war and peace. 1 
One implication of this was that nuclear weapons helped to deter wars 
- any wars - that were likely to escalate to nuclear catastrophe. In 
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short, they helped to deter conventional war between the superpowers, 
especially where vital national interests are at stake, as in Europe. 
F:~ .. Summary: aCademic strategists and the nexus between nuclear and 
conventional strategy. 
The analytical insights provided by the strategic studies 
literature into the relationship between nuclear and conventional 
strategy are illuminating but limited. Generally speaking, the 
nuclear-convent:i.onal nexus has been implicitly central to the work of 
the authors quoted here, but it has rarely been salient in their 
writings. The importance of the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces is inferred in many analyses, rather than drawn-
out; it is often a matter of vague assumption rather than close 
examination. General concepts (like signalling, bargaining, 
escalation, and thresholds) have been developed which are potentially 
inclusive of this nexus; but analyses have not often focussed on the 
details of this linkage. 
Nevertheless, some analysts have indeed attempted to grapple with 
various aspects of the relationship between nuclear and conventional 
weapons* For_exampleJ Schwartz has examined ho~ this relationship is 
largely rooted In the politics of the Atlantic Alliance. 118 Charles 
has attempted to assess the relationship as it operates at the level 
of warplanning. 119 Some potential "inadvertent" wartime interactions 
between nuclear and conventional forces have been suggested by 
Posen • 120 On a related leve>l, Bracken claims that inadequacies in 
command and control would almost inevitably lead to the semi-automatic 
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escalation of conventional war in~ Europe to nuclear conflagration. 121 
Another source of study on the nuclear-conventional nexus has been 
analyses of Russian military doctrine; it has been suggested tha't this 
nexus is central in Soviet thinking on war.l22 Questions about the 
linkage between nuclear and conventional forces can easily tt,Irn on 
concepts of escalation and thresholds. At tempts have been made by, 
for example> Freedman and Williams to relate these concepts to current 
policy issues. 123 One such issue has already been discussed: the 
calls, by commentators like McNamara, for improved conventional 
defences to raise the nuclear threshold. An alternative perspective 
has been provided by Cotter: he advocates a strategic synergism to be 
based on strengthened conventional defences and large numbers of 
modernised TNF, together with an "integrated concept of operations for 
nuclear and conventional forces.· 124 The notion of integrated 
operations has been taken to extremes by, for example, Rose, who seems 
to treat -nuclear weapons as 11 ttle more than an improved form of 
artillery. 125 
Each of these analysts have attempted to tackle particular aspects 
of the nuclear-conventional nexus. Their ideas will re-surface in the 
following chapters. For the moment though, it seems that we cannot 
move much beyond the statement made over twenty-five years ago by 
Snyder: 
Two balancing systems - the strategic balance of terror and a 
truncated tactical balance of power now operate 
simulta.neously, each according to different criteria) but 
interacting in various ways which are not yet thoroughly 
understood. 12 6 
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As described above, different analysts have different opinions as 
to what these criteria are and to the nature of the interactions 
between them. Attempts to fill-out the kind of framework outlined by 
Snyder have included: Nitze 's concern over possible gaps in the 
spectrum of deterrence (defined largely in terms :of a series of levels 
of tactical balances); Brodie's emphasis on the pervasiveness of the 
balance of terror (where tactical imbalances are not necessarily 
accorded much importance); Schelling's treatment of bargaining (which 
makes the manipulation of risk more important than military operations 
as traditionally understood); and McNamara 1 s attempt to enforce a 
conceptual and physical separation between nuclear and conventional 
military forces. 
There is at least one other important element which needs to be 
added to this framework. This is the political context of defence 
decision .making. The political basis of American and NATO defence 
planning needs to be brought into the analysis. The literature which 
deals with the political dimension of strategy is, compared to many of 
the works described above, less abstract, less rigorous in logic, and 
less conceptually elegant. But it is probably more to the point. The 
incorporation of the political dimension shifts the analysis away from 
generalised abstract principles or statements to an examination of the 
historical and bureaucratic processes behind politico-military 
decision making. Such a shift probably moves us away from 
establishing a lean and uncluttered conceptual framework for the 
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analysis of the nuclear-conventional nexus. There are probably too 
many variables to be contained within such a framework. 
Nevertheless it would be wasteful to disregard the work of the 
•·qlassical" nUclear-age strategists .. In any case, partial insights 
can be valuable and may provide useful, if limited, analytical tools. 
Moreover, as Rapoport has stated, "the nature of war is itself to a 
large extent determined by how man conceives of it.- 127 
In summary, it can be seen that the efforts of academic 
strategists have described, and helped to mould, an evolving strategic 
environment marked by the following: 
L Wide acceptance of the general and vital importance of 
nuclear deterrence. 
2. The importance of geopolitical factors and conventional 
military forces in setting the context for military 
confrontation~ notwithstanding the salience of nuclear 
deterrence. 
3. The focus on extended deterrence as a reference point for 
strategic analysis and debate. 
4. The use of concepts of limited war in an attempt to 
inject some rationality into the use of force (even 
between the superpowers using nuclear weapons)~ 
5. The use of concepts of escalation, thresholds and 
bargaining to help describe - and prescribe - the risks, 
threats, and opportunities faced by political decision 
makers and military planners. 
6. Uncertainty as to how the above points converge. In 
particular~ uncertainty as to the precise role and nature 
of the linkage between nuclear and conventional military 
power .. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNITED STATES AND NATO WAR PLANNING 1945-1976 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS 
A) Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of American and NATO 
warplanning from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of 
the Carter administration's term of office. The first part of the 
chapter is organised chronologically into five sections. Each section 
covers an important stage in the evolution of Alliance warplanning! 
"The strategic background to the formation of NATO, 1945-1949"; "The 
establishment of NATO's military machine, 1950-1953"; "massive 
retaliation, 1954-1960"; "The move to flexible response, 1961-1965"; 
and "The development of flexible response, 1966-1976". Each of these 
sections describes the political context of planning, shifts in 
planning, and a brief summary of the doctrinal implications for the 
nexus bet"'Ween nuclear and conventional forces... The chapter ends with 
a discussion of some of the major themes in United States war-planning 
and an outline of the doctrinal inheritance of the mid-1970s. 
B) The Strategic Background to~the Formation of NATO 1945-1949 
After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 the American military 
was firmly established in western and central Europe, but its leaders 
had little idea of United States long-term policy goals regarding the 
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Continent. If strategy is the matching of military force.s to 
political objectives, it can be argued that the US had no developed 
strategy at the end of 1945. 
The post-war American move towards a policy of the containment of 
Soviet power was gradual; it represented an evolution of ideas about 
the balance of power, its applicability to the real world, and how to 
translate it Into foreign and defence policy. Thus there was no "Year 
Zero" for Uni.ted Statet; military planning for war against the USSR. 
Since the US lacked a single well-defined long-term perspective 
at the time, the American strategic position in Europe was dominated 
by immediate concerns .. High on the list here were the prospect of 
European economic and possibly political collapse, occupation duties, 
and policy towards the country's erstwhile allies. In practice this 
tnt:ant tlv;t American strategic thinking was focused on formulating 
policy toward Germany, the UK, and the Soviet Union; in Asia, the 
par:.llel concerns were with Japan, areas under allied colonial rule, 
and the Chinese civil war. Broader foreign policy questions were 
related, most clearly in the issue of possible American support for 
European recovery .. In the background were important domestic 
political issues that were directly relevant to American options 
overseas - such as pressures for prompt demobllisation. 
Post-war US demobilisation was rapid. In June 1945 American 
armed forces stood at twelve million, by June 1946 they had been 
reduced to three million, and by June 1947 the figure was one and a 
half million. The respective numbers for ground forces were six 
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million in 1945, one and a half million in 1946, and six hundred 
thousand in 1947.1 This demobilisation was possible because in the 
early post-war period there was no real, immediate, Soviet military 
threat to Western Europe, .and no formal US security guarantee to the 
region. The most pressing problems in the area had more to do with 
economics and politics. It was not at first clear how, if at all, US 
military power was directly relevant to the resolution of the deep 
political crisis facing Europe. The preferred American instrument for 
tack ling this crisis, and so provide a long-term solution to the 
European power vacuum, was economic policy. These politico-economic 
issues are beyond the scope of this chapter and will not be examined 
in detail here. The point to be made though is that early American 
warplanning must be placed into context: the first "warplans", of 1945 
and 1946, were little more than superficial planning exercises lacking 
high political direction. In addition much of this planning was 
directed .at projected or future threats and was based on hoped-for 
future force levels. 
Uncertainty over political developments aside, the Soviet Union 
had been identified as a potential danger to the West by the end of 
the Second World War. However, the US military "had no fixed policy 
regarding the possibility of future war with the Russians", (nor did 
. ? 
they have firm ideas about the role of the atomic bomb).~ 
It was not until 1947 that a firmer pattern of superpower 
antagonism emerged. The deepening of the Cold War was associated 
with~ among other things 1 the t\1nerican stake in Europe, reflected in 
its concern for the establishment of a balance of power on the 
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Continent. The focus was on US support of a weak and disorganised 
Western Europe apparently threatened by Soviet military intimidation 
and political warfare. By· the end of 1947 the political hostility of 
the Cold War was being translated into serious warplanning, although 
the emphasis remained on possible future threat rather than immediate 
danger of invasion. The geopolitical basis for this planning was 
outlined in NSC 20/4 on 23 November 1948: 
Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether 
achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive 
means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable 
to the United States. 3 
Eventual US military commitments to Europe arose out of a mix of 
factors. These included a negative view of the USSR, ideological and 
geopolitical competition, occupation responsibilities (centred in 
Western Germany and Berlin), and inchoate British attempts to 
establish a strategic framework for Western security. These factors 
sometimes converged - as in the 1948 Berlin crisis. 
The US was linked to Europe by its close relationship with the 
United Kingdom, as well as its pivotal role in European recovery and 
its occupation duties. By 1943-44 the British war effort was largely 
integrated into the American war machine. This strategic integration 
was paralleled by British economic weakness and underpinned by 
American economic and military strength. Obviously the relationship 
was not equal; as one historlan has noted, Britain was reduced to the 
status of a "warrior satellite'' of the United States. 4 At the end of 
the war in 1945 the UK was the strongest country in Europe, excepting 
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the USSR~ But its economy was virtually exhausted and it is doubtful 
whether its Great Power stat us could have been sustained independent 
of - let alone in opposition to - American policy. 
It was within this context that the Anglo-American link became a 
significant post-war strategic axis. Coalition warfare was an 
important element in American politico-military thinking. But at the 
end of 1945 the wartime alliance between the US and the UK amounted to 
little more than a shared interest in occupation and general concern 
with European recovery. Moreover, American policy towards the UK was 
ambivalent. There was little interest in giving Britain a blank 
cheque especially if this meant underwriting British imperial 
ambitions; nor was there much eagerness to blindly accept British 
prescriptions on a balance of power in Europe. On the other hand, 
there was the (largely dormant) Combined Chiefs of Staff, a large 
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, the Quebe.c agreement on 
nuclear weapons-use, and a conscientious effort by the British Foreign 
Secretary to entangle the US in European defence. There was also a 
recognition in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that, with Britain 
reduced to a second class power, America could no longer take a "free 
ride" in security. 5 
Thus the links between the UK and America were, eventually, 
important in terms of setting Western strategy along a particular 
direction. (This can be illustrated by noting the developments 
arising out of the Greek Civil War and the Western European Union.) 
According to Rosecrance, when it came to practical politics neither 
the US nor the UK "conceived of fighting a major conflict without the 
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assistance of the other .. ~and, according to the same analyst, 
Once developed •.• the Anglo-American 
crucial reference point for both 
strategy came to he considered 
alliance became a 
alliance. 6 
Or as one commentator said in 1950, 
countries .. 
within the 
Military 
contex,_t of 
.. If the Anglo-American alliance 
should he dissolved, every military plan in the Pentagon would have to 
be torn up ... 7 
But, until the Korean war at least, American perceptions of the 
Soviet threat were essentially political rather than military in 
character. However, it was believed that a feeling of military 
imbalance on the Continent might help destahilise West European 
States .. This suggested the need to reassure Europeans that America 
would somehow counterbalance the power of the USSR. It was this 
diagnosis that underlay the formation of NATO. As the Policy Planning 
Staff of the US Department of State put it in November 1948: 
basic Russian intent still runs to the conquest of Western 
Europe hy political means. In this program, military force 
plays a major role only as a means of intim:tdation. 
The danger of political conquest is still 
the military danger ••• The political war, 
greater than 
is now in 
war, it is progress; and, H there should not he a shooting 
this political war which will he decisive. 
A North Atlantic Security Pact will affect the 
political war only insofar as it operates to stiffen the 
self-confidence of the Western Europeans in the face of 
Soviet pressures. 
We should have clearly in mind that the need for 
military alliances and reanr.ament on the part of the \>}estern 
Europeans is primarily a subjective one, arl.sing in their 
own minds as a result of their failure to understand 
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correctly their own position. Their best and mast hopeful 
course of action, if they are to save themselves frotn 
communist pressures, remai.ns the. struggle fOr economf.c 
recovery and for internal political stability.8 
NATO was created to "clarify American intentions regarding any Soviet 
attempt to change further the European balance of power ... 9 The US was 
formalising a political commitment, it was not committing itself to a 
particular strategy. 
Even so, Congress had demanded the formulation of an Alliance 
"Strateeic Concept" as a condition of US membership of NATO. The 
resulting docunent, known as DC 6/1, was entitled "Strategic Concept 
for the Defence of the Atlantic Area". One of the "principles" 
outlined was that, 
North Atlantic Treaty planning should he that each nation 
should undertake the task, or tasks, for which it is best 
suited~ Certain nations, because of the geographic locatl.on 
or because of their capabilities, will be prepared to 
undertake appropriate specific missions~ 
The "basic undertakings" of DC 6/l expanded on this and included, 
Insure the ability to carry out 
by all means possible with all 
exception. This is pri.marily a 
as practicable by other nations. 
strategic bombing promptly 
types of weapons, without 
US responsibility assisted 
Arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy 
offensive against [NATO] by all means available, including 
air, naval, land and psychological operations. Initially, 
the hard CO!Ce of g~Cound forces will come f~Com the European 
nations. 10 
The "Strategic Concept•• was a little vague. This had something 
to do with its dependence on United States warplanning which was both 
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highly classified and in a state of evolution. It is now necessary to 
examine these plans in more detail. 
By 1945 toe US JCS had settled on deterrence as: the basis for 
future planning; this required the maintenance of forces and the will 
to use them in order to prevent a war from breaking out. The JCS had 
also suggested the advantages of extensive global involvement; there 
was a need for "the maJ.ntenance of world peace, under conditions 
which insure the security, well being and advancement" of the US .ll 
Another premise of the planning developed more slowly, but nonetheless 
clearly; this was the identification of the USSR as a plausible 
potential enemy. 
As early as 1945 the US had a plan for war with Russia called 
"Totality"; 12 however, it bore no real relation to available forces. 
Also in 1945, an American study entitled "Strategic Vulnerability 
of Russia to a Limited Air Attack" was produced which speculated on 
an atomic bomb attack against twenty Soviet cities. 13 
The emphasis on airpower, deterrence, and a world role pointed to 
a requirement for an extensive network of forward airbases. For one 
thing, a key Alrerican policy was to "fight our wars H they be 
necessary, in sooeone else's territory~" 14 As early as 1943 plans 
had been started on outlining future base requirements, these plans 
were incompletely up-dated in 1945. 15 
The first "Joint Basic Outline War Plan" was received by the JCS 
in April 1946. This "Outline" was called "FINCHER"; it was intended 
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to provide guidance for further planning. FINCHER was followed by 
work on BROILER, CHARIOTEER, BUSHWACKER, and FROLic,l6 In due course 
the development of US warplanning was aided by administrative changes. 
Three categories of planning were established: emergency (capable of 
immediate implementation); intermediate (partly a budgetary and 
administrative category); and long-range 
mould trends). 17 
(used to identify and help 
High level guidance for warplanning was provided in NSC-30 
("Policy on Atomic Warfare") in September 1948 and NSC 20/4 ("US 
Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US 
Security") in November of the same year. NSC-30 suggested some of 
the uncertainties of warplanning during the nuclear age, as weJl as 
the importance of matching military means to political 
considerations: 18 
The circumstances prevailing when war is joined cannot be 
wholly forecast with any greater certainty than can the 
arrival of war. It appears imprudent either to prescribe or 
to prohibit beforehand the use of any particular weapons 
when the character of future conflict is subject only to 
imperfect prediction. In this circumstance, a prescription 
preceding diagnosis could invite disaster. 
If war itself cannot be prevented, it appears futile to hope 
or to suggest that the imposition of limitations on the use 
of certain miLitary weapons can prevent their use in war~ 
The time and circumstances under which atomic weapons mfght 
be employed are incapable of accurate determination prior to 
the evident imminence of hostilities. The type and 
character of targets against which atomic weapons might be 
used is primarily a function of military selection in the 
preparation and planning of grand strategy. In this case, 
however, there is the additional re.quirement for blending a 
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political with a military responsibility in order to assure 
that the conduct of war, to the maximum extent practicable, 
advances the fundamental and lasting aims of u.s. policy. 
The conclusions of NSC-30 were a little ambiguous but did recognise 
the need to plan for nuclear war: 
It is recognised that, in the event of hostilities, the 
National Military establishment must be ready to utilize 
promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, 
including atom.ic weapons, in the interest of natiOnal 
security and must therefore plan accordingly. 
The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the 
event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he 
considers such decision to be required. 
In the light of the foregoing, no action should be taken at 
the present time: 
a. To obtain a decision either to use or not to use atomic 
weapons in any possible future conflict; 
b. To obtain a decision as to the time and circumstances 
under which atomic weapons might or might not be 
employed. 
NSC 20/4 referred to American interests in eliminating Soviet 
domination in ··areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed 
to exist afte.r the war and in drastically reducing the military 
potential of any such remnant state. 19 
Early American warplans, partly developed from the FINCHER 
'Outline' series) called for a withdrawal from Western Europe and a 
nuclear offensive against the USSR from airbases in the UK, Okinawa 
and the Cai ro~Suez or Karachi areas. After some months the US was 
expected to take the offensive in ground operations~ Not all American 
planners were happy about this sort of thinking. One senior American 
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admiral judged the plan as "completely at variance with US foreign 
policy and national objectives." As the offical his tor ian 
explains, Admiral Denfield believed that the plan was flawed because 
it exaggerated Soviet strengths, virtually conceded Western Europe and 
the Mediterranean, and left the Middle East vulnerable. 
advocated holding a defence line along the Rhine. 20 
The admiral 
Indeed, it appears that warplanning and guidance may have been 
critically inadequate where it was most needed~ For example, in the 
1948 Berlin crisis, General Clay warned that conflict could arise with 
"dramatic suddenness", 21 yet at the time there was apparently no NSC 
policy paper dealing with the occupied city. Moreover, 
During the critical phase of the Berlin Blockade, when we 
were nose to nose with massive Soviet military power, the 
JCS were so poor~y advised that we could not draw 
contingency plans. 2Z 
1t seems that the only developed US Army plan for war in Europe was 
"Operation Doublequick" - an evacuation from the Continent. 23 The 
crisis over Berlin was a factor behind the tightening-up of warplans. 
The attempt to draft a unifield warplan during 1948 led to "the 
bitterest interservice war in [USJ history." 24 Problems. arose over 
the level of Army readiness required, the appropriate size of the 
Air Force, and the contribution to be made by Naval airpower~ The 
plan that came out of this was called HALFMOOil (and, later, 
FLEETWOOD/DOUBLESTAR). According to Bradley, this was the .. first 
fornal and co:nprehensive enunciation" of what later became known as 
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"massive retaliation".25 As he describes it, the plan took the' 
following form: 
If Russia launched all-out war, its huge Army overrunning 
Western Europe (as we assumed), we would respond by 
dropping atomic bombs on the Soviet homeland ••• with the aim 
of destroying the Soviet government and breaking the 
Kremlin's will to wage war ••. Air Force Studies had 
suggested that 133 atomic bombs dropped on seventy Soviet 
cities would be required. Since we then had only about 
fifty bombs, the plan was to launch the strategic air attack 
against Russia on D plus 9 with twenty-five bombs, follow up 
with another twenty-five then continue the attack with bombs 
coming right off the production line. 
The Army's role in Halfmoon was to support the strategic air 
offensive. Our main job would be to protect our air bases 
at home and abroad •• ~and ln order to prevent one-way" 
Soviet bombing attacks on the United States, deny the 
Soviets potential air bases in Greenlandt Iceland, 
Spitsbergen, Alaska and Azores. (It was assumed that 
British ground forces would protect air bases in Britain and 
Egypt.) Much later, following a World War II-type general 
mobilizatJon:> the army would occupy Western Europe and 
Russia in order to help restore law and order and stable 
governments. 26 
With regard to potential allies, HALFMOON was quite candid; it stated 
that the plan ''does not provide adequate assistance to the countries 
f W E .. 2 7 o estern .urope .•. 
In August 1948 a decision was made by US officials to "more 
closely integrate" HALFMOON with European efforts (earlier, in July, 
US B-29 bombers were forward based to the UK). 28 This followed the 
formation of the European ''Brussels Pact'' and the Senate passing of 
the Vandenberg Resolution calling for, 
the association of the United States by constitutional 
process vr' th sech regional and other collective arrangements 
as are based on continuous and effective self-help and 
mutual aid and as effect its nat1onal security.29 
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Amer lean 'observe-rs 1 were posted to the Western Union Defence 
Organisation (essentially an Anglo-French alliance based on the 
Brussels Pact) during 1948,3° The European position was that, 
... I~ the event of an attack by Russia) however sco~ it ~ay 
come, the ••• powers are determined to fight as far east in 
Germany as possible. If Russia overruns the countries of 
Western Europe, irreparable harm will be done before they 
are liberated, owing to the Russian policy of deportation 
and pillage. Their preparations are therefore aimed at 
holding the Russians on the best position in Germany 
covering the territory of the five powers in such a way that 
sufficient time for the Am~rican military power to intervene 
decisively can be assured. 31 
However) the US did not give the Europeans (except, to some extent, 
the British) details of American plans. As noted above, US planners 
believed that the prospects of holding a forward 1 ine in En rope were 
bleak. 
At the beginning of 1949 HALFMOON was superseded by TROJAN. The 
new plan expanded on the strategic bombing offensive by including, in 
an annex, a target list of seventy Soviet cities; first priority was 
given to twenty of these cities. 32 This plan was followed by work on 
OFFTACKLE at the end of January 1949. OFr'TACKLr: tried to incorporate 
more of an emphasis on coalition war. It called for the holding of a 
bridgehead in Western Europe, if possible on the Rhine although the 
feasibility of this was still in doubt. The plan represented a 
"Europe-first" strategy but had a strong fall-back position in the 
\/estern Hemisphere and oceanic fringes. 33 
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After consultation with the Canadians and British, OFFTACKI,E was 
approved in December 1949. It was "the first strategic plan to be 
based on political guidance from the National Security Council". 34 In 
the plan the objectives of the strategic air offensive were "broadened 
and made more ambitious". The official historian has stated tbat: 
OFFTACKLE also included, as a new objective, the 
"retardation" of Soviet advances in Western Europe •.• The 
new targeting plan, which had been prepared by the Air 
Force, was aimed at accomplishing the following objectives: 
disruption of controls of the Soviet Government over its 
people; undermining the will of the Soviet Government and 
people to continue the war; and disarming of the Soviet 
armed forces. These objectives were to be achieved by 
inflicting critical damage on petroleum refineries, electric 
power plants, submarine construction facilities, high octane 
aviation gasoline production fad.li ties, and other war-
supporting industries~ •• the strategic air operations were 
expected to retard the Soviet advance into Western Europe by 
curtailing supplies of petroleum products~ aircraft engines 1 
tanks, self-propelled guns, and other items. Loss of most 
new production of these materials, plus the disruption of 
Clobi.lization and a possible loss of morale, would force the 
Soviet High Command to reasses the strategic situation with 
immediate though unssedictable consequences for current 
military operations. 
OFFTACKLE was superimposed onto the prior planning efforts of the 
Brussels Pact, hence the inclusion of the possibility of holding some 
ground. 
Despite the projected massive bombing of the USSR it was still 
considered that large conventional forces would be required to hold or 
retake territory. This is clear from a reading of DROPSHOT a plan 
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developed in 1949 for war in the mid-l950s. 36 Deciding on the balance 
between nuclear and conventional forcest and the linkage between them, 
was a central doctrinal question which had not yet been conclusively 
answered~· 
In 1945 there was no consensus in American military circles as to 
how to interpret the doctrinrtl inheritance of the previous years of 
total war .. Debate over strategy often paralleled service prejudices 
and frequently turned on the impact of technology - particularly 
airpower and atomic bombs. The most technologically advanced war to 
date had not obviated the requirement to take and hold ground with 
mass armies.. It was not clear that atomic bombs would change matters 
radically in this regard. It was not self-evident whether or not the 
nuclear revolution had precipitated an immediate strategic 
revolution~ 
Right from the start nuclear weapons were closely associated with 
airpower, which had its own highly polemical advocates (the army would 
not get nuclear weapons until the 1950s). The experience of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki was used to bolster pre-existing dogma about the efficacy 
of strategic bombing. There was also a, perhaps inflated, belief in 
the importance of conventional bombing to the defeat of Germany. The 
rapidly developing independent US ai~rm could call upon a history of 
ideas, wartime experience, and new prospects to rationalise an 
emphasis on their own role at the expense of the other services. 
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The picture was complicated because it was not precisely clear 
how the demolition of enemy cities would affect the outcome of a 
battle for Western Europe. The linkage between strategic bombing and 
theatre ground campaign might at least in the critical early phase 
be tenuous. 
For a number of reasons much of the defence planning during this 
period concentrated on conventional forces. First, many of the 
interservice and budgetary disputes involved conventional force~ 
sizing. Second, the stockpile of atomic bombs was small (two at the 
end of 1945, nine ln 1946, thirteen in 1947, and fifty in 1948). 37 In 
addition~ the means and accuracy of atomic bomb delivery were limited 
and targeting intelligence was crude. According to a 1948 US Army 
study the "atomic warfare age" was not then a reality. Such an age 
was defined as, 
arriving when two or more nations have available to them a 
significant [100-200] quantity gf atomic bombs, together 
with suitable means of del1very. 3 
Third, details of the atomic weapons arsenal were highly classified. 
Fourth, there was a poorly articulated need for the flexibility and 
hedge provided by conventional forces. Fifth, even exponents of 
atomic: a irpowe r usually saw a need for some conventional forces, 
albeit in a supportive role. Notwithstanding the polemics associated 
with some air power advocates there was a broad consensus for some 
troops on the ground - ::'ilthough whether, in the long run, they should 
be American troops on European ground was another matter. 
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A 1945 report on the implications of nuclear weapons noted that 
such weapons did not allow "elimination of the conventional armaments 
or major modifications of the services that employ them··.39 By 1949 
SAC was envisaging the devastation of 70 urban~industrial target areas 
in the Soviet bloc within 30 days; a second phase of bombing would 
then follow. According to the .. Harmon .. report, this sort of attack 
would "probably" affect the Soviet war effort. 4° From the perspective 
of US security the "advantages" of early use of nuclear bombs was 
thought to be "transcending". Even so, this report argued that: 
The atomic. offensive would not, per se, 
capitulation, destroy the roots of Communism 
weaken the power of Soviet Leadership to 
people. 
bring about 
or critically 
dominate the 
Large conventional forces would still be needed to hold a defence 
line: 
The capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly 
into selected areas of \vestern Europe, the Middle East and 
Far East, would not be seriously impaired, but capabilities 
thereafter would progressively diminish. 41 
The limited utility of nuclear weapons was also recognised by 
American allies~ Rosecrance has noted that, 
could 
The 
it seemed wholly unlikely that the atomic bomb 
determine the outcome of a conflict with Soviet 0nion. 
British Chiefs were quite aware that a land invasion 
Europe could only be staunched by troops in the field. 4 2 
of 
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C) Establishing and Supporting NATO's Military Machine 1950-1953 
By 1950 NATO "embodied a degree of military collaboration that 
was unprecedented among peacetime conditions". 43 One reason for the 
relatively close US collaboration with Western Europe was outlined by 
Acheson in May 1950: 
We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world. We 
haven't got enough shots to do that ••• If anything happens 
:i.n Western Europe the whole business goes to pieces, and 
therefore our principQ/ effort must be on building up the 
economic strength of Western Europe~ and so far as Asia is 
concerned, treating that as a holding action •.. 44 
The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 served as a powerful 
catalyst for the bolstering of NATo.45 However pressure for a more 
assertive American posture and a more effective Alliance had been 
bLlilding up before the North Korean invasion. For example, NSC-68 
(often seen as a militant codification of Cold War and Containment) 
was formulated before the Communist attack, although it was approved 
after it. NSC-68's "main purpose" was to, 
impress upon its bureaucratic readership the Soviet threat 
to world peace, best blocked throu~h increased military 
preparedness in the non-Soviet world. 6 
This military build-up was to emphasise conventional forces, although 
not at the expense of a continued increase i.n nuclear weaponry. 
NSC-68 also alluded to an early for~ of flexible response and inplied 
the need to move at¥ay from automat1c large-scale atomJc bombing of the 
USSR: 
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If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the 
nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised 
froiD the outset our fundamental puipose. In the words of 
the: Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be 
proportioned to the extent of the mischief". The mischief 
may· be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for 
limited objectives. In either case we should take no 
avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of 
annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet 
drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest 
not· to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying 
force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent 
with our objectives) and our capabilities for the 
application of force should, therefore, within the limits of 
what we can sustain over the long pul~ 7 be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter~~ 
The intensification of the Cold War increased pressure for the 
provision of the forces called for in the warplans. The gap between 
capabilities and requirements looked, for a time at least, dangerous. 
Apart from the exigencies of the Korean campaign this meant an 
emphasis on building up conventional forces in Europe. The cohesion 
of the Alliance required a commitment to defend its members, not 
merely a promise to liberate them. This, in turn, reinforced the 
requirement for a forward deployment of troops~ Greiner has noted one 
difference between US and European perspectives that is relevant 
here: 
Europeans were planning a defence for which they lacked the 
resources, expecting to receive them instead from the United 
States. These expectations excluded the Strategic Air 
Command and its atomic bomb, the actual employment of which 
was viewed by the continental Europeans with deep distrust, 
for fear of the nuclear destruction of Western Europe: they 
preferred the thought of American land forces directly 
defending their territories. 
Because of the poor state of, in particular, its land 
forces) the US \vas or. nefther a short nor a medium-term 
basis able to match these expectations.48 
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More or less concurrent with the early NATO recdgnit ion of the 
need for enhanced conventional forees was the arrival of the age of 
nuclear plenty. Scarcity of atom bombs wa:s previously "assumed as the 
basis of [US] planning." 49 But by June 1950 there were components for 
nearly three hundred US nuclear bombs (this was six times as many as 
in 1948); by 1953 the stockpile had grown to one thousand. 50 The 
growing arsenal of nuclear weapons opened the door to a structuring of 
target categories. As Rosenberg has described: 
In August 1950, the JCS formally organized targeting 
categories and priorities for nuclear war. First priority 
was assigned to "the destruction of known targets affecting 
the Soviet capability to deliver atomic bombs". Second 
priority was assigned to fixed targets affecting the 
1:1obi lity of Soviet ground forces in Western Europe. Third 
priority was given to attacks on the Soviet liquid fuel, 
electric por.ver, and atomic energy industries. These 
categories were subsequently codena1:1ed BRAVO, ROMEO and 
DE~TA, for blunting, retardation, and the 
disruption/destruction of war making capacity respectively. 
With some changes, particularly a broadening of the 
industrial targets category, they formed a basic framework 
for US nuclear targeting for nearly a decade.5l 
The retardation ("ROMEO") mission assigned to the USAF was to be 
superimposed onto a World War II sort of strategy. Retardation was 
intended to affect conventional force ratios at the front line (by 
disrupting Soviet reinforcements) and so was expected to provide a 
direct link between nuclear bombing and ground operations. But, a war 
was "likely to commence with a ground thrust which had to be resisted 
in its own terms", 52 this was the reason for the ambitious 1952 Lisbon 
Agreement on NATO conventional force goals - goals which were never 
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Conventional devastation of Germany would parall~l the nuclear 
destruction of the Soviet Union. West Germany was to be the forward 
battle area for conventional operations. According to Greiner, 
There was agreement among all military leadets of the 
Western Union and NATO that the enormous quantative and 
partly qualitive inferiority of the !Vest ern Alli.es • forces 
stationed in the glacis, as compared with the Soviet forces 
deployed in Central and Eastern Europe, had to be 
compensated for by all available technical resources. Plans 
for destruction, obstruction, demolition and reinforcement 
of existing terrain obstacles were therefore given the 
highest priority in operational considerationsR These were) 
in fact, the first fruits of Western Union and NATO military 
planning. There was rarely any doubt that destruction was 
planned on a vast scale, particularly on the eastern side of 
the Rhine but also in other parts of West German territory, 
tn order to channel and stop a Soviet attack. Such plans 
showed very clearly the readiness Wjth which Allied officers 
disposed of West German territory. 5 
As already noted, the JCS did not believe it was sensible to plan on 
thP. basis of being able to hold a line forward in Germany. This was 
reflected in their wartime reinforcement plans: 
With the forces available to SHAPE, in the immediate future 
it is believed that the Allied forces will not be able to 
contain a Soviet attack for a sufficient period of time to 
permit the deployment of additional United States ground 
forces to the Continental European area after the initiation 
of hostilities. In fact, the United States Joint Outline 
Emergency War Plan •.. provides for such a contingency by 
planning post D-day deployment to the United Kingdom and/or 
North Africa. Under this premise, the allocation to SHAPE 
of United States forces, prior to their arrival in the 
European areal might well prove to be meaningless since 
there would be no area to which they could be deployed. 54 
Despite, or perhaps because of, these reservations, the NATO 
conventional force structure was significantly strengthened during 
195!: 
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The strength available to SACEUR increased significantly 
during 1951. In April, General Eisenhower commanded 16 NATO 
divisions (in varying degrees of readiness) and fewer than 
1, 000 aircraft; by December, he could deploy 35 d 1visions 
(active and ready reserve) and nearly 3,000 aircraft. SHAPE 
and its several subordinate headquarters were functioning 
satisfactorily; autumn manuevers had substantially improved 
cohesion and combat-readiness; airfield construction was 
well advanced, and communications facilities were being 
improved and extended. The nucleus of an international 
force now existed. 55 
Eisenhower, despite JCS reservations, ''forbade~· open discussion of a 
fall-back position behind the Rhine-Ijssel line already agreed with 
the allies; he felt that "political reverberations would far outweigh 
any military benefits.·· Meanwhile tbe JCS was contemplating a defence 
line at the Pyrenees. 56 
Thus the strategic concept outlined in OFFTACKLE at the end of 
1949 persisted into the early 1950s. That is, conventional forces 
would try to maintain a foothold in Europe - although the feasibility 
of this was doubted - and the USAF would drop increasing numbers of 
atomic bombs on the USSR and Soviet military infrastructure. This 
initial phase would be followed by mobilisation and a counter 
offensive on the ground to push back the Soviet armies. At the same 
time operations in the Middle East ('"of importance second only to 
Western Europe") were to be conducted; here it was a matter of 
correlating "US aspirations with British capabilities.· 57 
During this period planners saw the need for more atomic bombs to 
be programmed into the strategic framework just outlined, more 
conventional forces to increase confidence in holding a defence line) 
and for more direct nuclear support of conventional operations~ This 
last requirement led to the development of the "retardation" mission 
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and, from 1953, the deployment in Europe of tactical nuclear weapons 
for the US Army. 
The main strategic' issue facing Western planners was a perceived 
conventional force imbalance with the East~ Early estimates called 
for about one hundred NATO divisions to balance one hundred and 
seventy-five Eastern Bloc divisions~ After further reflection it was 
realised that about fifty divisions was a more realistic goal for KATO 
to aim for, about half the force deemed necessary to carry out NATO's 
defence plan. A former SHAPE planner has outlined how the mili.tary 
responded to this dilemma: 
A first effort to cope with this problem was the so-called 
Ridgway Plan of 1952 - 1953. The Plan's thrust was an 
effort to add atomic weapons to the projected NATO 
conventlonal defense forces in the hope of reducing 
requirements. What happened, not surprisingly, was that the 
force requirements went up instead of do'WD. This occurred 
because under the plan classic NATO conventional 
formations and force concentrations were retained. Everytime 
a nuclear weapon was fixed at ther:1, a whole unit or air-base 
was ~iped out 1 and therefore entire army units and airwings 
would have to be brought in as replacements. Obviously this 
plan did not solve the European security problem, and as 
such it never really saw the light of day ••. Having gone 
through this abortive exercise, the NATO planners then 
suggested three possible and previously ignored 
considerations which might ease the problem. There were 
three "'soft"' areas in the earlier NATO defense plans. One 
was the previous failure to consider the impact of U.s. 
strategic-nuclear forces on Soviet capabilities in Europe. 
This failure had been due in part to considerations of O.S. 
security, and in part because no one had calculated the 
effects which a concurrent strategic-nuclear campaign might 
have on NATO force requirements. The early NATO plans had 
been written as if NATO in Europe would be fighting its own 
separate war, while the_ Strategic Air Command was waging a 
war of its own. No degradation in Soviet capabilities in 
Europe was credited to the concurrent U .. S~ strategic (~ffort. 
Tt was therefore agreed to look at this facJ=gr and its 
possible implications for force savings in NATO.J 
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The two other ••soft areas addressed were (a) using tighter 
int~lligence estimates to downgrade the threat and (b) considering the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons from the start of hostilities along 
with introducing the necessary doctrinal and tactical changes to the 
ground forces. 59 There was, then, clearly a need to coordinate 
nuclear and conventional strategy; the apparent gulf between these two 
strands in NATO's defence posture needed some attention. 
In the light of ambitious, but unmet, conventional force goals 
and growing atomic airpower, it seemed that a "dual and inconsistent" 
strategy was being developed. 60 Perhaps one of the morce thoughtful 
ideas on the broad pol icy issues underlying the linkage between 
nuclear and conventional forces in the early 1950s was given by 
Acht'son; he stated, in 1951, that: 
The best use we can make of our present advantage in 
retaliatory power, is to move ahead under this protective 
shield to build the balanced collective forces in Western 
Europe that will continue to gyter aggression after our 
atomic advantage has diminished. 
However, the sentiment was not translated into subsequent policy .. 
Economic factors prevented a major conventional build-up, and nuclear 
weapons were integrated with "general purpose forces", 
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D) Massive Retaliation 1953-1960 
During 1953 the new Eisenhower administration formulated its 
policy of. massive retaliation under the label of the "New Look". This 
policy placed greater reliance than previously considered desirable on 
United States nuclear striking power. As such it allowed for the 
trimming back of conventional forces.. There were, however, important 
elements of continuity between the New Look and the posture developed 
under Truman. As one historian has noted: 
The Truman administration established a pattern in force 
structure that gave the air force unmistakable primacy over 
its rival services. The New Look refined this pattern, but 
did not change it •.• 
Massive retaliation 
produc~ 2 researched party. 
gave 
and 
a useful Republican label to a 
developed by the opposition 
But, despite the continuities, the New Look did shift the stress in 
military planning towards nuclear 1.1eapons; this had in:plications for 
the relationship between nuclear and conventional strategy. 
The New Look was introduced by an administration heavily 
influenced by fiscal considerations, it was also anxious not to repeat 
the previous administration's painful experience in Korea. A 
politically and financially expensive protracted conventional war 1.1as 
to be avoided. The deterrent potential of relatively cheap nuclear 
weapons was to be stressed. On a declaratory level this was explai.ned 
by Dulles, i~ Parly 1954! in the followi.ng terrc.s: 
••• It is not sound 
military expenditures 
bankruptcy' •.• 
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to become-· permanently committed to 
so vast that they lead to 'practical 
We want, for ourselves and the other free nations) a maximum 
deterrent at a bearable cost ••• 
The basic decision [is] to depend primarily upon a great 
capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of 
our own choosing~~ .As a result, it is now possible to get, 
and share, more basic security at less cost. 63 
The US was not prepared to continue the "cruel toll of American youth 
and the non-productive expenditure of many billions" in a bloody 
conventional slogging match 'l<ri th the "mighty land power of the 
Communist '!<rorld" which was "glutted with manpower". 64 Two other 
political factors reinforced this emphasis on nuclear weapons: the US 
Army's wish to be "out from under" the Air Force by obtaining its own 
nuclear forces, and Allied pressure for access to American nuclear 
weapons. 65 
Unilateral United States planning for massive retaliation was, of 
course, reflected in NATO planning, although there was a time lag 
before the All.iance formally endorsed the policy. Early US guidance 
for the New Look {as represented by NSC 162/2) pointed to the pivotal 
role of forward basing and allies in the execution of the 
strategy. 66 Indeed> the very raison d 1 etre of the New Look was 
extended deterrence: the linking of US nuclear strike power to local 
defences. To this end, in the words of NSC 162/2, "In the event of 
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as 
available for use as other munit tons~ .. 6 7 
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Tactidal nuclear weapons were introduced to US forces in Europe 
from 1953. Agreement over nuclear weapons information sharing was 
approved within NATO in March 1954. An Alliance version of massive 
retaliation was adopted between 1954 and 1957. lly 1957 arrangements 
were in hand to share US nuclear weapons with the European allies. 
Three years later there were about two thousand five hundred tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe.6S 
Tactical nuclear weapons were mostly integrated with the 
conventional (or "general purpose··) forces. They were used to stiffen 
NATO's so-called "Shield" which was to be used to buy time for the 
"Sword" of Strategic Air Command; they had a supportive, secondary, 
role in massive retaL-iation. Not only were general purpose forces 
supposed to buy time, they were deployed in Europe to act as a 
tripwire to escalation. NATO had agreed to plan to use nuclear 
weapons at the start of hos_tilities. Hence the following famous 
quote by Deputy Supreme Commander Montgomery in the mid-1950s: 
I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are 
basing all our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons in our own defense. With us it is no longer: 'They 
may possibly be used'. It is very definitely: 'They will be 
used, if we are attacked'.. In fact, we have reached the 
point of no return as regards the use of atomic and 
thermonuclear weapons in a hot war .. 6 9 
By the late 1950s the role of the general purpose forces was 
being refined - but sti 11 within the context of ••assive retaliation. 
Their purpose was to: 
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l) Hold the line in an all-out war whilst SAC's bombing · 
onslaught took its toll. 
2) Deter relatively small border incidents. 
3) Provide NATO with some flexibility, by enabling a limited 
(including a limited nuclear) option in the event of a 
Soviet at tack. In other words, general purpose, nuclear 
armed, shield forces might be used without triggering SAC 
assurtling a "less than ultimate incident". 70 
These Ideas were closely associated with the "pause" concept advocated 
by SACEUR General Norstad from 1957. It is unclear how the ideas were 
translated into planning. 
Be tween 1952 and 1956 the "retardation" role (nuclear 
interdiction of Soviet convent:i.onal forces) was moved from SAC to 
SACEUR's tactical airforces, 71 thus, presumably, facilitating theatre 
nuclear war planning. 
The central ele~ent in massive retaliation was of course 
Strategic Air Command. By 1.953 planning for strategic bombing 
firmly in the hands of the Alr Force - particularly SAC - with 
other services having only nominal influence. 72 Rosenberg 
described SAC's role in masstve retaliation as follows: 
By 1954) SAC t.~ns preparing to launc.~1 a sirnultaneo'us, massive 
integrated strike against a combination of target systems 
was 
the 
has 
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in the Soviet Union. In order to overwhelm Soviet air 
defenses, SAC planned to have the entire strike force of up 
to 735 bombers hit early warning screens simultaneously. 
Targeting categories and priorities set by the JCS were 
blurred In the interests of getting all the bombers into and 
out of Soviet air space as quickly as possible. There was 
no calculated strategy for war ~winning, beyond that of 
producing as much destruction as possible in a single, 
devastating blow. Increasing emphasis was placed on 
utilizing high yield weapons to cause bonus damage and 
destroy multiple targets simultaneously. This was 
facilitated by the entry into the American stockpile after 
the spring of 1954 of readily deliverable fusion weapons 
with yields ranging as high as fifteen megatons. 73 
In the midst of this onslaught top priority was given to destroying 
Russian nuclear capabilities. 74 
By the end of 1960 US strategic forces were being incorporated 
into the newly developed Single Integrated Operational Plan (SlOP) for 
Fiscal Year 1962. This SlOP was a scheme for, 
the massive} coordinated attack on a combination of target 
systems counterforce, military 1 industria 1} and 
governmental within the Soviet Union, China and the 
satellite nations planned for the first 24 hours of a 
general war.7 5 
"SIOP-62" called for the Unl.ted States to fire between 1,459 and 3,423 
nuclear weapons, depending on alert and readiness rates, at at least 
654 targets (apparently there were 151 urban-industrial areas 
targeted). Between 2,164 and 7,847 megatons would he dropped, killing 
between 175 million and 285 million Russians and Chinese. The 
redundancy tn targeti.ng was such that in order to satisfy themselves 
that a target comparable to Hiroshima could he destroyed to the extent 
that the Japanese city suffered in 1945 (as a result of a single 12.5 
kiloton bomb), the planners required SIOP-62 to assign three 80 
kiloton warheads. 76 
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The STOP - developed by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff 
(JSTPS) - was essentially under the control of SAC (although the other 
services did participate) and reflected SAC doctrine. 
In terms of doctrine the New Look appeared to treat the nexus 
between nuclear and conventional forces as a continuum;- nuclear 
weapons, particularly of the .. tactical .. variety, were seen by many as 
extensions of conventional firepower. For example* at a restricted 
session of the North Atlantic Council in April 1954, the US Secretary 
of State informed his audience that: 
The United States considers that the ability to use a.tomic 
weapons as conventional weapons is essential for the defense 
of the NATO area in the face of the present threat. 
In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having 
become "conventional", it should be our agreed policy, in 
case of [either general war or local] war, to use atomic 
weapons as conventional weapons against the mili.tary assets 
of the enemy whenever and whe'rever it would be of advantage 
to do so •.• 
The Secretary went on to say that the .. aggressor .. must be denied a 
"sanctuary status"; however this did not mean that "every local war 
must automatically be turned into a general war•·, and local use of 
atomic weapons would not involve indiscriminate bombing of .. civilian 
l . ..77 popu at1ons~ 
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A NATO report of 1954 seems to have concluded that: 
1. Warfare in the future would inevitably be atomic. 
2. The first 
military 
atomic targets would be 
installations rather than 
population. 
armed 
major 
forces 
centres 
and 
of 
3. The peak of destruction would come at the outset of the 
war5 
4. Therefore, the outcome would be determined by the active 
forces-in-being. 78 
The idea that the nuclear-conventional nexus was a continuum required 
a shift in US Army procedures and posture, hence the development of 
the "Pentomic" division which was supposed to be more able to fight in 
a nuclear war than its more traditional predecessor. 
There was a problem at SHAPE in calculating the effect of the New 
Look on conventional force requirements .. 79 The studies of 1952-53 
already referred to (see previous section), suggested that more, 
rather than less, troops might be required in a nuclear war. Other 
studies have shown that, in such a conflict, ~·one side or the other 
invariably lost almost all its combat capability in a few days ... so 
Nevertheless there was a body of opinion which believed that nuclear 
weapons would reduG:e manpower requirements. For instance, in 1954 1 
General Gruenther stated that: 
If seventy divisions~ for example. are needed to establish a 
c..onventio1.1al line of defence. between the Alps and the 
Baltic~ then Seventy min8
1
s X divisions equipped with atomic 
weapons would be needed. 
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If the nuclear armed general purpose forces went to "'ar it was 
expected to be a short, highly destructive, conflict; "the tactics 
called for destruction instead of mobility and capture": 
In an atomic defense, the brunt of needed forces are those to 
service the firepower) to force the enemy to form a target, 
and to identify the target.8 2 
But whether or not NATO forces fully incorporated the requisite 
posture for this type of atomic war is not clear; NATO seems to have 
stayed attached to more traditional conventional concepts (e.g. 
tactical nuclear warheads were concentrated in a few storage sites 
rather than routinely dispersed to field units). 83 
An early investigation of tactical nuclear war ''Project 
Vista" had, in 1952, advocated greater emphasis on local nuclear 
forces~ The resultant report encouraged some debate but was not 
accepted (for one thing it was suppressed by the US Air Force). 
Vista advocated a theatre nuclear posture somewhat different from that 
developed by NATO under the New Look. It suggested nuclear strikes 
by dedicated forces behind enemy frontlines. In particular it 
called for a "Tactical Atomic Air Force", counter-air operations 
(i.e. attacks against eno;!my airbases) and close support no closer 
than miles behind the lines. Nuclear and conv-entJonal 
operations would be simultaneous, related, but (to a degree) 
separate. 84 
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In contrast NATO adopted options for across-the-board 
nuclearisation, to the extent of deploying nuclear artillery and dual 
capable aircraft. 
Tbe relationship between nuclear bombing and the NATO theatre was 
the subject of a section of a 1955 report by the Weapons Systems 
Evaluation Group (WSEG) entitled ''Evaluation of an Atomic Offensive in 
support of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan". 85 (The Joiat 
Strategic Capabilities Plan JSCP replaced the Joint Outline 
Emergency War Plan. It is the JCS approved joint or coordinated plan 
for war should it break out in the near term). 
It appears that a section of this report dealt with the 
objectives of halting the Soviet Bloc military offensive "as close to 
D-Day frontiers as possi.ble"86 and of securing allied lines of 
cornmunicat ion. To attain these objectives it was believed that the 
following coaditions needed to be fulfilled: 
Allied ground strength must be adequate to force the 
Soviets to concentrate to the extent that they present 
good targets for atomic weapons; 
The Allies must have adequate ground forces to exploit the 
effects of atomic weapons by counterattacking; 
- The Allies must be able to provide a defense irr depth 
capable of breaking up such penetrations as the Soviets 
may make; 
The Allies must have adequate logistic support for their 
combat forces; 
The Allies must have air superior1ty. 87 
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In terms of meeting these conditions, Allied capabilities were 
considered "marginal". According to a briefing on the report: 
It does not appear that the Allies have adequate forces in 
any area, except possibly Korea, to exploit the effects of 
atomic ~eapons by counterattack. Further, as of 1 July 1955 
the Allies do not appear to have sufficient ground forces to 
provide a defense in depth capable of breaking up Soviet 
penetrations .•• 
Interdiction of Soviet land lines of communications is a 
part of SACEUR' s plan. If the Soviets employ the world-~ide 
strategy, it is estimated that any reasonable Allied 
interdiction effort, both atomic and conventional, would 
probably not limit the Soviets logistically in Central 
Europe. Ho'Wever, the uncertainties involved in this estimate 
are so large that such a conclusion may be incorrect. The 
major contribution of the Allied atomic interdiction effort 
may be the initial imposition of a fe~ days delay in which 
to attain their best defensive posture •. * 
Allied air superiority is a must for successful ground 
operations in any of the theaters. Therefore, the 
allocation of additional atomic weapons to troop targets is 
not warranted at the expense of weapons required to gain air 
superiority. 
With respect to tbe objective of securing Allied lines of 
communication, it appears that if planned Allied efforts to 
counter Soviet threats to sea tranport are implemented, 
Allied merchant shipping losses "'ill not cause a critical 
reduction in the support of the overseas theaters of 
operations. In addition to limiting Soviet submar:f.ne 
operations, the U,. S ~ atomic strikes against Soviet naval 
bases and supporting facilities are expected to reduce 
substantially the Soviet's capability to conduct amphibious 
operations and to provide seaborn logistic support for their 
forces.. In contrast to the foregoing favourable 
conclusions, we estimate that because of insufficent 
stockpiles and manufacturing rates, the Allied forces in 
Central Europe would becom~ short gf artillery ammunition 
during the third month of figbt1ng. 8 
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The report noted the problem facing NATO as a result of Soviet 
stockpiling; this could mean a lag of some months between US strategic 
bombing anrl serious Russian supply shortages at the frontline. It 
also suggested assigning larger warheads to "some airfield targets, to 
some ports and naval facilities, and to about thirty-three of SACEUR'S 
interdiction targets, particularly bridges. "89 
* * * 
The more extreme interpretations of massive retaliation, such as 
the one apparently epitomised in SIOP-62, were subject to intense 
controversy, not least due to criticism from the US Army. Most of the 
alleged flaws of the New Look have already been outlined in the 
previous chapter. It is sufficient to say here that, during the 
1950s, two successive Army Chiefs of Staff (Generals Ridgway and 
Taylor) had running battles in the JCS over the assumptions and 
implications of the New Look. General Taylor especially advocated a 
more flexible approach to warplanning in which ground forces would 
have a prominent role; he also called for "dual capable" forces that 
could be used in both nuclear and conventional war. 90 In particular, 
critics were concerned that the US option for conventional war was 
being undermined at the very time it might be needed: parity in 
nuclear weaponry with the USSR was looming which made strategic 
attacks suicidal and therefore incredible; tactical nuclear weapons 
had dangerous escalatory potential; "brush-fire'' wars looked likely 
and nuclea-r weapons seemed somewhat inappropriate counters to them. 
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In reaction to massive retaliation some work was done in 
introducing flexibility into warplanning. In time this work, like the 
development of the New Look, was to have important implications for 
the nexus between nuclear and conventional forces. An early 
qualification of massive retaliation has already been mentioned 
Norstad's ''pause" concept, outlined in 1957. In the same year a 
Colonel at SHAPE formulated a precursor of flexible response -the so-
called Stilwell Report. Rowny has stated that, 
the study envisaged a forward defense concept whereby the use 
of conventional land, sea and ai.r forces would be used. 
Should these forces-in-being be judged to be incapable of 
countering Warsaw Pact aggression, then tactical nuclear 
weapons would be used and additional forces would be rapidly 
transported to Western Europe. 
Stilwell's study used the term "direct defense" as the concept 
for countering aggression on the level at which the enemy 
might choose to fight. It also introduced into NATO, for the 
first time 1 the notion of "deliberate escalation" whereby 
agression would be countered by deliberately raising the scope 
and Jntensi.ty of combat so as to make the threat of nuclear 
response more imminent. This would be done by intensifying 
the non-nuclear engagement, by taking offensive action on another 
front, or by using tactical nuclear weapons. This failing, 
strategic nuclear weapons released to S9'1CEUR t s control would 
be used inltially against military targets. 1 
As Schwartz has noted) the report was, for the moment at least) 
shelved. 
§l_!he Move to Flexible Response 1961-1965 
In 1961 the new Kennedy adml.nistration directed a change in 
United States strategy away from masstve retaliation to flexible 
reponse~ Flexible response required the dividing up of the attack 
plan of SIOP-62 into separate, smaller, attack options, and the 
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expansion of conventional forces. The change was based on acceptance 
of the deep and wide-ranging critique of massive retaliation that had 
developed during the 1950s (this critique is described in the 
literature survey). There were three main reasons for the change, 
which will be briefly sketched here. 92 
Firstly, the emerging international context seemed to demand a 
shift away from the allegedly all-or-nothing implications of the New 
Look. Instability in the Third World, the growing Soviet nuclear 
deterrent, and some, albeit li.mited, trends in NATO suggested the need 
for less-than-ultimate strategies; this need was linked to the search 
for "credibility'' believable threats arguably required usable 
military forces. Of these international factors the prospect of a 
devastating Soviet reprisal to massive retaliation was perhaps 
salient. The refinement and greater sophistication of the Kennedy-
McNamara SlOP ( SIOP-63, introduced in 1962), and the strengthening of 
general purpose forces~ was intended to tntroduce balance and utility 
into US strategy in the face of the Soviet nuclear build up and 
disorder in the Third World. The attempt to enforce or manipulate 
thre_sholds (such as the nuclear-conventional, and counter force-
counter city thresholds) was seen as an indication of strategic 
maturity* Whereas in the 1950s the threat to lower the nuclear 
threshold was seen~ by the Eisenhower administration, as necessary to 
the security of American interests, it was now thought that the 
ability to raise various thresholds was necessary for the country's 
survival .. Even so, the Kennedy ad1nlnistration did r:ot go so far as 
to declRre a policy of no~first-use of nuclear weapons, princip;jjy for. 
reasons of Alliance politics. 
-110-
Secondly, domestic political factors opened the door to a change 
in strategic policy. Kennedy had used the putative flaws of massive 
retaliation as a stick to beat the Republicans in his election 
campaign. So, reinforcing Kennedy's own feelings on the subject 
{which were in favour of flexible response), there was political 
pressure to II!Ove away from the New Look - which was, after all, a 
Republican label. 
Thirdly, perceptions of the international-strategic context, and 
the entry into office of a dynamic new administration, converged to 
allow "defence intellectuals" - nurtured on reaction to the New Look -
to move into areas of influence and advise on defence policy. These 
strategists were a significant force in shaping flexible response. 
The adoption of flexible response represented an attempt to find 
diplomatically and militarily usable conventional and nuclear options. 
Despite real or approaching conditions of mutual deterrence, American 
military power was to be used as a key element in US foreign policy -
by, for example, countering subversion in the Third World, and 
providing the cornerstone of extended deterrence, thereby reinforcing 
United States' leadership of the Western Alliance. This type of 
poll.tico-military power projection had its dangers; in particular 
there was a risk of local di.sputes escalating to all-out nuclear war 
with the USSR. Flexible response attempted to minimise the likelihood 
of such escalation while retaining the threat of nuclear war to deter 
the Soviet Union and reassure the Alliance. 
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At the most basic level the shift away from massive retaliation 
required a change in the definition of "general war" (or all-out war 
with the Soviet Union). Kaplan states that, under massive 
retaliation, the JSCP (JCS approved warplan) had defined general war, 
in the following terms: 
"A general war is an armed conflict in which Armed Forces of 
the U.S.S.R. and those of the United States are overtly and 
directly engaged." In 1958, the Army had tried to add to 
this sentence the phrase, as pri.ncip&/· protagoni_sts with 
the national survival of both deemed to be at issue," but 
the Air Force succeeded in removing the amendment. And in 
general war, the u .. s. Emergency War plan the nuclear war 
plan, which ~~s superseded in late !960 by the SIOP would 
be executed. 
The definition was changed in 1962 ''so that", in Kaplan's words, "an 
armed conflict between the US and the Russians would not inevitably 
escalate into nuclear war of any sort.-- 94 
. SIOP-62 was an early issue for revision by the new 
admL1.istration. The first step was to try and move away from the all-
or-nothing implications of the Eisenhower SIOP. 
NATO meeting in Athens in 1962, 95 
As McNamara told a 
•• -..the u.s. has come to the conclusion that to the extent 
feasible basic military strategy in general nuclear war 
should be approached in much the same way that more 
conventional mill tary operations have been regarded in the 
past. That is to say, our princircJ ndlitary objectives, in 
the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on 
the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's 
military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as 
well as the integrity of allied society. Specifically, our 
studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear 
forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and 
military targets has serious 1 imitations for the purpose of 
deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war .. 
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The Defense Secretary continued: 
In the light of these findings the United States has 
developed its plans in order to permit a variety of 
strategic choices.. We have also instituted a number of 
programs which will enable the Alliance to engage in a 
controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that 
deterrence should fail. 
Ball has described how the massive retaliation SIOP (SIOP-62) was 
altered to accommodate flexible response in the form of SIOP-63. This 
new SlOP .. had a number of novel features .. : 96 
1. China and the satellite countries were separated from 
the USSR for targeting purposes. 
2. Soviet strategic forces were separated from Soviet 
cities on US target lists. 
3. Strategic reserves were to be held by the US in 
accordance with the concept of intra-war deterrence. 
'*"· US command and control systems were to be protected to 
allow 'controlled response'. 
5* Soviet command and control was to be preserved, at 
least in the initial stages of any nuclear exchange~ 
The US SIOP was given f.ive 'options', plus various sub-
options with US attacks against the USSR to proceed along 
the following spectrum: 
I. Soviet strategic nuclear delivery forces, includirrg 
missile sites> bomber bases and submarine tenders. 
II. Other elements of Soviet military forces and military 
resources> located away from cities - for ekareple, air 
defences covering US bomber routes. 
III. Soviet military forces and military resources near 
cities. 
IV. Soviet command and control centres and systems. 
V. If rrecessary, all-out urban-industrial attack. 
Bal: goes on to show tl1at US strategic planning was 
97 
counterforce in character. 
primarily 
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In his 1962 NATO address in Athens, McNamara noted that the 
demands that the new strategy would place on the survivability, 
command and control of the nuclear forces committed to SIOP-63: 
A large nuclear force is not enough to assure a politically 
responsible force, or to carry out a policy of controlled 
and selective response, or to permit us to fulfill all 
important general war missions. These vital properties 
depend on the survivability and endurance of the forces and 
their vital networks of command and control. The Alliance 
now possesses the ability to absorb a Soviet attack and go 
on to destroy a very high proportion of the targets of 
importance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This powerful, second-
strike force will be maintained together with the ability to 
control and direct the forces as the military situation may 
dictate at the time. For this purpose, distance, dispersal, 
mobility, hardness, and alertness represent the most 
effective measures at o~r ~isposal. Al~8are being exploited in current bomber and m1ss1le programs<> 
According to Enthoven and Smith, "Perhaps the most critical 
vulnerability problem ..• lay in the US high-level command structure • .,9 9 
Consequently: 
An extensive program was undertaken to improve and protect 
the command and control facilitief 8f U.S. strategic nuclear 
forces against a surprise attack. 0 
A major assumption of SIOP level planning was that America's 
strategic nuclear arsenal might be held back, for a while at least, in 
a NATO conflict. This placed a heavier load on theatre nuclear forces 
and, more particularly, on conventional forces which were now expected 
to try to hold a Warsaw Pact invasion for as long as practicable 
without nuclear support. That was the theory, at least. According 
to the ~octrine of flexible response, weak conventional forces 
represented a deterrent gap that might be exploited of by the USSR. 
As one intelligence report noted in the early 1960s: 
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The general implication of the Soviet military posture and 
the strategy which it supports would appear to be that the 
Soviets hope to confront us with continuing political 
pressure, subversion and variOus forms of unconventional 
warfare under the umbrella of their growing strategic power. 
At the same time, they would hope to capitalize on their 
conventional military power by the implicit threat of 
bringing it to bear on situations where they have a local 
conventional superiority. Thus -barring successful effort 
on our- pflrt to create additional options- such a str8.tegy 
coulO, ,qt worst, leave open to us the unpalatable choice of 
a first strike or swallowing our losses in a series of 
confrontations at local pressure points around the periphery 
of the Soviet Bloc. Increased Soviet ability to put direct 
pressure on the United States (through the threat of larger 
forces capable of hitting the US) would also open us to 
added Soviet efforts to sep~rd\te us from our Allies, and to 
create divisions among them. 
Weak conventional forces might add to the pressure for early use of 
nuclear weapons - just the sort of situation that flexible response 
was intended to avoid. In the words of a State Department analysis: 
"1>.'e attach the greatest importance to 'raising the threshold' beyond 
which the President might have to decide to initiate the use of 
1 .. 102 nuc ear weapons. 
To Kennedy and McNamara the solution was obvious: more money 
should be spent on conventional forces, and these forces should be 
capable of engaging in sustained conventional operations. To this end 
the President directed that the Army be expanded and that it abandon 
its Pentamic division structure (primarily orientated to the nuclear 
battlefield) and adopt a posture more capable of conventional 
combat. 103 
Mako has described how the 1961 Berlin crisis spurred efforts to 
provide a more capable conventional defence for NATO: 
-llS-
The three training divisions in the active Army were brought 
up to full strength and made combat-ready. About 42,000 
troops were sent to Europe, mostly to provide the u.s. Army 
in Europe with the combat and support units necessary for 
sustained conventional operations that had been lacking 
since the Army's 1956 reorganization for nuclear combat. 
The three infantry divisions in West Germany were mechanized 
and additional heavy divisions in the United States were 
activated, so that the ratio of heavy to light divisions In 
the ground forces was substantially increased ••. 
To facilitate the deployment of u.s. based heavy formations 
the equipment for two divisions was also prepositioned in 
Europe. At the height of the crisis, a limited mobilization 
was carried out in which 119,000 Army reservists were called 
104 up .. • 
Enthoven and Smith have outlined the build-up of conventional fire-
power under Kennedy: 
The number of active combat-ready Army divisions was 
increased from 11 to 16, and the number of active Air Force 
tactical air wings from 16 to 21. The annual rate of 
procurement of c.onventtonal weapons and ammunition and 
equipment was almost doubled. Over one hundred thousand 
additional men were added to the Army. The size of the 
Special Forces was greatly increased. The Marine Corp's 
strength was increased and the Marine Corps Reserve expanded 
to a full fourth division/wing team. A major expansion of 
airlift capabilities was undertaken. The tempo of 
modernization of naval and tactical air forces was greatly 
speeded up. Research and development funds for work on non-
nuclear weapons and ordnance were significantly increased~ 
Important improvements were made in organisation> training, 
readiness, and particularly the balance among elements of 
our general-purpose forces. By 1963, the United States was 
well on the way to having a meaningful alternative to the 
choice between responding to noJ'S'uclear aggression with 
nuclear weapons and surrendering. 10 
This US build-up was paralleled by West German re-armament. 
Despite the emphasis on the conventional force build-up, the US 
maintained an option to fire nuclear weapons first, rather than accept 
defeat in a conventional war. And, McNamara noted in his !:_Q~ 
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Statement for Fiscal Year 1966, 
NATO should not only have an improved capability to meet 
major non-nuclear assaults with non~nuclear means and forces 
prepared for that option, but it should also achieve true 
tactical nuclear capability which should include a broad, 
flexible range of nuclear options, short of general nuclear 
war, and the means to implement them. 106 
But, as contingency planning for Berlin had shown, it was not only 
distasteful but difficult to envisage how this tactical nuclear option 
might be used. 107 Several years later McNamara wrote that "there was 
great uncertainty as to whether and, if so, how nuclear weapons could 
be used to NATO's advantage." 108 McNamara stated that, 
in long private conversations with successive Presidents -
Kennedy and Johnson - I recommended, without qualification, 
that they never initiate~ under any circumstances} the use 
of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my 
recommendation. 109 
However, "private conversations·· aside, McNamara had assured the 
Allies that "The Cnited States is ••• prepared to counter with nuclear 
weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong it cannot be dealt 
wi.th by conventional means."ltO At the same time he made it clear 
that the administration did not find this a comfortable position. 
Enthoven and Smith have described the conclusions of early 
studies on tactical nuclear war which indfcated enormous problems in 
controlling escalation in such a conflict. 111 As an illustration of 
the l~vel of destruction that might be expected in tactical nuclear 
war, Zuckerman r.:efers to estimates of 200-250 nuclear "strikes" {with 
an average of 20 kiloton warheads) in an area of NATO territory "no 
ilL 
more than 50 by 30 miles" within "a few days". Such strikes could 
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be duplicated along the length of the front. 
In spite of the dangers of tactical nuclear weapons - and in 
apparent contradiction to the demands of flexible response (such as: 
survivability, centralised command and control, and rai.sing the 
nuclear threshold) - the numbers of these weapons in Europe went up 
dramatically during the 1960s. It seems that there were about 2, 500 
such weapons in 1960; 4,000 in 1963; 5,000 in 1965; 6,000 in 1966; and 
7 ,200, in 1968. 113 Rowen has offered an explanation of this growth in 
the arsenal which suggests that Kennedy and McNamara lacked the 
political motivation, power) and drive to reverse the trend in the 
expansion of NATO's auclear arsena1. 114 However, the rate of increase 
was slowed down. 
The growth in the TNF arsenal partly overlapped abortive 
attempts to put together a system of collective NATO nuclear forces. 
This attempt, centred around the concept of a "Multilateral Force" 
(MLF) , llS became a blind alley. The reason had much to do with the 
complexities of Alliaace politics and Washington's maintenance of its 
veto over the use of "NATO" weapons. Meanwhile extended deterrence was 
to be reinforced by the arrival of thousands of additional US TNF to 
the Continent. 
According to McNamara the first-use of NATO tactical nuclear 
b "l d 1 i . t d.. 116 ueapons was to e ate an m1 e • The "late and limited" 
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formula for tactical nuclear weapons put preSsure on conventional 
forces without answering the question of how to fight a theatre 
nuclear war should the conventionaldefense line look like collapsing. 
The issue may have been intractable. It appears that "unresolved 
questions relating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons" helped 
prevent Kennedy from approving a statement of "Basic National Security 
P li ,. 117 o cy • In his 1962 Athens address McNamara spelt out to the 
allies some of the problems and dilemmas involved in tactical nuclear 
war: 
NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in 
the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear 
exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most 
painful to contemplate. Further such an exchange would be 
unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could 
rapidly lead to general nuclear war. 
To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily 
for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ 
such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt 
without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. 
This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But 
prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to 
predict what the political consequences would be of taking 
such action. It is also conceivable that the limited 
tactical use of nuclear weapons on the the battlefield would 
not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform 
it. But we do not rate these prospects very highly. 
Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops 
would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and 
unauthorised acts could well occur on both sides. 
Furthermore> the pressures on the Soviets to respond in 
kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems) the enormous 
firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and 
accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from 
unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial 
importance of atr superiority in nuclear operations - all 
these considerations suggest to us that local nuclear war 
would be transient but highly destructive phenomenon ••• 
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It is possible, as I have mentioned, that a small, 
demonstrative use of nuclear weapons could be contained 
locally, and possibly, distant nuclear operations in less 
vi tal locations outside the NATO area, or at sea, may be 
limitable. But there is likely to be no effective 
operational boundary, or set of mutual restraints, which 
could restrict large-scale nuclear war to NATO Europe and 
the satellites. As we understand the dynamics of nuclear 
warfare, we believe that a local nuclear engagement would do 
grave damage to Europe, be militarily ineffective, and would 
probably e~pand v~ry rapidly into general nuclear war. 
(Emphasis added.) 11~ 
This probability of expansion or escalation required co-ordination of 
strategic and th_ea tre forces because, as McNamara noted, "the 
indivisible character of nuclear war compels it".ll9 
Clearly the avoidance of nuclear war with the USSR was a high 
priority and, to prevent the chain of events outlined above, some 
changes to the nuclear-conventional nexus were required. 
Unfortunately for McNamara this nexus was partly in the hands of the 
Europeans. The administration was very aware that the nuclear 
threshold was partly hostage to European action or inaction. European 
hesitancy over flexible response particularly regarding expenditure 
on conventional forces (and the development of independent deterrents) 
prevented a clear or smooth transition from massive retaliation to 
flexible response. This was paralleled by SACEUR General Lemnitzer's 
attachment to the old strategy120 (as enshrined in MC14/2), and the 
US military's growing appetite for tactical nuclear weapons. Besides 
which, for reasons mentioned earlier, the practical application of 
limited war theories to European conditions looked doubtful. 
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At the "sharp end" of US strategy NATO - US and allied forces 
seemed locked-in to a .sort of de facto massive retaliation; while at 
the more abstract level of the SIOP the administration was able to 
effect the adoption of some kind of flexible response. The 
consequences for the nucleat-conventional nexus were, to put it 
mildly, ambiguous. Further movement on Alliance policy was needed to 
clarify the issue. 
P) The Development of Flexible Response 1966-1976 
The American adoption of flexible response in the early 1960s 
was a unilateral move presented to the allies as a fait accompli. One 
of the biggest obstacles to translating the concept of flexible 
response into practice was European recalcitrance. To the allies the 
conventional balance appeared heavily stacked in favour of the East. 
This made expensive improvements to NATOr s conventional forces seem 
marginal. Also the UK and France were developing independent "minimum 
deterrent" nuclear forces which lessened the prospects for a centrally 
(US) controlled limited counterforce option in the event of a war with 
the USSR. And West Germany insisted on forward defence, which implied 
early recourse to tacttcal nuclear weapons - as territory was not to 
be traded for time. In addition the risks were high in Europe as vital 
national interests were at stake; this made the notion of limited war 
look doubtful. The crowded continent~ which included the western 
portion of the Soviet Union, offe.re:C few natural firebreaks. To many 
Europeans (especially the French) h!.storical, technicRl and 
geof~olitical considerations .suggested the absurdity and dangers of 
adopting limited war concepts to their defence, particularly if such a 
defence was to be centrally directed from Washington. On the: other 
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hand, US officials found the European attachment to the threat of 
nuclear catastrophe more reckless, as well as short-sighted, than the 
American attempt to establish firebreaks to contain conflict.' 
In an attempt to get the allies behind flexible response, the 
United States, under McNamara's direction, opened up the nuclear 
planning process to European inspection and consultation. It was an 
exercise in persuasion that led to the establishment nf the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. 121 
'IATO finally adopted flexible response as official doctrine in 
1967. The doctr1ne was outlined in a document known as MC14/3 
entitled ''Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO 
Area". The acceptance of flexible response was facilitated by the 
French withdrawal from NATO's integrated !llilitary command. HC14/3 was 
a watered-down version of American ideas of flexible response. 
Despite European hesitancy over flexible response the United 
States stuck to the doctrine and, indeed. moved to build on it. A 
series of developments between 1969 and 1975 led to a new SIOP (SlOP-
5), which entered the warplans in January 1976. One of these 
developments arose out of the Jordanian crisis of 1970. Kaplan has 
noted that during this crisis National Security Advisor Kissinger 
bec.Bme "frustrated" about the lack of plausible US limited 
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nuclear attack plans.122 This frustration apparently encouraged 
further efforts to formulate more refined target packages. SIOP-5 was 
based on a Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP-1, signed in April 
1974), itself a result of National Security Decision Memoranduo 242 
(NSDM-242). NSDM-242 called for the development of more limited and 
selective nuclear attack plans.l23 
These developments were associated with Defence Secretary 
Schlesinger. According to Schlesinger, "Nuclear weapons now cast 
their shadow over all of .. us ••• He continued: 
Without a firn foundation of nuclear deterrent forces the 
rest of our power would not count for much in the modern 
world. 
I cannot stress this last point too strongly. All 
since 1945 have been non-nuclear wars shadowed by 
nuclear presence~ The threat to use nuclear weapons 
remained, for the most part, in the background} 
belligerents and neutrals alike have known that, like 
big stick in the closet, it was there. 124 
wars 
the 
has 
but 
the 
Schlesinger argued that strategic analysis and planning should take 
into account the possibility of limited Soviet attacks, such as 
against the allies or US ICBMs: 
Nuclear threats to our strategic forces, whether limited or 
large-scale~ might well call for an option to respond in 
kind against the attacker's military forces. In other 
words, to be credible. and hence effective over the range of 
possible contingencies, deterrence must rest on many options 
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and on a spectrum of capabilities (within the constraints of 
SALT) to support these options. Certainly such complex 
matters as response options cannot be left hanging until a 
crisis. They must be thought through beforehand. Morever, 
appropriate sensors to assist in determining the nature of 
the attack, and adequately responsive command-control 
arrangements, must also be available. And a venturesome 
oppone.nt must know that we have all of these 
capabilities. 125 
Schlesinger found the options developed in the 1960s unsatisfactory: 
In the past, most of those. options - whether the 
targets were cities, industrial facilities, or 
installations have involved relatively 
responses .. 12b 
principal 
military 
massive 
Cordesman has noted reports that until the mid 1970s the limited SlOP 
attack options involved at least 2,500 weapons and were so closely 
meshed with NATO plans that they would have "almost automatically 
triggered" an additional 1,000 NATO nuclear strikes. 127 
Schlesinger saw a requirem~nt for a force that, 
.. ~in response to Soviet actions, could implement a variety 
of limited preplanned options and react rapidly to 
retargeting orders so as to deter any range of further 
attacks that a potential enemy might contemplate •.• 
[Another] requirement is for a range and magnitude of 
capabilities such that everyone -friend, foe and domestic 
audience alike - will perceive that we are the equal of our 
strongest competitors. We should not take the chance that 
in this most hazardous of areas, misperceptions could lead 
to miscalculation, confrontation, and crisis. 128 
The result of these moves was the development of Limited Nuclear 
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Options (LNO). It seems cl~ar that a primary rationale for LNOs was 
possible use of strategic nuclear weapons in regional conflicts .. 
Schlesinger had talked of ffthe importance of strategic forces in 
establishing a framework within which conflicts may take place st a 
lower level. " 129 He also referred to the extended deterrent to NATO 
and the way that it demanded "both more limited· responses than 
destroying cities and advanced planning tailored to such lesser 
responses." 130 The possible use of LNOs in regional war also implied 
the selective targeting of the Warsaw Pact conventional force 
structure .. 131 Schlesinger explicitly tied his notions of limited 
nuclear war planning to the security of Europe in a presentation to 
some apparently incredulous senators during congressional 
hearings • 132 
Cordesman has described two types of options, closely related to 
LNOs, that developed out of the NSDM-242 process: 
Regional Nuclear Options (RNO) included the entire mix of 
countervalue and counterforce targets in areas like the 
Warsaw Pact or Persian Gulf that might be attacked by US 
strategic and theatre nuclear forces. In many parts of 
the world, the same type of options were most logically 
targeted on Soviet territory ••. 
Theatre Nuclear Options (TNO) included all the military 
targets in the theatre of operations directly involved in 
the conflicts. They could involve many different types 
of 'theatre' throughout the world, and they often 
overlapped RNO when the theatre involved conflicts as 
large as the entire Central Region. More attention was 
also devoted to the use of theatre nuclear weapons in TNO 
than in the other options, although it was clear that 
theatre weaqons 
RNO as well. 33 
could be employed ln LNO and 
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Of course, in the NATO context, regional military capabilities 
were already backed-up by thousands of deployed theatre nuclear forces 
(TNF). Since 1966-67 the Alliance had been consulting on ideas for 
limiting the use of TNF in the event of the West deciding to cross the 
nuclear threshold in response to a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion; 
but progress was slow~ The Nuclear Planning Group had a prominent 
role in this consultation. Buteux has summarised the early work of 
the NPG as falling into the three broad categories concerning 
discussions over (a) circumstances of NATO use of nuclear weapons; (b) 
objectives and means of such use; and (c) emergency consultations 
regarding use of nuclear weapons. 134 
One of the first concerns of the NPG was wl.th policy for Atondc 
Deooli tion Mines (ADH). This i.ssue was apparently raised by Turkey 
(perhaps with German backing) in 1967. It was followed by German 
feelers for veto power over the use of NATO weapons based in the 
Federal '35 Republic.' During 1968-69 an Anglo-German report on 
possible first-use of TNF was produced. The first-use issue has long 
been a central one in NATO thinking, so Buteux's following description 
of the Anglo-German report deserves to be quoted at length: 
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The 65-page paper suggested a number of general principles, 
which should be included in the proposed guidelines 
governing resort to·· nuclear weapons in defence of the NATO 
area. Among them, one, clearly reflecting German 
interests, was that any decision to use nuclear weapons 
should be taken in the last resort by those immediately 
concerned9 This was understood to mean the possessor of the 
warhead, the possessor of the launcher and the country from 
which the weapon would be fired. However, again as a 
general pri.nciple, the likely issues. circumstances and 
consequences surrounding a decision to use nuclear weapons 
would be fully discussed and, where possible, agreed by the 
allies in advance. Another proposal was that initially 
nuclear weapons should be used very sparingly, the report 
stressed that nuclear weapons used tactically were not to be 
conceived simply as an extreme form of artillery, but rather 
as a means of demonstrating resolve and the willingness of 
the allies to escalate the level of conflict further if 
necessary* The overall intention of the paper was not to 
extend the authority or responsibilities of the NATO 
military commanders, but to provide the basis for political 
guidance in a crisis, and to indicate the underlying 
tactical and technical problems that needed to be resolved, 
including the problem of rapid consultation in an 
emergency. 
Although there was apparently a broad degree of acceptance 
for the proposals contained in the Anglo-German paper, 
agreement seemed closer on questions involving arrangements 
for consultation in the event of the possible use of nuclear 
weapons being considered than on questions involving what 
stage in a conflict such weapons might be used and on what 
scale. The joint paper seemed to suggest a rather earlier 
resort to nuclear weapons in the event of conflict in 
central Europe than was envisage.d by the Americans. In 
addition, the Anglo-German approach seemed to favour in 
these circumstances a limited demonstration use rathe.r than 
the more massive use favoured by the Americans in order to 
secure a definite, if only temporary, military advantage. 
In essence the difference was the old one between the 
Europeans who argued that forward defence could only be 
accomplished by the deterrent threat to use nuclear weapons 
at a relatively early stage in a conflict, and the Americans 
who continued to seek a higher nuclear threshold through 
increased conventional force contributions from the European 
allies. No firm guidelines were suggested as to where the 
nuclear threshold might occur. It was widely appreciated 
that this would depend on the circumstances and scale of any 
attack, and no allied government would commit itself to any 
firm course of action in advance. lJ6 
Other reports written in the co~text of the NPG at the time dealt with 
maritime use of nuclear weapons, ADMs, nuclear anti-aircraft weapons, 
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the use of TNF on the battlefield, and the demonstration use of 
TNF • 137 
At the end of 1969 the Anglo-German paper on first-use was 
revised and accepted as "Provisional Political Guidelines for the 
Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO" • 138 These 
guidelines have been described as offering the military an idea "as to 
the circumstances in which initial tactical use of nuclear weapons 
. h b h t d " 139 m1g t e aut or se • It seems clear that the most important such 
eire urns tance was probably the threat of an imminent Warsaw Pact 
breakthrough. Also at the end of 1969, a decision was made to try and 
speed-up procedures for consultation in a crisis. 140 
In 1970 NATO adopted a document called "Concepts for the role of 
theatre nuclear strike forces in Allied Command E-urope''. This was an 
attempt to place TNF doctrine more firmly into the framework outlined 
by MCl4/3; it was revised in 1972. The document apparently provided a 
basis for the development of Selective Employment Plans (SEPs) for 
TNF. 141 A report submitted in 1974 suggested that (in the words of 
Legge): 
Follow-on use [of TNF, assuming the failure of first-use] 
should have the same porpose as initial use (to persuade the 
enemy to cease his aggression and withdraw), and the nature 
of the use should therefore sttll be se\ective and be 
designed to meet this political requirement. 1 2 
'!:n 1975 an attempt to produce "consolidated" guidance (presumably 
bringing together the numerous separate NPG reports) failed. 143 
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This may have reflected the difficulty in achieving a consensus on 
details (compared to general concepts), at least as far as TNF were 
concerned. 
Despite these limitations some changes were made to the plans. 
According to Cordesman: 
Tactical nuclear bomb yields and tactical missile yields 
were ••• cut back to levels more proportionate to the size of 
Warsaw Pact targets. NATO also adopted new Nuclear 
Operations Plans (NOP) to reduce collateral damage, and 
changed the Priority Strike Programme (PSP) within the NOP 
to provide additional lower-threshold strike options.l44 
Schlesinger saw the development of TNF as paralleling the shifts in 
SlOP level planning. He laid down five conditions for a sound TNF 
posture: 
First, we must reduce their vulnerability to sabotage, 
seizure, and conventional assault. 
Second, the vulnerability of these forces to surprise 
nuclear attack should be reduced, and the more exposed dual-
capable systems should have the capability to disperse 
quickly so as to match a surprise dispersal by the Warsaw 
Pact. And even after dispersal, all forces should remain 
under central command and control, which may imply the 
organization of new units with more specialized nuclear 
missions ••• 
Third, we need to improve our centralized command and 
control and campaign assessment capabilities to the point 
where reliable and comprehensive information about both non-
nuclear and nuclear attacks, and the status of defending 
forces, can he mare rapidly and reliably communicated to 
those political leaders who hold the responsibility for 
nuclear decisions and the release of nuclear weapons. 
Fourth, target acquisition systems that can survive at least 
the first phase of any nuclear use still remain essential if 
we are to be able to implement a range of selective and 
controlled options, and at the same time limit the 
collateral damage from their implementation. 
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Fl.fth, we should continue to develop selective, carefully 
controlled options that will permit us: (a) to enhanc" our 
ability to deal with major penetrations of an allied sector 
and achieve a quick 1 declsive reversal of the tactical 
situation; and (b) to engage, if necessary, in a highly 
discriminating interdiction campaign against enemy lines of 
communication~ Both basic options are designed sO as to 
minimize the incentives for the enemy to reply at all or to 
respond with controlled attacks.l 4 5 
During the early l.970s US Army doctrine moved towards an explicit 
adoption of limited theatre nuclear operations. In 1971 a new field 
manual stated that tactical nuclear warfare was defined as 
••• a conflict between the land forces and associated air 
and naval forces of two or more nations in which nuclear 
weapons are limited to the defeat of opposing farces in a 
theatre of operations. Implicit in this definition is the 
condition that a strategic nuclear exchange on the 
belligerents' homelands does not occur. 14 6 
In ~lay 1973 an Army policy paper called "Deployment and Employ!7lent for 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons" identified five "employment options": 147 
1) Demonstration 
2) Limited defensive use 
3) Restricted battle area use 
4) Extended battle area use 
5) Theatre wide use .. 
Another Aruiy manual stated that: 
Unless the enemy uses them first, nuclear weapons will not 
be authorised before conventional defenses have been 
severely tested and found inadequate. The situation facing 
corps at the time nuclear weapons are requested must 
therefore be grave -- under sustained attack by superior 
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forces, own forces becoming fully committed and not likely 
to hold, reinforcements not available, insufficient combat 
support: and combat service support available to sustain the 
defense, and the surivivability of the force in question. 
One of the criteria to be followed by the corps commander in 
requesting release of nuclear weapons is that the corps 
defensive capability must not be allowed to deteriorate to 
the point where the corps could not defend conventionally. 
After the release and execution of the nuclear strike, the 
corps must have sufficient forces available to conduct a 
conventional forward defense against the remaini.ng enemy 
forces. (Emphasis added.) 148 
In other words, use of nuclear weapons had to be delayed until 
conventional defences were approaching a desperate condition, however 
the delay could not be too long: after a defensive nuclear strike 
ground forces were expected to be able to maintain a viable defence 
line. 
Schlesinger, like McNamara, put NATO on notice that the burden of 
deterrence was shifting away from US nuclear weapons towards allied 
conventional forces . 149 Just as changes to the SlOP reflected a hope 
for escalation control, so. too did the importance attached to 
conventional forces: 
In an era of world-wide US interests, power politics and 
nuclear parity, it is preferable to deter or to repel 
limited threats by limited means. To do that requires a 
capability to place boundaries on conflicts and exercise 
some degree of control over the escalation of violence in 
the ~vent that deterrence should fail. The general purpose 
forces, it is generally agreed, are best suited to these 
purposes. 150 
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Schlesinger made an obvious statement on first-use, but one with 
contentious implications: "the decision to use nuclear weapons will be 
an agonizing decision not lightly entered into by anybody nor lightly 
concurred in by the member nations of NATO." 151 This meant, as shown 
above, that the Americans would push for a raising of the nuclear 
threshold and an enforcement of a firebreak between conventional and 
nuclear weapons. But, as in the early 1960s (and for much the same 
reasons) the US did not adopt a formal policy of no-first-use of 
nuclear weapons. Alliance diplomacy made that step very awkward; 
besides, the option of first-use might come in handy. Indeed, the 
development of I iroited nuclear options could be seen as a way of 
possibly lowering the. first-use threshold but in a seemingly 
discriminate manner. 
By the rnid-1970s there was a recognition that the NATO TNF 
stockpile could, and probably should, be trimmed hack; this view was 
apparently shared by Schlesinger, ho>~ever political factors (primarily 
concerning th·e reasurance of the European Allies) acted as a break to 
h 1 . 152 sue a po ~cy. In short, NATO's military posture was at least as 
much a product of ill-defined political compromises as of a coherent 
strategic plan. The nature of the nexus betwf.~en nuclear and 
conventional forces was partly defined, and partly obscured, by the 
attempted provision of multiple military options and the ambiguities 
of HC14/3 which directed military commanders to, 
~ •• provide for the employment as appropriate of one or more 
of direct defenset deliberate escalation, and general 
nuclerlr response, thus coofronting the er.emy with a credible 
threat of escalation in repoose to any t{.P.e of aggressioTJ. 
below the level of a major nuclear attAck. )) 
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TNF would be used to support a conventional defence line "as late as 
possible but as early as necessary" .1.54 
QL.~ummary: The Doctrinal Inheritance and Strategic Framework Of The 
Mid-1970s 
It now remains to show how the development of US warplanning from 
the 1940s to the 1970s was reflected in the way that strategy was 
thought about on the eve of the Carter administration's term of 
off ice. Mainstream strategic analysis of the mid-1970s can be 
described in terms of a loose conceptual framework. This framework 
was largely arranged around the demands of extended deterrence; that 
is, the American security commitments to its allies provided primary 
reference points in strategic thinking. It was within this context 
that concepts such as escalati.on and flexibility acquired practical 
meaning and relevance. 
As the historical survey has shown, some issues have been more-or 
-less constant concerns of US policymakers since the 1940s. These 
include deterrence and coalition warplanning. Other issues surfaced 
over time as mnjor preoccupations of planners - examples here are: 
the search for strategic flexibility and the development of options, 
and uneasiness over questions of credibility of threats~ 
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Deterrence has been accepted as a key security concept since the 
start of the Cold War. De terrence has been a long-s tanding theme in 
American policy and has provided an important rationale for military 
planning. Besides which, deterrence along with its attendant military 
planning, became enmeshed in what Howard describes as the American 
objective of .. reassuring .. the European allies. This was because 
American plans for deterrence were substantially rooted in the 
security guarantee to Europe offered in the 1940s. Extended 
deterrence. as an immediate planning issue} predated concern over 
"central strategic'' deterrence; lndeed, it can be argued that the 
latter grew out of the former. 
Deterrence is about convincing the other side that it probably 
could not win a war and, or, that the costs of aggression would 
outweigh the benefits. An assumption of post-war deterrence thinking 
has been that general war would probably be disastrous, with 
incalculable consequences, and would involve a risk of the breakdown 
of the funda1:1ental strategic equation whereby military means are 
supposed to be held in balance with political objectives. 
Using these criteria it is possible to argue that the Soviet 
Union and United States may have been in a condition of mutual 
deterrence since the 1940s. The US has never been confident of 
beating the USSR in a "clean .. war whose outcome could be comfortably 
predicted. A 1949 report on the ''Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War 
Effort Resulting fran the Strategic Air Offensive" noted thatz 
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Atomic bombing would open the field and set the pattern for 
all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and 
result in maximum retaliatory measures within Soviet 
capabilities. 
Atomic bombing will produce certain psychological and 
retaliatory reactions detrimental to the achievement of 
Allied war objectives and its dest,ructive effects will 
complicate post-hostilities problems. 105 
In 1950 NSC-68 pointed out the problems of ending a war with the USSR 
on favourable terms~ It stated that "even if [a US surprise attack] 
were successful .. : 
It is clear that the United States would face appalling 
tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among 
nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all 
or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so 
enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an 
attempt to achieve our. objectives by other means •.. 
A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, 
but it is estimated that these operations alone would not 
force or indt1ce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the 
Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its 
control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would 
probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the 
free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving 
people would be destroyed and the re'\_en,erative capacity of 
Western Europe dealt a crippling blow. 5 
Kaplan has shown how reluctant the US was to use its nuclear 
superiority during the crises over Berlin and Cuba in the early 1960s; 
and this was .. the last time that either side could seriously 
contemplate a 'splendid first strike ... l5l 
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From the military point of view deterrence has been seen to rest 
on warplans and the capabilities and will to execute them. Specific 
elements of the warfighting basis of deterrence have been subject to 
scrutiny because of a belief that relatively narrow factors (such as 
numbers of weapons) may be critical in the strategic balance which 
underpins deterrence .. In short, narrow military factors have been 
analysed for their implications for warfighting utility and, by 
extension, deterrence. This happened in speculation over: SAC 
vulnerability and the "bomber gap in the mid-l950s; the "missile 
gap" of the late 1950s; the conventional balance in Europe since (at 
least) 1961; the need for strategic nuclear flexibility in the early 
1960s and mid-l970s. The fear was that a "gap" in the force structure 
could open a "window" of opportunity that the Soviet Union might be 
tempted to exploit either politically or militarily. 
But there was also a broader v:tew of deterrence which suggested 
that some "gaps" were E.'\Ore apparent than real, that 'deterrence in the 
nuclear age was quite strong (especially given Invulnerable second 
strike forces capable of destroying the attacker's society in a 
retaliatory strike), and that deterrence was based on all sorts of 
factors - not merely numbers and types of weapons. 
Despite this alternative broader view some planners and analysts 
saw merit in the more military dewanding perspective; "gaps in the 
spectrum of deterrence had to be plugged, every step in a hypothetical 
escalation ladder had to be covered by appropriate forces. This 
approach focussed a good deal of attention on Soviet capabilities and 
doctrine, and bred ''worst case'' thinking. 
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In a sense the relationship between Western nuclear and 
conventional forces was seen to represent a potential gap in the 
spectrum of deterrence. This type of thinking lay behind some of the 
developments of flexible response: it was one reason for the 
refinement of limited nuclear warplanniog and the advocacy of a 
conventional force build-up. At least four assumptions were involved 
he.re: 
l) Nuclear parity between the superpowers made conventional war 
between them more likely. The side best able to engage in 
conventional operations was therefore at an advantage. 
2) There was a synergistic relationship between nuclear and 
conventional forces .. 
3) There should be a continuum of usable force, from low-level 
conventional operations to large-scale nuclear conflict 
not withstanding the importance of the nuclear threshold. 
4) The Soviet Union had, or was developing, a force posture and 
doctrine that enabled it to exploit the nexus between nuclear 
and conventional forces~ For example, it seemed to be bettet" 
placed than NATO to fight a conventional war or to engage in 
combined conventional-nuclear operations~ Some analysts 
believed that the USSR might also be able to manage the 
transition (rom c.cnventional war to nuclear conflict better 
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than NATO. Moreover, the USSR, by the mid-1970s, seemed to be 
acquiring a military posture aimed at eventual escalation 
dominance~ 
The first two of these assumptions were outlined in the last US 
~An~n~u~a~l~~D~e~f~e~n~s~e~~R~e~p~o~r~t (for Fiscal Year 1978) submitted before the 
Carter administration took office, 158 
with the reality of rough equivalence in nuclear forces, 
gains and losses in the international arena are largely 
determined by conventional military power, will, and 
resolve. To complete the paradox, conventional military 
power obtains authority from the nuclear capabilities 
underlying it. 
The second and third assumptions were brought together by the Report 
in the following terms, 
.•• there is no clear distinction between strategic and 
theater (or tactical) nuclear forces. For some years, the 
Soviets have based variable-range ICBM's in their 
lRBM/MRBM fields, now, with the prospective deployment 
of the SS-X-20 missile and the deployment of the Backfire 
bomber, they have introduced a further element of 
a;nbiguity as to the range of capabilities and missions of 
their various nuclear forces ••• [In addition] Aircraft and 
missiles designed to perform deep missions, and attack what 
used to be called strategic targets, may not necessarily 
have the decisive role in nuclear. warfare currently 
attributed to them. The outcome of a nuclear conflict, as 
has been the case in more traditional warfare, could depend 
on an ability as much to hold or occupy §~rritory as to 
destroy specific targets. (Emphasis added.) 1 · 
-138-
This report reiterated the point that the putative deterrent gap 
between conventional and nuclear forces was to be bridged by the 
threat of first-use of TNF: 
The United States has never ruled out a first use of nuclear 
weapons. If an enemy, whether by stealth and deception or 
by large-scale mobilization, should attempt to defeat U.s. 
and allied conventional forces, it is NATO and US policy to 
tdk.e whatever action is necessary to restore the situation~ 
Thus, the theater nuclear forces provide a source of opt:tons 
and flexibility that would be difficult and perhaps 
!:~~:!:a~!:cest.o160incorporate exclusively into strategic 
TNF were to be targeted i.n a way that gave added f i.repower to the 
conve-ntional defence: 
The United States plans its theater nuclear forces on the 
basis of war-fighting missions. Both the posture and the 
contingency plans place proper emphasis on restraint rather 
than on indiscriminate damage, and on the achievement of 
traditional military and political objectives, rather than 
on the destruction of an enemy's society.l 61 
A"11ong other things this sort of thinking sugg10sted a role for "mini-
nukes" -such as Enhanced Radiation Weapons ("neutron bombs"). Three 
clltegories of TK'F targets were identified in the Report quoted above: 
-- limited nuclear strikes 
important, fixed military 
demonstrate a determination 
whatever means necessary; 
designed to destroy selectively 
targets and at the same time 
to resist the enemy's attack by 
-- regional nucle.ar strikes intended, 
destroy an attacking enemy force before 
breakthrough; 
as one examplet to 
it achieves a major 
and theaterwide strikes directed at counter-air and 
-139-
counter-missile targets, lines of communication, and troop 
concentrations both at the front and in reserve.l62 
The implications of US TNF doctrine, and improvements in Soviet 
capabilities, for TNF force posture modernisation were spelt-out by 
the Report as follows: 
improved survivability through well planned dispersal, 
greater mobility and hardening, and reduced vulnerability to 
sabotage, seizure or conventional attack; 
more accurate, timely, and discriminate operational 
intelligence and target information; 
doctrine and plans that allow the TNFs 
battlefield or threater-wide requirements more 
effectively; 
to support 
rapidly and 
weapons that would allow us to minimise collateral 
damage 1 while maximising damage to enemy targets; 
systems that more effectively complement conventional 
force capabilities.163 
Clearly the development of US doctrine was not taking place in a 
strategic or geopolitical vacuum. The demands of extended deterrence 
have already been mentioned as a driving force behind shifts in 
American warplanning~ The other side of the coin, obviously, was a 
perception of the Soviet threat to NATO; and, indeed, the world beyond 
NATO. The D~fence Report prece.....<ling Carter's inauguration (referred 
to earlier) claimed that the Soviet threat was growing more powerful; 
containment was now under threat and the USSR appeared to be 
developing a "warfighting capabl.lity". 16 1• In January 1977 Najor 
General Ke"egan, head of US Air Force intelligence.) wrote an alarmJng 
(son:e would say alarmist) description of the difference between US and 
Soviet views of deterrence and nuclear warf!ghting. The Russians, 
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apparently, had discovered, and were developing, the key to strategic 
advantage in the nuclear age; the US, by contrast, had not grasped 
certain fundamentals: 
I am impreased by the soundness of the Soviet literature on 
these matters. The Soviets have correctly attended to the 
knitting of war and strategy. They have determined that a 
nation can survive a nuclear holocaust; and they have 
proceeded to get on with the business of being capable of 
initiating, waging and prevailing in a nuclear conflict. 
I am convinced that the Soviet approach is more 
realistic than our own ••• 
On the basis of hard evidence of equipment, training and 
doctrlnal trends, lt is my judgment that a Soviet war 
planner in charge of the Warsaw Pact battle plan could 
anticipate being able to defeat NATO in twenty-four to 
thirty-six hours, with or without nuclear weapons ••. 
{Emphasis added.) 165 
An article entitled "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic 
Thought" was published in International Security in 197 8. It's 
author, Fritz Ermartht wrote the piece before becoming a member of 
President Carter's National Security Council staff; he referred to 
""the critical times in the US-Soviet strategic relationships we are 
facing." Errnarth went on to say that: 
In our thinking about the actual prosecution of a strategic 
conflict, once conflict at that level begins we tend to 
forget about what might be the local outcome of the regional 
conflict that probably precipitated the strategic exchange. 
The Soviets, on the other hand, appear to take a more 
comprehensive view of strategy and the strategic balance. 
Both in peacetime political cornpetltton and in the ultimate 
test of a central conflict, they tend to see all force 
elements as contributing to a unified strategic purpose, 
n.ati.onal survival ar:2 the e,limination or containment of 
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enemies on their periphery. The U.s.S.R. tends to see 
intercontinental forces, and strategic f~rces more 
generally, as a means to help it win an all-out- conflict in 
its most crucial theater, Europe ••• Soviet intercontinental 
strike forces are an outgrowth and extension of forces 
initially developed to cover peripheral targets. Land 
combat forces, including conventional forces,. are carefully 
trained and equipped to fight in nuclear conditions ••• In 
any case, regional conflict outcomes seem not_ to lose their 
significance in Soviet strategy once strategic nuclear 
conflict begins. 166 
In other words, the Soviets were apparently more serious about the 
strategic linkage between conventional and nuclear forces than 
Americans. They seemed to have a ''more comprehensive view .. •· 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON, 1977 - 1980 
MANAGING THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS. 
A) Introduction 
President Carter came into office ~ith promises to restore 
America's vision and pride~ The rhetoric suggested a fresh approach 
to defence and foreign affairs. The supposedly stale and morally 
questionable policies of the Nixon/f'ord-Kissinger years were to give 
way to policies based on a more ethically sound and imaginative 
vision. Extravagant defence projects like the B-1 bomber ~ere to be 
dropped and the defence budget was to be cut. Moves were to be made 
to rid the Earth of nuclear weapons~ No longer was an ''inordinate 
fear of communism" going to dominate America's vtew of the l<Oiorld. 
Hore attention needed to be given to the challenges of North-South 
relations, human rights~ nuclear proliferation, and regional peace in 
the Middle East and Southern Africa. 1 
But, for all the apparent novelty of the political rhetoric, 
national security policies ~ere not radically altered. Establishment 
figures were appointed to key positions: Harold Brown as Secretary of 
Defense; Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State; and Zbigniew Brzezinski as 
liational Security Advisor. 2 lihUe these three central officials may 
have had differences of opinton from their predecessors (and betl</een 
eacb other), it would be difficult to argue that their appointments 
-152-
represented a fundamental break from long established perspectives or 
a deep seated shift in the American international relations 
paradigm. 
As Gaddis has noted, "Carter in fact had few differences of 
substance wlth the Nixon-Ford-Kiss inger po lie ies." He adds that the 
Carter administration, 
developed no new strategy, but they did graft onto the 
basic premises of the old one certain highly visible 
initiativ-es designed to make it appear as though the 
American approach to 
had not. 3 
the World had changed when in fact it 
The adl:li.nistration did not dramatically reorientate the management of 
core national security interests. It did not unilaterally abandon a 
balance of power with the USSR. Nor did it reject the view that this 
baLance was largely hinged on the NATO~Warsaw Pact stand-off in Europe 
and the central strategic stalemate. 
This balance of power was based on interlocking regional balances 
and the linkage between local convent tonal forces, of ten supportec! by 
a US military presence, and American nuclear strikepower. This helped 
underpin two much publicised elements in US foreign policy at the 
time: detente and trilateralism. Detente was a term used to describe 
a policy which attempted to balance East-West competition with 
cooperation - a form of Great Power management.. Trilateralism was an 
e:nphasis on huilding z~loser links between the core democr8.c1es of 
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Western Europe, Japan and the USA. Within the context of detente and 
trilateralism, interdependence was to be stressed> but not at the cost 
of weakening America. 
There was no question of retreating from NATO and despite some 
early signals suggesting otherwise, there was no serious question of 
abandoning nuclear deterrence or of drastically cutting the defence 
budget. Indeed, during the_ course of the administrati.on's term, the 
conservative stand in US national security policy was reinforced. The 
administration was seen to move joltingly away from a soft centerist 
position on national security towards a more hawkish posture. 
This move to the Right had three related causes: dissatisfaction 
with Sovi_et behaviour; most dramatically in the case of the invasion 
of Afghanistan; domestic US political forces; and the working-out of 
different strands of opinion within the administration. In due course 
Carter ·adopted a more explicitly negative view of the USSR and 
sponsored a stronger defence posture than the one he had inhertted. 
Carter was bitterly disappointed by the actions of the Soviet Union. 
In his memoirs he stated that: 
The fact was that when violence occured in almost any place 
on; earth, the .Soviets zr their proxies were most likely to 
be at the centre of it. 
Reintorcing the trend towards stronger defences was the military-
industrial complex which Carter has described as "extremely pow-erful" 
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and, in some cases at least, "almost impossible to stop··~ 5 These 
forces for change towards a tougher military stance were given a good 
deal of encouragement by highly publicised lobby groups such as the 
Committee on the Present Danger. These groups attempted to expose and 
resist perceived official softness on defence issues. 6 
Limi.ted US public discussion of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
was occassioned by moves to modernise NATO's TNF posture., in 
particular with regard to Enhanced Radiation Weapons, Cruise Missiles 
and Pershing II. Among other things this led to renewed controversy 
over NATO's option for "First-Use" of TNF. This, of course, revolved 
around the wisdom, or lack of it, of linking the risk of nuclear 
holocaust to the possibility of conventional war in Europe. (As the 
turmoil in the l1iddle East was reaching a clirnal< in 1979-1980 concern 
over the nuclear-eonventlonal nexus was expressed with regard to 
possible American reaction to hypothetical events in Iran, Afghartistan 
or neighbouring countries -such as a Soviet take-over of the Persian 
Gulf oil fields. 7) 
This study necessarily focusses on particular aspects of Carter's 
national security policies and excludes areas of considerable 
importance, such as the American-Israeli-Egyptian talks and the 
Iranian revolution, which, at the time, had a high priority. It is 
therefore necessary to bear :tn mind the following words of Carter 1 s 
National Security Advisor: 
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The general reader probably cannot imagine the extraordinary 
pressures of time under which those engaged in shaping 
America's global policy operate. The president's advisers 
are like jugglers: moving from IOeeting to meeting, from 
topic to topic, dealing with developments as they occurred 
in an increasingly disorganized world. There is probably no 
effective way of conveying this atmosphere, for which the 
overused simile of the pressure cooker is~ if anything, an 
understatement~ ... each problem, no matter how urgent, 
remained only one of a number of pressing concerns which had 
to be dealt with simultaneously. 8 
The rest of this chapter will describe the NATO related defence 
reviews of the administration and the extent to which the nuclear-
conventional nexus was identified, conceptualised, and treated by 
decision-makers~ 
B) Establishing a. basis f~r policy 
In early 1977 the newly installed Carter administration was 
facing a strategic environment which,. according to many conservative 
analysts, was becoming increasingly hostile and unfavourable to the 
United States. 9 Across-the-board improvements in ·soviet military 
power ~ere allegedly pushing the US into an inferior strategic 
position. The Soviet threat appeared to be taking a more ominous 
shape consisting of Russian adventurism in the Third World, an 
emerging new generation of long range TNF, the deployment of heavy 
NIRVed ICBNs, and Warsaw Pact conventional force modernisation. 
Underlying all this was the worrying arglLJllent that the USSR had a 
comprehensive nuclear warf ight ing doct rine. 10 
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These concerns were heightened by parallel reports on Soviet 
conventional military power and the Soviet nuclear posture. In 
January 1977 the influential Senator Sam Nunn, and his colleague Dewey 
Bartlett, submitted a report to the US Senate Committee on Armed 
Services entitled "NATO and the New Soviet Threat". The report stated 
that "the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies are rapidly 
moving toward a decisive conventional military superiority over NATO .... 
Moreover. the Warsaw Pact was developing a .. standing start" invasion 
capability: they were developing the forces and doctrine to overwhelm 
NATO defences quickly and with little warning. The significance of 
this, the report warned, .. cannot be exaggerated" .. 11 
Adding to the atmosphere of concern over Soviet capabilities and 
intentions was a highly alarming semi-official intelligence report 
inherited by the Carter administration. This was the so-called "B 
Team" report, a product of hawkish analysts brought into the 
intelligence system to offer an independent assessment of the Soviet 
threat13 (some of these analysts were to become members of the 
ComTiittee on the Present Danger). According to Prados, 
The B Team argued that the Soviet Union's ultimate 
intentions were to develop forces able to interfere with the 
free flow of ocean transport, to deny raw- materials to the 
West, and to disrupt fuel supplies; it aimed for the 
projection of power on a global scale and strategic forses 
that would have a first-strike "war-winning" capability. 1 
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Faced with these alarming interpretations of the Soviet threat, 
and keen to develop its own policies, the Carter administration 
embarked on a review of the strategic environment. As Prados notes, 
"the new administration did all it could to put the B Team episode 
bebind it." 14 
Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) was ordered on 18 
February 1977. It was entitled "Comprehensive Net Assessment and 
Military Force Posture Review". According to Harold Brown, 
One part of it, the comprehensive net assessment, looked at 
the world in general, and the evolving relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. The 
second part addressed the capabilities of the current US 
defence posture under various assumptions and constructed a 
range of defense postures for the US, along with rough 
estimates of their costs and what they could accomplish. 15 
The comprehensive net assessment was conducted by the National 
Security Council (NSC); the Force Posture Review was produced by the 
Department of Defense. 
The closest that PRM-10 came to analysing the nuclear-
conventional nexus seems to have been in its treatment of defence 
options for NATO forces in West Germany. One of these options - which 
was officially rejected - appeared to back away from forward defence 
and first-use. This option outlined a potential fall-back position 
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for conventional forces along the Weser-Lech line running up to eighty 
miles deep inside West German territory. When news of this potential 
option leaked it added to America's political problems in 'Europe 
(particularly with regard to the relationship with the German Federal 
Republic). 16 
The controversy over the possible fall-back position in Europe 
raised questions over the military feasibility and political 
significance of forward defence. It also suggested a qualification of 
the pledge to maintain an option for the first-use of T!;!F. However it 
appears that no high level studies or defence reviews were 
specifically addressed to the "first-use" issue during the PRM-10 
excerciset nor does it seem that the linkage betweeen nuclear- and 
conventional forces was explicitly focussed upon. 17 
PRM-10 has been described as "an organisational monstrosity". 
E~lements of it have been refer-red to as "conceptually unsound" and "an 
exercise in confusion". PRM-10 led to Presidential Directive 18 (PD-
18). PD-18 was, reportedly, only "marginally usefu1". 18 It did not 
provide a finn basis for policy. 19 Essentially it endorsed inherited 
policy, noted the rising strategic importance of the Middle East, and 
called for follow-on studies dealing with strategic nuclear weapons 
policy. The PRM-10/PD-18 exercise had fulfilled one task however: it 
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qualified the more worrying conclusions of some earlier estimates of 
the strategic environment. 
PD-18 noted, in general terms, the significance of the nuclear-
conventional nexus. According to one report, 
Mr Carter .•. asked that the Soviet Union be prevented from 
attaining enough strategic power to deter or coerce the 
United States from taking action with conventional forces in 
areas considered vital to United States interests. 
The President's directive made clear that because an era of 
nuclear equivalence had dawned, increasing significance must 
be given to conventional military power.20 
Thus the nuclear umbrella would not only be a deterrent to war, it 
might also be a shield behind which United States conventional forces 
might fight. The ''increasing significance" of conventional military 
power was reflected in the Carter administration's decision to 
strengthen NATO's ground and air forces. In particular, PD-18 called 
for an improved NATO capability for quick response to a potential 
Warsaw Pact invasion.2 1 
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C) The focus on conventional forces 
The idea that NATO should significantly strengthen the 
conventional element of its defence was hardly new. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters~ it has been a recurrent theme in strategic debate 
since at least 1950. And, as also discussed, since the early 1960s 
conventional force improvements had been seen as a way to raise the 
nuclear threshold. 
The particular form in which the Carter administration developed 
its policy on NATO conventional defence improvements had its roots in 
various studies undertaken in the early to mid-1970s. These included 
a classified RAND study calling for an integrating framework, 
collectively formulated by NATO, 
22 programmes~ As a result 
to provide direction for long 
of this and other efforts 
term 
the 
administration pushed for the adoption, by NATO, of the Long Term 
Defence Progralilille (LTDP) and tbe parallel Alliance commitraent to 
inCrease defence expenditure by three percent in real terms per year. 
An important driving force behind these initiatives was Robert 
Komer. Komer was appointed by the incoming administration as advisor 
on NATO affairs to the Secretary of Defense; subsequently he moved 
over to become Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy between 1979 and 
1981. Prior to his work in the adnlinistration Komer had shown a 
special interest in !\ATO conventional defence iniprovements. 
ln a 1973 RAND publication, Komer stated that, "the myth of 
inevitable Pact superiority is to a great extent a self-inflicted 
-161-
wound." 2 3 According to Komer, NATO was underestimating its own 
inherent strength and exaggerating Soviet capabilities. Further, 
Ironically, the sedulous fostering of this image of an 
overwhelming threat by generations of NATO military 
authorities to buttress their pleas for higher defense 
spending has had the opposite effect. Instead, it has 
helped convince their civilian masters that only nuclear 
deterrence makes sense. 24 
Komer was keenly aware of cost constraints in any attempt to 
strengthen the conventional element of flexible response, 
the normal answer to NATO's securi.ty dile:nma to buy more 
forces to meet the full spectrum of threats ~ is not a 
viable answer these days. For the other horn of NATO's 
d.ilemma in the seventies is that just when a credible 
conventional capability is becoming more essential, it is 
becoming more expensive. 25 
"New approaches" were required which. "avoid politically unrealistic 
budget increases .•• The Alliance will have to find ways of doing more 
i h l .. 26 w t ess. The solution, according to Komer writing in 1973, was a 
rationalised force structure streamlined to meet a Soviet armoured 
blitzkrieg, rather than a protracted sea-land war~ The requirement 
was for more cadre/reserve units, quick reinforcement, more anti-tank 
weapons, barriers, enhanced Alliance cooperation, and leaner divisions 
with a greater tooth-to-tail ratio. By 1976 Komer's thinking had 
become more focussed on the re.quirements for "preparation for 
coalition war" .. In particular this necessitated an enhanced ability 
of the allies to fight together especially in and over West 
Cer£Gany. 27 The following year he wrote "Rationalization is a concept 
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whose time has come.· in NATO". 28 It was to be a way of enhancing 
effectiveness while limiting costs. 
The Carter administration centered it's NATO conventional force 
improvement initiative around the LTDP. According to Harold Brown, 
The LTDP was developed to bring increased efficiency to the 
use of limited resources by explicitly increasing the levels 
of coordination, joint planning, equipment compatability and 
mutual support among NATO forces.29 
Brov.m has d.escribed the nine primary elements of the LTDP as follows 
(a tenth element - dealing with TNF - will be discussed in the next 
section): 30 
L Readiness 
NATO will increase its ability to respond wl.th the 
rnaximu~ possible combat capability in the face of short 
warning time. Specific programs to increase readiness 
include: improvement in anti-armour units; 
mod.erniza·tion and increased holdings of air-to-surface 
weapons; improved defense against chemical warfare; 
enhanced support from lhe civil sector; increased 
holdings of tanks) anti-art'lor weapons and missiles, and 
armed helicopters; increased ability to upload 
ammunition at short 11otice; and a larger commitment of 
national forces to NATO. 
2. Reinforcement 
NATO will develop an increased capability for rapid and 
effe.ctive reinforcement of the Allied Command Europe. 
This will include: the greater commi trnent of civil 
air, sea. and land national infrastructure resources to 
the reinforcement task, more effective arrangements to 
co-ordinate the flow of reinforcements; and new 
measures to accelerate movement of sigrdficant fighting 
units and t3ctic<1l air forces to the forward areas in 
the critical early phase of any potenti.al confLict with 
the Warsaw Pact. Central to these efforts is the US 
commitment to Clore than double its ground reinforcer:1ent 
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rate in the first week after mobilization by adding 
prepositioned equipment for three additional 
prepositioned divisions by the end of FY 1982. 
3. Reserve Mobilization 
Additional measures will be taken to ensure that 
reservists and reserve formations are properly 
equipped, trained, and deployable where they are 
required. Programs include: bringing national reserve 
forces up to established NATO standards; improving the 
operational readiness of certain reserve units; and, 
for some European countries possibly forming additional 
units over the long term from uncommitted reserve 
manpower .. 
4. Maritime Posture 
NATO will develop a stronger and better-coordinated 
maritime defense. This effort will involve: enhancing 
maritime command, control, and communications; 
increasing capabilities for air defense of naval units; 
improving anti-submarine capabilities; developing 
better surface-to-surface and anti-ship missile 
capabilities; increasing mine warfare capabilities; 
and cooperating in the development of key weapon 
systems. The correction of shortfalls in the number 
of ships will be sought under established NATO planning 
procedures. 
s. Air Defense 
Improvement of NATO's air defense capabilities will 
include: improvement in capabilities of identification 
of hostile aircraft; enhancement of the control of 
NATO's own combat aircraft; improvements in fighter 
aircraft; and the acquisition of better surface-to-air 
weapons and more air-to-air missiles. 
6. Co~nd, Control and Communications (C3) 
Overall capabilities will be improved by: implementing 
the second phase of the NATO Integrated Communication 
System (NICS); more co-operation in the field of 
maritime communications; and improvements in combat net 
radios, NATO/ national area interconnections, automatic 
data processing and war headquarters improvements. 
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]. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Increasing our ability to counter the sophisticated 
electronic warfare threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to 
NATO's forces is particularly important. Both 
offensive and defensive improvements in organization 
and procedures for NATO's EW forces~ as well as closer 
cooperation in EW research and development, are 
included in the LTDP. 
8. Rationalization of Armaments Production 
The alliance can enhance its 10ilitary efficiency by 
increased standardization and interoperability of 
weapons and munitions, resulting in savings that could 
be applied to an increase in forces. 
NATO will improve its policy and organization for 
enhancing the logistical support:. oL combat forces. A 
position of NATO Assistant Secretary General 
Infrastructure and Logistics has been created. 
Improvements will be facilitated by: defining more 
clearly the logistics support responsibilities of NATO 
commanc!ers and mei:!ber nat ions; providing improved 
logistics structures within NATO military commands; 
developing a logistics master planning system for 
better planning and manageme"t of NATO logistics 
functions; increasing war reserve stocks of combat 
equipment; seeking ways to improve flexibility in the 
use of ammunition stocks in war; and building up war 
reserve stocks of primary fuels) ammunit1oh and 
supporting equipment with improved storage facilities. 
The LTDP was complemented by ''a programme of short-term measures in 
areas of anti-armour, war reserve munitions, and readiness and 
reinforcement." 31 l'aralleling the LTDP, efforts were made to 
Htrengthen the NATO infrastructure programme (which covers 
collectively financed projects such as some communications systems) 
and host natl.on support (whereby European support is given to US 
forces in NAT0). 32 
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An important aspect of these improvement measures was, of course, 
the promise they held out for greater cost effectiveness. However, 
despite this, there was also pressure to increase defence 
expenditures* This was to lead to heavy-handed US pressure on its 
European allies to commit themselves to sustained real growth in their 
defence budgets of about three percent per year. 
The three percent goal emerged from Washington in time for a NATO 
meeting in Nay 1977. According to a report by the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, the ''three_ percent" objective) 
asked nothing impractical of the Europeans, who were already 
doing that rr.uch or better in many cases; it was close to the 
estimated Soviet increase; and it accorded with anticipated 
economic growth so that no i.ncrea.Se in the percentage of GNP 
or of the portion of the national budget devoted to defense 
tvould be necessary. The Three Per Cent appeared to strike a 
balance between what seemed feasible on the one hand and 
what seemed prudent on the other. 
Indeed. accordi.ng to the same report) 
the burden of the Three !'er Cent fell first and foremost on 
the United States. It was an American i.nitiative, and it 
promised to sustain a reversal of the trend toward reduced 
dPfense allocations in the United States. Along with the 
LTDP it would signify a change in American priorities, a 
return to the basics of the North Atlantic Alliance after 
the disastrous foray into Southeast Asia.33 
But Carter was not disposerl to higher defence expenditure (not this 
early in his term anyway) and had, in his election campaign, talked of 
cuts. One way around thls problem was to hold the defence budget down 
and assign ~ATO a higher j)rlority within It. Although the 
administration considered t~is idea, it finally decided, at the end of 
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1977, to apply the three percent formula to the budget as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the defence budget was rearranged in favour of 
conventional forces at the expense of the strategic nuclear arsenal 
(fo~e example the B-1 bomber was cancelled and the MX and Trident 
programes were slowed down). 34 
The Alliance agreement to increase defence expenditure in real 
terms at an annual rate Y'in the region of three percent .. was outlined 
in an annex on "Ministerial Guidance" after the ~lay 1977 meetings of 
~ATO. The increases in expenditure were necessary, according to an 
Alliance communique, because "the disparity in conventional military 
capabilities hetween NATO and the Warsaw Pact continues to widen". An 
"emphasis placed on conventional force improvements" would "avoid the 
need to use nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict,." Thus) 
Priority should be given to those capabilities which 
contribute directly to deterrence and to NATO's ability to 
withstand the initial phases of attack and, in particular, 
to measures which will enhance readiness and reinforcement 
capabilities and promote a collective approach to equipping, 
supporting and training Alliance forces. 35 
It is clear that one motive for strengthening NATO's conventional 
forces was to raise the nuclear threshold. Carter wanted to buy ti.:ne 
in a potential European conflict by lengthening the fuse between an 
outbreak of conventional hostilities and a decision to use nuclear 
weapoos. 36 The LTDP and the three percent goal were, in a limited 
sense, attempts to weaken the linkage between conventional and nuclear 
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strategy. A, consequence of stronger conventional forces was a lower 
probability of escalation from conventional to nuclear war ~ or so it 
was suggested .. 
Another reason behind the measures to lmprove conventional forces 
was the idea that nuclear stalemate between the superpowers opened the 
door to conve-ntional war - especi.ally if there was a conventional 
force imbalance. This reasoning closely echoes similar American 
policies in the early 1960s. Then the European response was a 
mixture of ambivalence and recalcitrance~ The allied position tJas, 
in general terms, that the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional deterrence should be reinforced not (as seemed to be 
the American preference) weakened. The European view pivoted on 
the concept of "coupling" the integration of the European and 
North American theatres of operations. lJS moves to raise the 
nuclear threshold were seen as .. dccoupling"; prepari.ng to fight a 
conventional war to Europe was seen as separating the European theatre 
from the US ~uclear guarantee. It was not that the allies wanted to 
abandon firebreaks and encourage rapid escalation~ On the contrary, 
l.n a w-ar the Europeans would probably be desparate to contain 
conflict. But they were unsettled by the prospect of public 
declarations of strategy built around firebreaks which T7light encourage 
Soviet adventurism and don:estic protest. 
To help fend-off some of these doubts the Carter administration 
added consideration of TNP modernisation to the LTDP. This aspect of 
the LTDP was to assum<> an unintended dominance in t~ATO's defence 
debate, overshadowing the prlmary purpose of the pr:)gramme. The 
inclusion of TNF modernlsat ion in the LTDP was part of aa /l.r,Jerican 
attempt to sell conventional <iefence improvements to its allies.~1 
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D) Patching together an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in NATO's 
TNF 
Despite the essentially political nature of measures to modernise 
NATO's TNF, there loiere also technical and military reasons for a 
revieloi of the Alliance's nuclear position. These reasons were 
apparent before the Carter administration took office. For example, a 
1974 Brookings Institution report noted that: 
An alternative to the present US tactical nuclear posture in 
Europe, a posture nOlo/ ill suited for credible deterrence or 
defense, is clearly in order. Both the number and the 
destructive power of US TNW on the continent are excessive 
for either purpose, and the deployment is needlessly 
vulnerable to both preemption and the threat of 
unauthorized use .. Horevert the doctrine governing the use 
of US TN'ri in Europe is inco'lJllruent with the 
character of the weapons themselves. 
This report advocated a large cut in the numbers and explosive yields 
of TNF, the elimination of artillery-delivered nuclear loiarheads and a 
greater reliance on missiles for nuclear missions. 
Before Carter came into office the US Defense Department had 
outlined eriteri.a for TNF modernisation. As discussed in chapter 
three, the Departments Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1978 (published 
in January 1977) called for: (a) improved TNF survivability; (b) 
changes to doctrine to allot./ more effective use of TNF; (c) improved 
command and control; (d) better TNF target intelligence; (e) TNF that 
would r.u1xlm.ise military effect whlle. minimising unintentional damage; 
and (f) TNF that "more eftectively complement conventional force 
capabilities." To this end, "renewed planning efforts [focussed] on 
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improving operational procedures for the TNF and enhancing 
coordination of nuclear and conventional forces ... 3 9 
Measures to modernise TNF represented an attempt to put some 
operational substance into doctrinal statements. A member of Carter's 
NSC staff, James Thomson, has noted that, by the mid-l970s, little 
had been done in terms of force structure to implement the flexible 
response doctrine agreed to by NATO in 1967. An additional motive was 
concern over the new generation of Soviet TNF (including Backfire 
bombers and SS20, SS21, SS22, and SS23 missiles). 40 In the background 
was, of course, strategic parity which, as discussed above, appeared 
to neutralise central strategic forces and refocus attention on 
regional balances. The relationship between central strategic and 
theatre nuclear forces was brought into political prorr;_inence during 
the course of SALT, especially .in the wake of the 1974 Vladivostok 
agreements. The suggestion that SALT might restrict future Western TNF 
deployment options caused particular concern among the European 
allies. For all these reasons (the requ l.rements of flexible response, 
the perceived need to counter new Soviet TNF, and allied concern over 
SALT), the Carter administration, in the words of Thomson, "inherited 
a looming strategic and political problem ..... 41 
The first u;anifestation of this problem faced by Carter was the 
controversy over Enhanced Radiation Warheads (ERW) or "neutron 
bombs". In the ~:rATO context ERW were intended to rnaxi.mise the 
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military effectiveness of short-range or battlefield TNF in combined 
nuclear-conventional operations. At the same time ERW WEcre supposed 
to mtntmise unintentional (or "collateral") civilian and military 
damage. This was to be done by modi.fying a nuclear warhead so that 
short term radiation effects are increased ("enhanced") while blast 
effects are decreased. l'he most suitable delivery system for ERW were 
considered to be_ Lance surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear~capable 
artillery. Lance has a range of 125 km, and the artillery a range of 
up to 30 km. Both weapons are more-or-less integrated into the 
conventional posture of US and allied forces in Europe. It was 
expected that the primary target of NATO ERW would be Warsaw Pact 
conventional forces, particularly armoured concentrations, that 
threatened to break-through NATO's defences. 42 
In November 1976 President Ford approved research and development 
of ERw. 43 In June 1977 the Wash ton Post published a critical, 
sensationalist "expose" of the ERil programme. This was the first of a 
series of "Killer Warhead .. headline stories.. According to Wasserman, 
"in a sense, the press made the neutron bomb a political issue. ··44 
The ERW was presented as a peculiarly evil devtce - "a supercapitali.st 
weapon. The effects of an ERW detonation would, according to 
exaggerated press reports, be to kill and sicken people in a uniquely 
grotesque way while leaving buildings undamaged. A different level 
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of criticism of ERW concerned their putative effect on the nuclear 
threshold. Being relatively small 'clean' nuclear W'eapons it was 
suggested that they might be more easily used than older weapons in 
the stockpile. In other words it was argued that ERW might lower the 
nuclear threshold. It was also suggested that although ERW might 
appear to provide an option for limited 'clean' nuclear operations, 
their use would almost certainly set off a chain of escalation leading 
to all-out war. According to this view, the availability of ERW might 
well lead to a dangerous misreading of the possibilities for 
escalation control. 
These ideas were fuelling a lively public debate within the USA 
and Europe. 
Within the Carter administration there was a good deal of 
''excruciating'' bureaucratic politics over the ERW. 45 One example of 
this occurred when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was 
required - largely through Congressional pressure - to submit an "Arms 
Control Impact Statement" (ACIS) on the proposed Lance ERW. This had 
the effect of putting the ACDA in an adversarial role vis-a-vis the 
Pentagon and NSC, with the ACDA taking a somewhat negative view of the 
46 proposed weapon. 
Doubts surrounding the planned ERW development were reinforced by 
the personal ambivalence of President Carter~ An early sign of this 
occurred during the first half of 1977 when Carter requ.~sted Congress 
to approve ERW funding before he had reached a decision on whether or 
1;.7 
not to go ahead with its production. In the event qualified 
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approval was granted in July. The President's concerns over ERW both 
fe.d, and were being reinforced by, a similar ambivalance on the part 
of America's NATO allies. Allied doubts were important because Carter 
was to make his decision partly conditional on a publicly declared 
NATO request for the new weapon. Europe was, after all, the place 
where the new weapons would be deployed and, possibly, used. (Although 
there was also clearly the potential to deploy ERW in Korea, as well 
as anywhere else the US Army might be deployed.) 
In 1977 TNF modernisation was a contentious issue in Europe, 
creating public disquiet and media interest. This, in turn, 
encouraged caution among European leaders anxious not to alienate 
their constituents~ So, not only was Carter reluctant to give a firm 
lead on ERW, but the European allies were not ready for and did not 
welcome an open debate on such a distasteful and politically divisive 
subject. 
But Carter's response to the ERW predicament was to attempt to 
share the burden of responsibility for any ERW development decision 
with the NATO allies. According to Wasserman, .. Carter's handling of 
the ERW issue reflects his muddled perception of the allies' own 
domestic political constraints," 48 Muddled perception was paralleled 
by muddled policy. For example, the requirement to bring the allies 
into the ERW decision-making process necessitated State Department 
involvement in Alliance consultation; yet this consultation was 
initiated in the absence of a clear-cut Presidential directive and 
without an adDinistration consensus on the merits of ERw. 49 
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A central element in the administration's efforts to get a shared 
Alliance decision on ER\i was the special strategic relationship 
between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany is 
the Central Front; it probably represents the main prize and battle 
field of any future war in Europe. The country has a pivotal role in 
Alliance diplomacy and force structuring. This is partly due to its 
powerful conventional military forces - in 1977 the Federal Republic 
had 4,000 tanks (with another 1,000 on order) and 500 combat aircraft; 
its armed forces stood at half a million with more than a million in 
50 reserve. The country also hosted over 3,000 TNF warheads and 
hundreds of "nuclear-related facilities" 51 as well as allied armies 
(mainly American, British and French, but also Belgian, Dutch and 
Canadian). Underlying this concentration of military force, and 
potential targets, was, of course., the Federal Republicts special 
geopolitical position as one half of a nation divided by the Cold War. 
American endeavours to share responsibility for E.RW development 
with West Germany opened-up political problems in the European ally's 
ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD), encouraged Soviet propaganda 
efforts, and, ultimately, back-fired. The German Chancellor, Helrrut 
Schmidt, initially took a publicly neutral stand on ERW issue. He 
apparently wanted Carter to reach a firm decision. one way or another, 
on production; afterwards he would then have wanted (presumably low-
key) consultation over deployments to Europe. Meanwhile the SPD' s 
executive secretary, Rgon Bahr, was referring to the ERW as a "symbol 
of mental perversity" 52 
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Schmidt was anxious not to be seen as the prime mover behind the 
efforts to bring ERW into Europe as the issue was simply too 
controversial to be politically tied to; it was clear that a German 
request for the new warhead would alienate many of the SPD's members 
and supporters. By the second half of 1977 public opposition, along 
with the Soviet propaganda effort, was building up. By September the 
US administration was coming around to the idea that the ERW i.ssue 
might best be managed as a way of demonstrating Alliance cohesion. 53 
An Alliance decision to deploy would, it was argued, show how united 
NATO was and would demonstrate that the USSR did not have a de facto 
veto over NATO defence planning. On ll and 12 October the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group met in Italy; the US failed to get all1ed 
agreement on the deployment of ERW to Europe. In the words of the 
final communique: "They agreed that their Governments would continue 
their consideration of this subject.- 54 
The US administration next attempted ro get ERW into Europe as a 
pseudo bargaining chip. Ostensibly ERW were to be deployed as part of 
an arms control move. According to Wasserman: 
This was purely a political tactic .• 6There was no intention 
whatsoever of halting the deployment of the ueapon in 
exchange for a concession from Moscow ... This rnanouver is a 
true case of arms control as a .. flg _leaf" to hide weapons 
acquisition. 55 
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Some thought was given to placing ERW in the context of the Mutual 
Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR). MBFR was primarily about the 
European conventional balance, and NATO TNF were supposed to help off-
set Warsaw Pact conventional force advantages; so there was obviously 
some sense in looking at the two in a linked and comprehensive way. 
However, the MBFR option was rejected as bebg too complex and 
difficult. 56 
In the end the administration chose to link NATO ERW with the 
Soviet ss2o57 despite the fact that the Russian missile was a 
different type of weapon unrelated to the original rationale for ERW. 
The SS20 t.vas t targeted t because it was new, excluded from SALT, aimed 
at Western Europe, and put some of the ontxs for TNF modernisation on 
the Russians. More particularly it was hoped that such a ploy r:1ight 
fac.l.litate an allied deployment decision for ERW as it seemed unlikely 
that the USSR woald give up Its SS20s. 
By early 1978 officials in Washington perceived a need to 
demonstrate leadership within the Alliance in the face of Soviet 
political warfare, the supposed weakness of President Carter, and the 
lnability of NATO to agree on TNF modernisation. Once again it was a 
matter of Alliance cohesion, but this time there was the added 
ingredient of an image of a Unlted States President who could not, or 
would not, manage events. In an effort to rectify this potentially 
debilitating state of affairs Western defence otficials attempted to 
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put together an ERW package that they could publicly agree to. 
It appears that, by the middle of March 1978, tacit agreement had 
been reached within NATO over ERW deployment. 58 This agreement was to 
be finalised on 20 March at a NATO meeting. However, the weekend 
before this meeting was scheduled, President Carter informed 
Brzezinski that he did not want the hard won agreement, nor did he 
want the NATO meeting to go-ahead the following Monday as planned. 
According to Wasserman: "The announcement struck [the State 
Department] like a thunderbolt, sending a shock wave through all those 
who had spent most of their working hours over the last few months 
trying to achieve an alliance-wide consensus ... .. 59 Schwartz wrote 
that: "It would be difficult to overstate the effect that Carter's 
decision had in Europe." 60 The primary political rationale for ERW -a 
rationale that, in time, had superseded the l:lilitary role of the 
warhead - was unravelled. 
Carter's cancellation, or "deferment~' of ERW came despite what 
he was to call, with reference to the new war:head, "a Iaajor advantage 
over existing tactical nuclear weapons it would replace". According 
to the President, referring to events leading up to the 
cancellation: 
It was becoming increasingly obvious to n:e that a sharp 
difference of opinion existed within [Britain and Germany]: the 
military commanders wanted the weapon to be deployed, but the 
political leaders did not.6l 
But underlying this was Carter's own thoughts o~ the natter. 
Brze?.inski has written that the President "had a queasy feeling about 
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the whole thing". The National Security Advisor also stated that "I 
don't think that I have ever [up to March 1978] seen the President 
quite as troubled and pained by any decision item"6 2 (emphasis added). 
One lesson for TNF modernisation that came out of the ER!< affair 
was very sharply highlighted. This was that, for various domestic and 
international political reasons, it can be difficult to get 
politicians to publicly endorse specific TNF modernisation measures 
however much they may approve of deterrence in genera::.. terns~ 63 One 
might speculate that this is directly related to the fact that TNF are 
seen to lie at the core of Western strategy - a strategy which links 
regional defence with the prospect of nuclear disaster~ The ER\ol 
controversy exposed, to public, Congressional and Parliamentary view, 
two distastful elements of NATO's strategy of tlexib1e response: the 
preparation for regional conventional war; and the r8adiness to 
escalate, in stages, to large-scale nuclear conflict. Tae subject was 
further politicised because most "Europeans realised that it was the US 
President that would (or would not) pull the "NATO" nuclear nigger. 
These issues, revolving ar-ound the US role in NATO and the nexus 
between conventional defence and nuclear risk, continued to attract 
official and public attention following the collapse of the ER\ol 
proposals. After-all, the ERW fiasco h~d achieved nothing except to 
spotlight contentious areas of NATO policy and weaken the image of 
Alliance solidarity. 
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The NATO response to the ERW debate was to reinforce another TNF 
modernisation proposal that was already in the pipeline. The focus of 
this effort was the question of long range TNF (LRTNF) modernisation. 
Here, it was hoped, Alliance strength and unity could be demonstrated. 
It was in this context of LRTNF modernisation that the US would try to 
address European fears of "decoupl ing" (i.e. separation of US and 
European security) and put right some of the problems exposed during 
the ERW controversy~ 
The decision to push ahead with LRTNF modernisation was largely a 
political one. There appeared to have heen few compelling military 
reasons for the move, although there were obviously some military 
advantages to be gained. 64 A US paper on cruise missiles (an early 
candidate for up-grading LRTNF) provided to the allies in 1977 pointed 
out its negative aspects and repeated American claims that US 
strategic forces covered all the necessary targets that might be 
reached by new LRTNF. According to Thomson, the US suggestion that 
A 
cruise missiles were not needed by NATO was "preJ.emptorily rejected" by 
its allies. 65 
On 28 October 1977 the West German Chancellor, Schmidt, gave a 
well publicised speech66 which was interpreted as calling for an 
"Eurostrategic" balance. He asserted that "SALT neutralizes [US and 
Soviet strategic] nuclear capabilities." This had implications for 
NATO as strategic parity "magnifies the significance of the 
disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional 
wenpons. Sch;HiCt was apparently calling for a balance at each level 
of threat faced by NATO~ He went on to say that: 
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Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and 
the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the 
WeSt European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet 
military super.iority in Europe if we do not succeed in 
removing the disparities of military power in Europe 
parallel to the SALT negotiations. 
According to the West German Chancellor, "the Soviet Union has 
given no clear indication that she is willing to accept the principle 
of parity for Europe ••• " The implication was that either the USSR 
should be made to accept theatre parity in the (preferred) context of 
arms control negotiations, such as MBFR, or NATO should counter 
Soviet military power with a limited build-up of its own. 
These sorts of ideas were apparently tested within the NATO 
consultative machinery in late 1977 and early 1978. The discussions 
took place in meetings of the High Level Group (HLG) of the Nuclear 
Planning Group. Here, according to Thorr.son, the British and Germans 
pressed for an "evolut:i.oaary upward adjustment" in LRTNF. 67 Such an 
"adjustment" required a definite up~grading of NATO's TNF posture, the. 
purpose being to insure that European based TNF' were capable of 
credibly threatening Soviet territory (in the late 1970s NATO's LRTNF 
consisted of aircraft with a questionable ability to penetrate Soviet 
airspace). 
The initial American response to this type of thinki:1g was not 
clear~cut but) as described abovet showed little enthusiasm. For the 
sake of facilitating dlocussion US officals floated three other 
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options, which were rejected largely for political reasons. These 
options were, in the words of Schwartz, (a) "do nothing", (b) "build a 
serious battlefield nuclear capability for the theatre, without the 
capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union'', and (c) ''develop a 
theatre capability to wage a [large scale] counterforce and 
countervalue strategic nuclear war against the Soviet tnion .. (emphasis 
6S 
added). A consensus settled on the idea to "make a modest 
improvement" in LRTNF (i.e. to accept an "evolutionary upward 
adjustment"). Despite some reservations American officials decided to 
lead an attempt at getting this abstract agreement translated into 
so~ething more tangible. The politically damaging failure of the ERW 
episode in the Spring of 1978 convinced US officials that a positive 
American response was needed to help repair the Alliance. 
As a way of managing the US administration's response to the 
LRTNF issue an interagency study was undertaken) under the direction 
of the NSC, during June, July and August 1978. Known as Presidential 
Review Memorandum 38 (PRM-38/"Long Range Theatre Nuclear Capabilities 
and Arrr:s Control"), the study suggested two possible ways forward. 
One -the "hardware" solution advocated new LRTNF deployments to 
Europe; the other, "political'', solution called for the assignment of 
more US strategic force to SACEUR, but no new deployments. By the end 
of 1978 the administration had resolved in favour of the hardware 
solution as a visible reiteration of the US nuclear guarantee. (It 
could also be rationalised in terms of filling a putative gap in the 
spectrum of deterrence - the gap between SRTNF and strategic forces -
and as a counter to the SS20.) It was also suggested that Ti.Jodern 
LRTNF could help in the development of lireited nuclear strike 
options .69 
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By the middle of 1979 it was decided that any new deployments 
should be a mix of extended range Pershing missiles (Pershing II) and 
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles ( GLCM) .7° These weapons would 
clearly have the range to destroy targets deep within Soviet 
territory) providing linkage between theatre and strategic war and, 
it was hoped, thereby deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe by 
threatening retaliatory escalation against Russia. The HLG of the 
NPG decided on a force of between 200 and 600 of the new missiles. 71 
(The eventual decision called for 572 weapons.) It was also decided 
that LRTNF modernisation should not lead to changes in the Alliance 
concept of flexible response, nor to an increased reliance on Th'F in 
NATO's plansJ 2 
Thoms on states that less than 200 missiles would hav~ been 
considered a token force while more than 600 might have been thought 
o.f as decoupling it may have looked like an at tempt to create a 
Eurostrategic balance seperate from the main US strategic 73 forces .. 
The emphasis was primarily on perceptions not military calculation: 
Western Europe was to be made to appear more tightly integrated with 
the massive US deterrent.. 1n Congressional testimony during 1983, 
SACEU~ General Rogers stated that: 
\<hen I arrived as SACEUR in June 1979, I said "Show me the 
SHAPE staff study that supports there being 572 [ INJ'] ••• in 
Western Europe;" and th@re was no such study becaus@ we had 
~4 
not been asked 1 (Emphasis added.) 
It is worth quoting Brzezinski ~n some of the non-military aspects of 
LRTNF modernisation~ 
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The intense bargaini.ng, maneuvering) and recalculations 
involved in this issue demonstrates a problem which many 
outside the policy process frequently forget. In the modern 
world, at the pinnacle of power, there ia no pure, objective 
analysis of a strategic problem. All decisions are made in 
a generalized decision-making process that is coloured by 
domestic politics, economics, and allied react ions. The 
question of an objective "need" for a credible response in 
Europe (TNF) had to be balanced against internal NATO 
politics, various numbers dictated by a variety of actors 
(both domestic and foreign), and the need for numbers high 
enough to give the US bargaining leverage with the 
Soviets. (Emphasis added.)75 
The arms control proposals which accompanied the LRTNF 
modernisation were primarily intended to facilitate deployment 
decisions by the allies not to allow the USSR a means of stopping the 
measures .. In the jargon of the time, arms control was to be "a 
complement to not a substitute for force modernl.zat1on." 76 Apart from 
possibly affecting the numbers (but not the presence) of the new 
LRTNF, arms control was introduced to ease the expected NATO debate. 
NATO formally agreed to deploy the new geoerat"ion of LRTNF 
on 12 December 1979. The deployment package consisted of 108 Pershing 
lis to replace 108 Pershing lAs held by the US Army in West Germany, 
and 464 GLCHs (160 in tbe UK, 112 in Italy, 96 in West Germany, 48 in 
Belgium, and 48 in the Netherlands; Belgium and the Netherlands 
qualified their agreement pending the success or otherwise of arms 
control moves). At the same time it was announced that l, 000 old US 
SRTNF warheads would be withdrawn from NATO, in addition to the old 
weapons removed on a one-for-one basis as the new LRTNF were 
deployed. 77 
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As a result of these changes a NATO study was undertaken to 
examine "the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments 
resulting from LRTNF deployments and their possible implications for 
the balance of roles and systems in KATO' s nuclear armoury as a 
whole. "78 This came to be known as the "shift study"; It resulted 
from a Dutch initiative. Holland's Defence Minister stated his 
governments "conviction .. that, 
•• ~efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons w-ould have 
to be reflected not only in the strengthening of 
conventional defense, the mutual limitation of nuclear arms 
through discussion on arms control and the search for 
conventional alter:natives to certain nuclear weapons} but 
also In the entire nature and composition of NATO•s nuclear 
potential. 
This means the Netherlands government is endeavoring to see 
that, where possible, less emphasis is plac.ed withi.n the 
alliance ~~ short-range weapons, in particular nuclear 
artillery. 
ln addition to reduced reliance on nuclear artillery the Dutch 
government believed that atomic mines and nuclear air defence weapons 
should be "dispensed with in the central region as soon as 
conventional alternatives become available.· 80 
By the time the Carter administration left office in early 1981 
an important trend in TNF developments had been established: a 
precedent for a large reduction in old SRTNF has been established, 
while the. emphasl.s had, for the mommer>t at least, apparently been 
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placed on LRTNF (although thousands of SRTNF remained in-theatre). 
~) Revising strategic n\Jclear war doctrine 
The US government has a comparatively free hand when it comes to 
developing and planning strategic nuclear forces. This is in contrast 
to policy for NATO TNF (where the Americans have a predominant role 
but are largely subject to allied veto), or NATO conventional forces 
(where the US is a large contributor but it$ efforts are less than 
those of the allies in combination). Decision making over policy for 
strategic nuclear forces is therefore relatively simple and not open 
to serious Alliance input. On the other hand unilateral American 
strategic requirements are global in nature and are not restricted to 
the European theatre. 
Nevertheless, despite greater direct Washi.ngton control over 
central strategic policy and extensive US unilateral security 
interests, the American strategic nuclear posture is largely 
configured to be compat lble with NATO requirements. This is so for 
three reasons: (a) Europe is considered to be a critical theatre of 
operations in a large scale East-West war; (b) the existence of NATo-
oriented strategic options helps reinforce US leadership of the 
Alliance; and (c) the present and projected strategic posture is 
thought to be useful for non-t;ATO contingencies (and, in any case, 
this posture clearly does not preclude the development of LNOs for 
other regions). 
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Carters "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture 
Review" (PRN-10, discussed above) led, in August 1977, to Presidential 
Directive 18 on "US National Strategy". Ball states that 
PD-18 both 
policy and 
important 
reaffirmed 
codified certain aspects of existing US strategic 
called for further study of other aspects. Most 
from the viewpoint of targeting policy, PD--18 
the continued use of NSDM-242 and NUWEP-l in "the 
absence of further guidance for structuring the US strategic 
posture". It insisted that the United States maintain the 
capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the USSR even 
if that nation struck first with nuclear weapons. It 
ins tructec the Pentagon to develop options for limited 
nuclear responses by the United States. It directed that a 
reserve" of strategic forces be maintained, safe from 
attack, for use if nuclear war becawe relatively extended .. 
And it stated that US forces should be strong enough to 
ensure that any possible nuclear war would end on the most 
favourable terms possible to the United States. Finally, it 
directed that three further major studies be undertaken: a 
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR), a modernization of 
the I~fM force study~ and a strategic reserve force 
study. 
With regard to the nuclear-conventional nexus, the most 
relevant of these studies was the Nuclear Targeting Pol icy 
Review. The NTPR covered a wide range of issues such as 
strategic comrr.and, controlt communications and intelligence 
targeting flexihili ty; the targeting of Soviet post-
war economic potential; the relationship between nuclear 
targeting and political objectives; and the relevance of Soviet 
perspectives to US nuclear targeting doctrine. 
As confirmed by Leon Slosst directed the N-::'PR, 
perhaps the most 0spect ,:;tratcgi.c 
review was the salienc~ attAched to Soviet views on nuclear 
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warfighting. The review "engendered a new appreciation of probable 
Soviet objectives and operations in a nuclear conflict." Sloss 
believed that: "Acknowledgement of these Soviet [nuclear war winn1ng] 
views at senior levels of the US Government had a profound influence 
on the strategy that ultimately emerged ••• "82 One shift in targeting 
philosophy suggested by the NTPR was a greater emphasis on politico-
military targets with less weight given to some economic targets. 
Specifically, Soviet post-war economic recovery was down-graded as a 
targeting priority. Instead, according to Sloss, "economic targeting 
focused on the better understood problems of destroying logistics and 
industries providing immediate support to the enemy war effort". 83 A 
general thrust of the NTPR was to try and sketch-out Soviet thinking 
on how a war might be conducted and then suggest ways which Soviet 
strategy might be thwarted by changes in A:nerica's defence posture. 
Thus, for example, Soviet acceptance of the possibility of protracted 
nuclear war pointed towards the need for a more survivable US 
strategic posture, one able to endure successive nuclear strikes. 
Potentially at least, this politico-military approach provided a 
rationale for targeting the linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces in the Warsaw Pact. In other words, Washington had a rationale 
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for targeting Warsaw Pact conventional forces with US nuclear weapons, 
especially if these conventional forces have been assigned a 
"strareglc" role by Moscow.84 It appeared that the Russians 
emphasised combined nuclear-conventional operations in their military 
doctrine. Moreover, to make SIOP-level planning more strategic, in the 
sense of politically purposeful, it was felt necessary to make it 
clear that the Soviet conventional force structure was at risk to 
nuclear destruction. After-all, conventional forces are a central 
element of the Soviet military establishment and would be used to 
seize Soviet political objectives during wartime. 
The NTPR therefore suggested scree ways of applying a neo-
Clausewitzian approach to nuclear targeting (although I am not aware 
of the term being used in the review): nuclear strike options were, 
in theory, to be more closely related to political objectives. For 
example, analysts suggested using nuclear attacks to bring about the 
collapse of Moscow's control over the constituent regions of the USSR, 
and of e>:posing the Soviet Far East to Chinese attack by targeting the 
area's Russian garrison.85 
Once the relevance of Soviet perspectives was accepted, and 
married to US doctrinal development, certain implications for defence 
planning emerged. One of these was that US readiness to engage in 
protracted nuclear war might be a better way of deterring the USSR 
than a posture based on a short war. This, in turn, required a 
strategic c31 system that could survive attack and continue to support 
retaliatory forces for as long as such forces remained .in operation. 
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Paralleling this attention to c3r was the· perceived need for, in the 
words of Sloss, "a redefinition of the secure reserve force· 8 6 (this 
reserve consists of nuclear weapons held back from initial attacks to 
provide the US with an intra-war and post-war deterrent). 
The policy that emerged from this thinking became known as the 
Countervailing strategy; it was the Carter administration's version of 
flexible response. Brown called it "a refinement, a codification of 
previous statements of our strategic policy. ~· 87 The Countervailing 
strategy had a good deal of continuity with inherited policy. One 
reason for this was that it was a product of a politicised 
bureaucratic process in Washington. The ·refinement• of US strategic 
doctrine was encouraged by an assortment of analysts with a previous 
association with ideas of limited and flexible nuclear war doctrine. 88 
Those who formula ted and pushed through the Countervailing strategy 
helped develop what might be described as the "flexible response 
paradigm· for strategic analysis. Moreover, these trends in the 
formulation of US strategic doctrine were underpinned by political 
pressures from both inside and outside the administration. From 
within, sections of the DefenSe Department and NSC provided support 
for Brzezinski's push for the revised nuclear doctrine; 89 outside the 
administration the Committee on the Present Danger lobbied hard for 
stronger defences based on a nuclear ·warfighting" posture. 90 
The NTPR exercise led to Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) which 
Carter signed in July 1980, alt:hough it was drafted somewhat earlier. 
PD-59 re.sulted fror. an inreragency effort, largely between DoD and 
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NSC, to encapsulate the policy implications of the NTPR. It was a 
directive from the President to the Secretary of Defense authorising 
changes to nuclear doctrine. This directive led to the issuance of a 
new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP-2/NUWEP-80) in Octobe< 
1980. The NUWEP instructed the military to make changes to the 
warplanning; it was longer and more explicit than PD-59 and dealt with 
target packages. 91 
The public expositions of PD-59 given by involved officials 
(princip;liy by former Defense Secretary Brown, and his Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Walter Slocombe) are 
rather general in nature- A key element was acceptance of the NTPR 
view that Soviet perceptions should be more closely addressed by 
American planners. As Slocombe has noted, "our strategic doctrine, 
like our strategic forces, is designed to deter the Sovietst not some 
group of Western analysts .. ; he continued, "deterrence requires shaping 
Soviet assessments about the risks of wart assessments that will be 
made using their models, not ours ••• - 92 In particular, the following 
Soviet views neede.d to be addressed: 93 
l) Acceptance of the possibility of protracted nuclear war. 
2) The critical importance of military targets. 
3) The high vnlu~ of maintaining Communist control over the 
USSR during wartiJ~e. 
4) Acceptance of the possibility of winning a nu~lear war. 
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Harold Brown has reiterated the point that the US objective in 
planning its nuclear forces was to "deter any adversary from any 
course of action that could lead to general nuclear war"9 4(emphasis 
added). This was a rather ambitious and ambiguous objective with 
direct relevance to extended deterrence. The Secretary of Defense 
noted that "deterrence must restrain a far wider range of threats than 
just massive attacks on US cities." He contlnued: 
Our strategic forces also must deter nuclear attacks on 
smaller sets of targets in the US or on US military forces, 
and be a wall against nuclear coercion of, or attack ont our 
friends and allies. And strategic forces in conjunction 
with theatre nuclear forces must contribute to deterrence of 
conventional aggression as well •.. 95 
US deterrent policy and Soviet perspectives on nuclear war suggested 
an American strategic posture in which, accordtng to Brown, the US 
Must have forces, contingency plans, and command and control 
capabilities that will convince the Soviet leadership that 
no war and no course of aggression by them that led to use 
of nuclear weapons1 on any scale of attack and at any stage 
of conflict, could lead to victory, however they may define 
victory. 96 
The United States would, according to Brown, continue to 
develop selective nuclear attack plans that would target 
political and military control centres, nuclear and 
conventional forces, and ''the industrial capability to sustain 
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a war. In addition: ··~e are also acting to improve our 
ability to maintain effective communications, command and 
control of our forces, even in the highly uncerta:tn and chaotic 
conditions that would prevail in a nuclear war~·· 97 
The possibility of theatre providing the 
context of escalation to nuclear strikes was clearly a 
significant element in the development of the Countervailing 
strategy. As Brown has stated, 
The contingency that has dominated US defence planning for 
35 years has been much less a surprise attack with strategic 
weapons on the United States than a massive Soviet invasion 
of Western Europe. Because of that concern ••• a strategic 
nuclear exchange has been envisaged, not as a separate and 
independent phenomenon, but as a part ••• of a much larger 
and more traditional campaign of the kind we had experienced 
in World War 11. 98 
One of the implications of this was that Warsaw Pact conventional 
forces may, "under many conditions", 
be more time-urgent targets 
might the command~control, war 
communication necessary to 
campaigns. 99 
than residual missiles. So 
reserve stocks, 
the conduct 
and lines of 
of theatre 
One of the special problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons 
during a theatre campaign is keepln5 track of mobtle targets (both 
nuclear and conventional) that rntght be moving forward. There 
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was also a requirement to target mobilising or concentrating 
conventional forces. This may be the reason for the reports that PD-
59 called for an improved capability to ''find new targets and destroy 
them once a war begins." 100 Brze,inski states that, 
c3I ~<as treated as a broader requirement, for control of 
both strategic and general-purpose forces in a protracted 
conflict, and it [PD-59] called for a "Look-sh8ot-look" 
capability for identifying new and moving targets. 1 1 
The administration's view was that the countervailing strategy 
supported NATO strategy, 
the effect of PD-59 on the selective employment and general 
strike planning of SACEUR will be that of complementing them 
because we will have the flexibility for employment of 
nuclear forces in support of NATO over a broad range of 
situations, •• The US countervailing strategy will contribute 
significantly to the strategy [of flexible resporrse] by 
making available to NATO a large number of nuclear weapons 
employment options in defense of the Alliance.l02 
F) The Carter Administration and the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces 
As shown above) the linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces lay at, the heart of many of the strategic problems faced by the 
Carter administration~ This was ref lee ted in four of the 
administration's defence programmes: the LTDP, the ERW affair, 
modernisation of ~RTNF, and the Countervailing strategy. The LTDP was 
lntended to (am::n1g other things) raise the nuclear t{J::eshold; the E~\.J 
option arose as a direct consequence of the connection between 
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conventional defence planning and tactical nuclear weapons doctrine; 
the modernisation of LRTOJF was largely a politico-technical response 
to allied fears of a growing separation between US nuclear strategy 
and regional security issues in Europe; PD-59 attempted to breath new 
life into extended deterrence by restating the link between strategic 
warplanning and American security interests on the Eurasian periphery 
(particularly in Europe, the Middle East and North East Asia). 
Thus all four of these programmes were,. in their own way, related 
to considerations of the linkage between US nuclear firepower and 
local conventional forces .. Yet, despite its core importance, the 
linkage between nuclear and conventional forces was not subject to any 
high level, systematic and sustained analysis. 103 The general 
requirement for linkage lay implicit in the administration's policies 
and was largely taken for granted. And it was assumed that this 
linkage would operate within the framework of the long established 
doctrine of flexible response. VS defence officials tended to accept 
the assumptions underlying the requirement for linkage rather than (a) 
challenge them, or (b) critically assess the implications for military 
planning. So, although the nuclear-conventional nexus was (and is) 
pivotal to US security, its precise nature and irnpl teat ions remained 
poorly articulated. The following questions were not brought 
together, in a single package, for official examination: 
1) How are conventional force plans related to the formulation 
of nuclear options? 
2) !low does/should conventional strategy affect nucle;;1r 
strategy and vice versa? 
3) How interciJangeable are nuclear and conventional weapons? 
/~) How do particular strategies~ planst and weapons affect the 
nuclear threshold? 
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5) What is the optimum size and shape for NATO's TNF posture? 
6) 
Is there a trade-off between the political and military 
value of forward-based systems? 
At what, if anyt stage in an 
"signalling" likely to supersede 
nuclear-conventional operations 
makers? 
escalating war is nuclear 
the importance ~of combined 
in the minds of decision 
7) What level of nuclear attack could be absorbed by the 
conventional forces and military infrastructure of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact? 
8) What is the linkage between British and French nuclear 
forces and the operational environment of EUCOM? 
9) Does the concept of flexible response adequately address 
these issues? 
One reason for this official reticence was the highly charged 
political nature of the subject. This can be illustrated by looking 
at the issue of "First-Use" of nuclear weapons. Controversy over 
NATO's option for first use was fueled in 1979 following a speech by 
Henry Kissinger to a NATO audience in Brussels. Coming in the wake of 
the PRM-10 leak, the ERW muddle and deliberations over LRTNF, the 
speech struck some raw nerves among officials and politicians on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The former US National Security Advisor and 
Secretary of State said that 
I would say, which I might not say in office, the European 
allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic 
assurances that we cannot possibly mean; or if we do mean, 
we should not want to execute bef54se if we execute, we risk 
the destruction of civilization. . 
The Soviet military build-up could produce a period of massive 
crisis .. for NATO. Nuclear parity and a US force posture which was not 
(according to Kissinger) suf:'iciently oriented to counterforc.e was 
jeopardizing extended deterrence. In Kissinger's words, ··we are 
approaching a point where it is dtt'ficult to assign a clear military 
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objective to American strategic forces in a strategic nuclear 
exchange." The clear message was that the US nuclear guarantee to 
Europe was largely a bluff. Schwartz has described the reactions to 
Kissinger's speech as ua mixture of bafflement, outrage,. and 
embarrassment ..• others reacted with deep uneasiness." He notes that 
the speech had a "profoundly negative effect ••• on European confidence 
in the United Statea.· 105 
As with the PRM-10 leak, the Carter administration publicly 
rejected the notion that the link between nuclear deterrence and 
conventional forces had been, or was about to be,. broken. In his 
memoirs Carter mentions discussions between Brown, Vance> Brzezinski 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) over the 
''advisability of a mutual pledge of non-first use of nuclear forces". 
These d lscuss ions appear to have covered old ground; Carter writes 
that: 
In Europe, the superiority of Soviet conventional forces now 
required the threat o£ our nuclear forces to deter 
aggression. I did not want to encourage an attack by 
promising the Soviets that a European war would be fought on 
their terms. I was convinced that if, as a result of Soviet 
aggression, a conventional war ever began in Europe, 
threatening the ultimate security or existence of our 
allies, it was likely to escalate into a nuclear war between 
the Warsaw Pact nations and Western Europe, despite any 
previous assurances to the contrary. Armed aggression would 
serve as the trip wire - the beginning of a war that might 
not be limited by any prior agreement on weapons. It was 
important to impress Brezhnev with this fact. A joint 
pledge with the Soviet leaders of nonfirst use of any 
military force in Europe would be acceptable for now. 
Later, success in balancing conventional military forces by 
mutual reductions, or a buildup in NATO forces to match 
Soviet non-nuclear capabilities, might make a pledge of 
nonfirst use of nuclear force advisable. 106 
-196-
The fact was that the declared American willingness to use 
nuclear weapons in response to an overwhelming conventional invasion 
of Western Europe was ingrained in US national security policy. This 
aspect of the nuclear-conventional nexus was embedded i.n America's 
Alliance diplomacy. It would have been politically and 
psychologically harder to change or break this nexus than to live with 
it. To explicitly reverse declaratory policy on possible escalation 
would have required a reorientation of the Alliance and the rewriting 
of ~Cl4/3 - itself the product of a painfully worked-out consensus. 
(None of this is meant to suggest that the US would necessarily carry 
out its threat/promise to escalate.) 
Operationally, little effort seems to have been made to change 
the character of the nuclear-conventional nexus in NATO. There is no 
evidence that the administration introduced significant changes in 
SHAPE, EUCOM or corps plans regarding contingencies for nuclear 
release> either in terms of timing. scale or objectives. 
In retrospect the years of the Carter presidency represented an 
atte:npted tidying-up exercise as far as NATO defence planning was 
concerned~ The LTDP, ERW episode, LRTNF modernisation, and 
Countervailing strategy reflected attempts to restate the requirements 
of flexible response in terms relevant to the late 1970s. As such 
Carter's NATo-related defence policies should be seen as allowing 
incremental changes within an inherited national and collective 
security framework. 
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Given this 1 tt is not surprising that only marginal changes were 
made to the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces .. Here 1 
will summarise the effect on this 1 inkage of the three prineipoa.f 
NATO-related policy issues faced by the administration. 
(!)Conventional force improvements. 
At the end of his term in office Harold Brown noted that: 
NATO has made real progress in a number of LTDP programs, 
especially readiness, maritime posture, consumer logisticst 
and command, control, and communications. Progress in other 
areasJ however, is limited, and the Alliance must renew its 
efforts, particularly in electronic warfare, training and 
equipment of reserve forces, war reserve stocks of 
ammunition and fuels, mining and mine counterneasures, 
defense against chemical warfare, and the provision of 
additional European reserve brigades. National defense 
planning in the Allies also needs to be more closely aligned 
with the LTDP. 107 
The following year (1982) the former Secretary of Defense spelt out 
the perceived implications of this continued putative inadequacy in 
conventional forces: 
nrown 
NATO needs enough con~entional military capability to 
prevent a quick conventional Soviet victory) by stabilizing 
for at least some weeks a line much nearer the inner-German 
border than the Rhine. NATO cannot confidently expect to do 
this now. Although the Soviets are probably not sure of 
being able to drive to the Rhine, the North Sea, and the 
Channel in that time, their confidence of doing so probably 
exceed ours of being able to prevent it. That leaves NATO 
with an uncomfortable degree of reliance on the threat of 
nuclear es~alation. 10 8 
called for more prepositioned equipmentt better 
'*interoperahility of the national systems of communication.s, com:;:;Jar:d 
and control" and improved force re.A.diness and reinforct"ment:s; his 
first priority was to enhance- immediate combat capabllity. 
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Perceived Western conventional weakness seems to be a perennial 
feature of Western strategic analysis and defence planning. Eight 
years after the LTDP was initiated, and after four years of overseeing 
burgeoning military expenditure, Defense Secretary Weinberger noted 
that, 
with our present effort to 
strength, NATO is essentially 
established but elusive goal 
nuclear weapons].l09 
increase our conventional 
seeking to secure a long-
[of reducing reliance on 
The reason for the continued putative imbalance in conventional 
forces is threefold. First, the European allies {who bear most of the 
burden for the conventional defence of Europe) have not, as a whole 
and consistently, fully implemented the LTDP or the three percent real 
growth in defence expenditure. 110 Second, the Warsaw Pact has 
continued conventional force improvements of its own. 11 1 Third, 
following the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan, at the end of the 
1970s, Europe was given less weight in US reinforcement plans as the 
Rapid Deployment Force was built-up. 112 
US conventional forces were overcommitted. To be able to fight 
the USSR and prevent escalation to nuclear war was believed to require 
substantial ground, sea and air forces capable of deployment to 
north, south and central Europe, north-east Asia and now the Middle 
East/south-west Asia. 
By 1980 the US was putting increasing pressure on its European 
allies to do more in the area of conventional defence. According to 
David Greenwood: "Three Per Cent ceased to be an index of resolution 
and had become an issue in recrimination". 113 One reason for American 
irritation over European recalcitrance was (aside from problems over 
burden sharing) an awareness that the nuclear threshold was partly 
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hostage to European action - or rather inaction - on conventional 
force levels .. Not only was an American attempt to raise the nuclear 
threshold being confronted head-on by Warsaw Pact conventional defence 
improvements, and being out-flanked by events in the Middle East, it 
was also (from the US perspective) being undermined by allied foot-
dragging. 
(ii)TNF modernisation. 
The Carter administration put in train TNF modernisation measures 
that might, in time, lead to significant changes in some aspects of 
the 1 inkage between nuclear and conventional forces. More 
specifically, overall numbers of TNF were scheduled to decline. Also, 
a10re emphasis was placed on LRTNF at the expense of SRTNF. ( Although 
this sensible trend has since been reversed.) In add it ion, the 
decision was made not to replace any atomic mines and nuclear air 
defence missiles retired, and to increase the' range of nuclear 
artillery; an ERW option was also retained for Lance warhead 
replacements. 114 Various aspects of c3r support for TNF were also 
improved. Communications links to US nuclear custodial units in Europe 
were upgraded. Redundancy was added to TNF communications to allow 
more reliable transmission of emergency action messages". Some 
thought was also given to improving safety locks on TNF "which require 
a unique code to gain access to, or to arm a weapon". For the future, 
Brown noted in January 1981, the US had 
completed a comprehensive plan for longer term 
to theater nucleat weapons release 
communications~ and command and control.ll5 
improvements 
procedures, 
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A potential consequence of these hardware and command and control 
developments might be a less hair-trigger TNF posture and, somewhat 
more speculativelyJ greater possibilities for controlled, limited 
nuclear war in Europe. This is certainly a NATO planning objective, 
as described in the previous chapter. Brown has referred to the 
possibility of using a "few" TNF "as a way of signalling political 
seriousness"; such an attack might also have "an immediate effect on 
Soviet reinforcement with conventional forces & •• ll6 A further gain 
from TNF modernisation may be the release of more forces to the 
initial, conventional, battle. Brown has stated that 
[TNF] readiness (to attack time urgent targets] should not 
be at the expense of our conventional firepower~ •• We 
cannot afford to tie-up major conventional capabilities 
during an emerrrncy in order to improve and expand our 
nuclear alert. 
This suggests disadvantages with dual capable aircraft,, and a 
requirement for dedicated TNF such as GLCM as well as the freeing-up 
of some of the manpower needed to guard SRTNF near potential 
conventional battlefields. 
The "evolutionary upward adjustment" of NATO's TNF can be seen in 
the context of attempts to streamline the,Alliance's military .posture. 
Despite the diplomatic and bureaucratic confusion and the ad-hoc 
d~cision-making, the LRTNF modernisation can be seen as part of an ill 
defined and poorly articulated package of measures to bring nuclear 
aod convr3otional forces into balance with e:ac:h other. TNF 
modernisation was a component of the LTDP which was largely concerned 
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with raising the nuclear threshold by strengthening conventional 
forces. Although the TNF issue soon developed an unwelcome life of 
its own, the result of the 1979 "adjustment" decision was consistent 
with ldeas of how to improve the relationship between nuclear and 
conventional forces .. The decision encouraged a trend towards fewer, 
more reliable, longer range TNF118 with improved command and control; 
and it set an example for Alliance agreement on withdrawing some of 
those T~~ with relatively doubtful deterrent and operational efficacy 
(such as nuclear anti-aircraft missiles). 
However, the decisions made on LRTNF were primarily based on 
perceived political requirements rather than military calculations. 
And, largely for political reasons, the conceptual and strategic 
framework for TJ:.Ir planning was not precisely spelt-out for public 
consumption. Instead, simplistic general rationales were presented 
such as countering the SS20. In so far as there was a strategic 
debate in public it led to a massive politicisation of NATO planning 
and sharpened some of the more negative public feelings towards the 
Alliance. 
The TNF controversies brought into sharp relief the potentially 
explosive mix of conventional and nuclear forces that had been amassed 
on the Cootinent; They also brought into quest1on the abil1ty of the 
Alliance to sustain its political basis of support; it was, after all, 
partly this political base which underpinned the form in which nuclear 
and conventional forces were linked in Europe. 
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Political and psychological factors were therefore central to the 
TNF issue. This was reflected in Schmidt's relationship with the 
Carter administration. Brzezinski notes that, by 1980, "Schimdt had 
let it be known to all and sundry what a low opinion he had of the US 
President." It seems that Carter "had concluded that Schmidt was 
unstable, egotistical and unreliable.-119 Carter has written of "an 
unbelievable meeting with Helmut Schmidt" in the midst of the LRTNF 
debate; Schmidt was "ranting and raving" . 120 Of one meeting 
Brzezinski wrote: 
It was an angry and 
session, with Schmidt 
quite balancect. 121 
at times an altogether 
striking me as occasionally 
unpleasant 
not being 
Personality clashes aside, it is hard to believe that the politically 
charged nature of the T~F issue did not contribute to this mutual 
antagonism. 
(iii). The Countervailing strategy. 
PD-59 attempted to reinforce the links between central strategic 
warplanning and regional contingencies. This was to be done on two 
levels: declaratory and operational. Operationally the emphasis was 
on the growth and refinement of limited nuclear attack options and the 
c3r to support them. Insofar as the provisi_on of options makes it 
easier to use nuclear weapons, one may speculate that one consequence 
of PD-59 may have been to marginally lower the nuclear threshold. 
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But such a hypothetical consequence is probably more relevant to 
the Middle East than to Europe. The latter already has an 
established, in-place, TNF posture (with limited attack options) 
whereas the Middle Eastern theatre does not - unless one includes US 
naval forces with their on-board nuclear weapons. From a geopolitical 
perspective PD-59 might be seen as a way of projecting US nuclear 
strike power into the Middle East region to plug a gap in the ring of 
containment where there was little in-theatre alternative .. 
One of the reasons for the qualified tone of this discussion has 
been suggested by Brown (in 1979): ··we have to admit that <.1e have not 
developed a plausible picture of the conflict we are trying to 
deter." 122 Another reason is uncertainty regarding whether PD-59 made 
much of a difference, or, indeed, whether it could be fully 
implemented.. Two points need to be made here.. Firstly, the SlOP was 
being refined even in the absence of PD-59: up-dating the SIOP seems 
to be almost routine. Secondly, it is not clear that any force 
posture and c3r improvements can ever make nuclear warfighting a 
feasible option - at least not above a certain, difficult to define, 
level of destruction. If strategic and theatre c3 r systems break down 
after 1 say, 20--100 nuclear detonations, i.t mlght be prudent to plan 
for operations below this problematic threshold, but the value of 
escalatory options involving (for example) two hundred, one thousand}' 
or five thousand nuclear warheads seems dubious; 123 in any case~ the 
US already had a range of Hajor and Selective Attack Options. 
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Despite assertions to the contrary, SIOP level planning remained, 
perhaps inevitably, essentially astrategic after PD--59. That is, the 
US had "not developed a plausible picture" of the conflict it might 
have to fight with its nuclear options. Nor had it developed a 
convincing plct<Jre of how, in such a conflict, military means could be 
kept in line with political ends. Without these "plausible pictures" 
it is difficult to say anything precise about how, in extremis, PD-59 
would affect the linkage between regional conflict and central 
strategic forces. 
Nevertheless, the Countervailing strategy did help rationalise a 
growth in options and an improvement in c3r. And it did attempt to 
place these options some of which were directly related to potential 
theatre war l.nto soa:e kind of general geopolitical perspective. 
This perspective was apparently articulated by the NSC, in particular 
Brzezinski, but it was already implicit in post-war lJS national 
securl ty policy. The administration's geopolitical thinking (which 
went back at least as far as PD-18) was somewhat sharpened by the 
Iranian revol;.ttion and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan .. These 
events led, of course, to the announcement of the ··carter doctrine" in 
January 1980. According to Brzezinski, the events of the late 1970s 
led to "a strategic revolution in America's global position". The 
National Security Advisor wr'ote that: 
The President's words represented a formal recognition of a 
centrally important reality: that P.merica 1 s secority had 
become interdependent with the security of three central and 
inter-related strategic zones consisting of Western Europe, 
the Far Ease, and the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Fo!:" rne 
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it was a particularly gratifying moment because for more 
than a year I had been seeking within the US government the 
adoption of such a policy, based on a formal recognition of 
the interdependence of these three central strategic 
zones. 124 
Carter has described how his response to the Soviet invasion required 
re-examination of the possibilties for horizontal and vertical 
escalation: 
Some news reporters dubbed my decision the Carter Doctrine 
and called it an idle threat, because, they said, we could 
not successfully invade Iran if it were to be attacked by 
Soviet troops. 
The fact was that mine was a carefully considered statement, 
which would have been backed by concerted action, not 
necessarily confined to any small invaded area or to tactics 
or terrain of the Soviets' choosing.l25 
The relevance of this to PD-59 and the nuclear-conventional 
nexus has only been discussed in general terms~ ~'or example, 
Brzezinski has stated that 
the new strategic doctrine would provide the necessary 
deterrence umbrella for the needed application of American 
conventional force if son:e re~ional interests vital to the 
United States were threatened. 26 
What the Ur.ited States had done was to restate its sec.urity 
interests in c.ontaining the Soviet Union while adding to its nuclear 
and c.onventional options. Conventional forces,. where strong enough 
as in Europe, were to be the fjrst lf_ne of defence, with an option to 
escalate to r::uclear operations if necessary. However, thls 
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conventional ~defence line was to be more than a tripwire to nuclear 
escalation. It was intended that US and allied forces would be able 
to absorb the shock of a Soviet attack, hold most of lvestern Europe, 
and sustain intensive combat operations for weeks~ Where conventional 
forces were weak (as in south west Asia), they were to symbolise a 
commitment and, by their very presence,. threaten to act as a potential 
trigger to nuclear strikes; here conventional forces could be used 
essentially as a signal rather than primarily as a way of matching the 
Soviet Union in a ground war. 
The Carter administation attempted to reduce reliance on nuclear 
weapons while adding to its range of nuclear choices. Although 
nuclear options were designed to look credible, the administration did 
not want to pivot its defence policy around them. Indeed) it is an 
open question as to whether or not the proliferation of nuclear 
options under Carter was part of a bluff. 
As already noted~ Carter oversaw incremental changes to an 
inherited framework of collective security. The same may be said of 
Reagan. The broad pattern of Alliance planning has been remarkably 
resilient to change. Even so, the TNF controversies of the l970s did 
fuel the defence debate. This has coloured NATO formulations of 
strategy~ Five categories of proposals for change to NATO strategy 
will be identified here {not all of them are mutually exclusive)~ 
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First, some analysts have called for preparations for more 
integrated nuclear-conventional battlefield operations. It was 
suggested that TNF be made more freely available to local commanders 
to reinforce their conventional .. fire-and-manoeuvre" plans: nuclear 
weapons were seen as a form of super artillery. This idea found no 
support in Europe; it was considered politically destabilising and 
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strategically daft. 
Second, it has been argued that KATO strategy is pote.ntially 
destabilising as it (a) helps feed the arms race, and (b) would 
increase pressures for escalation during wartime .. Hany of these 
critics advocated "alternative defence·· concepts .. "Defensive 
defence", for example~ stresses troops and barriers rather than long-
range strike aircraft or armoured divisions geared to manoeuvre 
warfare on World War Two lines.l 28 
Third, some analysts criticised NATO conventional doctrine for 
heine too passive. Their primary target for criticism was forward 
defence which \olas seen as overly dependent on static. defences and 
lateral defence lines. 
mobile operations. 129 
These observers advocated an emphasis on 
use 
Fourth, calls have been made for a NATO declaration of no-first-
of nuclear weapons. 130 
Fifth, NAcO has been urged to raise the nuclear threshold by 
spending more on increasingly 5ophisti.cated conventional weapons (such 
as modern conventional ballistic missiles). Tl.1is suggestion has 
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sometimes been made i.n association with calls for n-o-early-first-use 
of nuclear weapons. Here the wording of current NATO doctrine was to 
remain more-or-less 1 ntac t, while. the substance was changed to reflect 
a massive conventional defence effort. 131 
* * * * * 
None of these proposals has been accepted unequivocally by the 
NATO bureaucracy, although the last/fifth suggestion came closest. 
Changes have had to be made within the long-standing Alliance 
framework. Three such changes merit attention~ 
Firat, NATO has adopted the "Follow-on-Force-Attack" (FOFA) 
concept .. FOFA is about using conventional airpower to interdict 
Vlarsaw Pact reinforcements .. Theoretically, FOFA would raise the 
nuclear threshold by lessening the weight of attack against NATO's 
forward defence line and thereby enhance the Alliance's ability to 
sustain the cohesiveness of its conventional defences .. Conventional 
interdiction is hardly a novel idea. As General Rogers has stated, 
FOFA is .. by no stretch of the imagination a new strategy ... 132 The 
endorsement of FOFA reinforced a trend towards adopting more 
sophisticated conventional weaponry~ However, FOFA falls short of 
ambitious proposals to revamp NATO conventional capabilities with 
state-of-the-art and emerging technologies. (The adoption of FOFA was 
erroneously associated with the concept of ''Airland Battle'' as 
developed by the US Army. ~ATO authorities have stated that open 
offensive manceuver~ integrated with nuclear fire support, as outlined 
in Air land Battle, has not supplanted Alliance doctrine ~133 
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Second, NATO has reviewed its TNF posture. The trend, 
established during Carter's term, to retire obsolete/ inappropriate 
warheads, has been continued. In 1983 the NPG decided to withdraw 
1,400 such weapons. 134 This streamlining process was to include the 
modernisation of remaining TNF, and the correction of maldeployment. 
Once again it was recognised that the TNF posture should emphasise 
survivability and effective command and control. 135 These 
developments have been associated with SHAPE's classified five year 
"Nuclear Requirements Study" initiated in 198o. 136 By the end of 
1986 NATO had even agreed on "General Political Guidelines" for the 
~ l 137 use ot nuc ear weapons. These guidelines apparently clarified 
previous guidGnee and brought various relevant Alliance ideas together 
in one package. 
Third, it has been decided to withdraw GLCM and Pershing 2 
missiles~ The constituencies for the weapons proved to be too narrow 
and/or fragile to sustain the original deployment rationale - which 
was to treat arms control as a complement to. not a substitute for, 
deployment of modernised LRTNF. The coupling issue, and concern over 
dependence on vulnerable aircraft, was obscured and then marginalised. 
Broader matters appeared to seize the public's, and the Reagan 
admi.nistration's) imagination. Few people wanted to publicly argue 
that GLCM improved Western seeurity, especially tf this looked like 
obstructing a new phase of detente. After misleading the public Into 
believing that SS20s were the simple reason for new LRTNF deployments, 
it was politically awkward for NATO to refuse Soviet arms control 
initiatives~ 
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The TNF agreement bet;;een the United States and the Soviet Union 
in 1987 threatened to unsettle NATO. West German leaders came under 
presssure as German Pershing 1 launchers \\'ere drawn into the arms 
control momentU!n catalysed by • the .. Rykjavik process". 
f. 
The focus on 
TNF planning apparently shifted back to short-range weapons which, to 
some observers, suggested a central European battlefield -rather than 
collective deterrence or enhanced scope for crisis management. As Les 
Aspin (Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, US Congress) 
stated: .. we're eliminating the safest weapons and leaving in the most 
dangerous ••• The whole thing worries me a very, very great deal" .138 
It seemed that NATO might drift into a dispute analogous to the ERW 
muddle. It looked as if the wheel was going to turn full circle. Once 
again) as during Carter 1 s presidency, the spotlight was on how to 
manage the link between nuclear risks and conventional defence 
\o/ith:in the framework of evolving conceptions of European security. It 
was clear that the problem had not been solved by the earlier 
rejection of ERW, the endorsement of the LTDP, or the decision to 
modernise LRTNF. Meanwhile, NATO warplanners continued to superimpose 
options for nuclear escalation onto a pattern of force deployment 
geared to conventional denial and political acceptability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE NATO PLANNING FRAMEWORK: 
PLANNING FOR THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a picture of NATO planning. It does not 
offer predictions of how a war in Europe will be fought. First, some 
very brief comments are made on the political context of Alliance 
policy-making. NATO's organisational framework is then outlined. 
Next, the pattern of NATO planning is described in a way that 
corresponds to a hypothetical and simplified escalation ladder. To 
this end, each of the following is looked at: in turn: the threshold 
between peace and war 1 NATO's concept of operations, NATO conventional 
doctrine, NATO planning for the first-use of TNF, doctrine for theatre 
nuclear warfare, and the links between TNF and central strategic war. 
R) ?olitic-al Background 
Alliance planning and doctrine is constrained by political 
considerations which attempt to bal.ance the requirements of separate 
national sovereignties with the development of a collective view of 
European security issties. The Alliance, qua Alliance, view of 
the politico-military framework for defence planning therefore rests 
on a good deal of compromise and ambiguity. 
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The ,broad political perspective underlaying NATO planning since 
the late 1960s was outlined in the Harmel Report of 1967 on the 
"Future Tasks of the All lance". This report firmly tied detente and 
defence together: "Military security and a policy of detente are not 
contradictory but complementary ... J NATO military preparedness was to 
help underpin Western solidarity and the stabilisation of political 
relationships on the Continent .. 
A series of developments since 1967 have changed the political 
landscape in Europe but have not drastically altered the formula 
sketched above and in the Harmel Report. These developments have 
included: the signing of a non-aggression treaty between \lest Germany 
and the USSR, and the normalisation of relations between the FRG and 
Poland in 1970; the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the "Basic 
Treaty'" between the FRG and East Germany, the initiation of the 
Helsinki process, and the signing of SALT I in 1972; the signing of 
the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe in 1975; and the INF arms control process. 
The consequences of this partial ratification of detente for 
military planning in Europe have not been clear-cut and are not easy 
to sharply define. ~onetheless it can be argued that the atmosphere 
of relaxed tens ions or even the aspiration for a relaxation of 
tensions has reinforced other factors which have undermined the 
establishment of a stronger and more coherent Alliance war-fighting 
posture. It has also coloured the special role ot West Gennacy in 
both East-West relations and .in NATO deliberations .. 
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At the very least images of ~detente have added to the complexity of 
the NATO planning context. 
But it Is not only political factors which have changed since the 
adoption of the Harmel Report in 1967. The mill tary basis of NATO 
security has continued to shift~ The previous chapters have sholNn how 
the trend towards strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers 
encouraged the move towards flexible response; the continuance of this 
trend added pressures to develop the new policy. Strategic nuclear 
parity was explicitly acknowledged by NATO in the 1974 "Declaration on 
Atlantic Relations", commonly called the Ottawa Declaration. This 
declaration referred to a "point of near equilibrium" in the 
"strategic relationship" between the US and DSSR. This had produced a 
"'different and more distinct" edge to NATO's defence problems. The 
European allies ("'who provide three-quarters of the conventional 
strength of the Alliance in Europe, and two of wbom possess nuclear 
forces capable of playing a deterrent role of their own") would have 
to note this difference. In support of its allies, and in the face of 
the Soviet strategic nuclear build--up, the US was to "reaffirm its 
determination .. and state its "resolve" to help defend Western 
Europe. 2 US willpower and European troops would therefore remain key 
interlocking elements in NATO's defence posture. 
C) The Org~nisational Framework 
In the Alliance, defence policy is developed at many different 
levels~ Two of these lev0ls are sallent in terms of the higher 
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direction of planning: the NATO and national levels.~ The~ NATO level 
of planning is represented at, for e~ample, Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). National input can be provided at 
different levels. For e~ample, policy developed in Washington can be 
fed into the North Atlantic Council, the NATO V.ilitary Committee, and 
SHAPE; it can also be fed directly into national military forces (in 
this case US forces in Europe) in a way that by-passes the NATO 
framework. A 'dual hat' system; whereby national force commanders 
have comparable and parallel NATO collll!lands, facilitates the meshing of 
national and NATO policy. NATO is not a supra-national organisation, 
so national positions and initiatives dominate the Alliance defence 
posture. In addition, considerable input to the West's strategy is 
provided at lower levels such as various corps headquarters~ 
The highest decision making body in NATO is the North Atlantic 
c:ouncil (NAC). It is a forum for Alliance political consultation and 
coordination. A sub-group of the NAC - the Defence Planning Committee 
(DPC) - is the highest authority dealing with detailed aspects of NATO 
strategy; it excludes France-. The NAC has routine meetings but can 
sit at about two hours notice if need be. 3 The Council directs the 
work of numerous committees (such as those dealing with communications 
and logistics). Via the DPC, the NAC is linked to the Nuclear Defence 
Affairs Committee (NDAC), whit:h is closely related to the Nuclear 
Planning Group (NPG). 
~225~ 
The NAC and its committees are supported by the NATO International 
Staff. One branch of the International Staff forms the Division of 
Defence Planning and Policy; this division is divided into Force 
Planning, Nuclear Planning, and Civil Emergency Planning. The 
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy chairs the 
Defence Review and Alerts committees, and supervises the NPG Staff 
4 Group. 
The role of the NPG is to provide a forum for Alliance 
consultation over nucle-ar planning and the formulation of guidelines 
for the use of (mainly) TNF. The NPG is essentially a bureaucratic 
mechanism for granting the European allies access to US policy and 
concepts, and a platform from whtch the Europeans can respond to 
American thinking on T);F. The NPG does not dr-aw~up warplans. The NPG 
is not meant to manage operational aspects of TNF planning and may be 
able to offer only somewhat general guidance to warplanners. 5 
The senior military authority in NATO is the Military Collllllittee 
(MC). The ~C is supported by the International Hilitary Staff (IMS) 
and is responsible for strategic guidance for the defence of the NATO 
area; it is subordinate to the NAC/DPC. MC guidance is given to the 
Major NATO Commands (NNC); these MNCs are Allied Command Europe 
(ACE), Allied Command Channe 1, and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). 
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ACE is headed by the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR). In 
war SACEUR would direct and coordinate four subordinate commands: 
Northern European; Central European; Southern European; and UK NATO 
Ai rforces (UKAIR). In peacetime SACEUR has no operatl.ona 1 command 
over forces (except some air defence systems - and perhaps in certain 
circumstances some Quick Reaction Alert TNF). National military forces 
have to be assigned to SACEUR by national political authorities during 
a crisis. 
ACE therefore has three Continental commands under the direction 
of SACEUR: Northern (centred on Norway and Denmark); Central (centred 
on Germany); and Southern (centred on the central and eastern 
Mediterranean area) .. Most of ACE's ground combat power is to be 
alloted to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe; this 
force is concentrated in West Germany and is divided into Northe:rn 
Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). These Army 
Groups coordinate corps. "The corps commander is at the top of NAT0 1 s 
battle management hierarchy", according to some analysts" 6 Corps 
commanders direct mul tid! visional forces .. Be low division level are 
brigades, the cutting edge of NATO's conventional ground forces. 
The Central front is divided into eight corps areas. From 
north to south these are (first under NORTHAG) the First Netherlands 
Corps, the First German Corps, the First British Corps - BAOR, and the 
First Belgian Corps; further south (under CENTAG) are the Third German 
Corps, the Fifth and Seventh tS Corps' and the Second German Corps. 
There are additional US troops in NORTHAG (in the Bremen area) and 
lim! tee Canadian forces in CENT A G. Adjoining Central European Command 
in the north (in Schleswig-Holstein) is another West German corps~ 
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During a crisis these different national corps would, in theory, 
come under SACEUR's control. SACEUR has always been an American and 
is also the Commander-in-Chief of US forces in Europe; these American 
forces are organised as US European Command (EUCOM). 
pivotal role in NATO nuclear war planning. 7 
EUCOM has a 
Like the other US Comreands (such as SAC and Pacific Command), 
EUCOM works under United States JCS guidance. The JCS "recommend 
missions and publish master plans whose express purpose is to join 
these ••• commands like pieces in a gigantic jigsaw puzzle ... B This 
jigsaw puzzle comes together i.n the form of the Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Commanders of the Unified and Specified 
Commands take orders frore the President via the Secretary of Defense 
and the JCS. 
The JCS also oversees the development of strategic nuclear 
warplanning via the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). 
The JSTPS develops target lists and the major strategic nuclear 
warplans in the form of the SlOP. The SIOP Division of the JSTPS must 
consider, among other things, "the most likely conditions of [war] 
plan initiation." 9 One of these conditions is clearly the possibility 
of conventional or theatre nuclear war in Europe. Since 1963 European 
NATO officers have been attached to the JSTPS to help coordinate or 
"deconflict" SlOP and TNF planning; SACEUR has been "designated as the 
NATO nuclear targetting coordinating authority. " 10 
As previously noted, the l\ATO nuclear force structure is under 
review. The present NATO objective includes a ceiling of 4,600 Tl\'F 
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warheads in Europe. This will enable NATO to deploy about 1, 700 
bombs, 750 artillery shells, 80 Lance surface-to-surface missile 
systems, and 200 anti-submarine depth charges; in addition, NATO may 
develop a new surface-to-surface missile (Lance 2?) and an air-to-
surface stand-off missile. !lost NATO TNF warheads have apparently 
been kept in about 50-100 storage sites; the majority of SRTNF 
warheads may be concentrated in about 20 such sites. About two-thirds 
of these sites house US warheads earmarked for allied (Turkish, Greek, 
Italian, German, British, Belgian, and Dutch) use. All these warheads 
are held in US custody. A significant proportion of Alliance nuclear 
firepower is held on ai rbases. Seventeen of these airbases house 
nuclear armed aircraft on "Quick Reaction Alert" (QRA). Some missiles 
h1we also been placed on QRA. 11 
Whereas planning for conventional forces is primarily concerned 
with force levels, deployment patterns and logistics, nuclear planning 
is largely a matter of selecting and prioritising targets and 
assigning specific weapon systems to them. NATO nuclear planning is 
carried out at three major centres - ACE (Casteau-Hons, Belgium), 
ACLAN"T (Norfolk, Virginia, USA), and HQ EUCOM (Stuttgart-Vaihingen, 
and at various lower echelonst such as corps. West Germany) 
Targeting of NATO TNF can best be described in terms of two dual 
categories: pre-planned and partially pre-planned, and selective and 
general attack. Pre-planned targets are mostly fixed targets (such as 
airfields), partially pre-planned targets are mostly mobile (such as 
armoured forces). The provision of selective attack plans covers 
contingencies for limited nuclear war, while general attack means all-
oUt nuclear war. 
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NATO nuelear targeting is meshed into the Nuclear Operations Plan 
(NOP). LRTNF have played a pivotal role in the NOP. For example, the 
1973 version of the NOP (then called the General Strike Plan -GSP) 
included land and sea based airpower, SLBMs, and Pershing 1 missiles. 
These forces were to be controlled by SACEUR during wartime. The GSP 
allowed tor a range of selective nuclear attacks - from demonstration 
shots to "the theatre nuclear warfare option" (this option, presumably 
involving thousands of TNF, was nonetheless considered an example of 
"selective use") • 12 As discussed in chapter three, planning for 
lim1 ted use of TNF has been incorporated in the development of 
Selective Employment Plans (SEPs). The NATO general response option 
calls for a massive and coordinated NATO/US nuclear attack against 
Eastern Europe and the USSR. 
SRTNF or battlefield nuclear weapons (such as artillery) are, 
reportedly, not included in the NOP. 13 For one thing they are not 
well suited to central pre-planning. SRTNF are most likely to be used 
against targets of opportunity after considerable Warsaw Pact force 
movements had got underway. SACEUR would, iu theory, decide when and 
on what scale SRTNF should be released to local corps commanders in 
order to support particular sections of the front-line (assuming 
presidential approval). Such a use of SRTNF at corps levc>l might 
involve 20-200 warheads. As outlined in chapter three, NATO is not 
expected to launch this type of attack early in a crisis or war. 
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The organisation of TID' is superimposed on a range of crisis 
management and conventional capabilities In a defence framework that 
attempts to maximise options at various stages in a confrontation. In 
theory NATO TNF could be used early or late in a war, in a measured 
first-use role or in calculated retaliation against Soviet nuclear 
attack. TNF strikes are supposed to be tailored to the special needs 
of any crisis at hand, including conventional war. 
J)) The Peace-to-War Threshold 
NATO planning assumes a period of tension and political warning 
prior to an attack (although the Alliance does maintain some hedges, 
such as significant ready forces, in the event of a "bolt from the 
blue" surprise attack). NATO crisis management oachinery and 
procedures are intended to maintain the firebreak between peace and 
war and, failing this, to ease the transition to war. They are partly 
centred around the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN) and the Council 
Operational and Exercise Committee (COEC). The COEC develops crisis 
management policies and some NATO exercise procedures. SITCEN 
contains extensive communicati.ons and data processing capabilities. It 
is a joint military-civilian agency with .. watch-keeping" 
responsibilities. SITCEN is tasked to "asl>e<llf>±e, ,,.-Gallate and 
disseminate" information "with regard to developing situations." 11' 
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The details of NATO planning for crises are secret; howeve~r, the 
general requirements of a crisis management system can be sketched. 
Such a system clearly requires an effective command, control, 
connunications and intelligence (c3 I) network; in NATO much of this 
network is keyed into S ITCEN. Some national authorities have a need 
for national c3r/crisis management syste~s - most obviously the United 
States. As a US Defense Report has noted, there is a requirement for 
a system that allows for the management of forces "during 
transition from a normal readiness posture through a crisis situation 
to the conduct of conventional or nuclear warfare.~· ~a tional decision 
makers and the military require "timely and accurate information 
critical to evaluation of crises and control of escalation ... lS The 
special c3 r demends of the US include manegement of theatre and 
central strategic nuclear weapons (and the linkage between them) and 
global coordination of conventional forces. 
Effective crisis managereent, and the capabi.lity for an orderly 
transition to advanced stages of defence preparations) can be seen as 
complementary; almost as two sides to the same coin. Both require 
adequate warning impending threats .. This, in_ turn, calls for 
effective intelligence gathering, sensible interpretation of data 
based on sound political and military judgement, and an efficient 
system for passing information and assessments to higher levels~ 
Betts has described some aspects of this issue. He notes the 
"quantitative trade-off'" between "comprehensiveness in breadth and 
depth of monitoring and confusion or viscosity of the system." 16 
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Intellige.nce agencies work with indicator lists covering Warsaw 
Pact military preparations. High on this list would, of course, be 
mobilisation of Soviet army units in the USSR. Betts has described 
other indicators, such as:17 
Intensified enemy reconnaissance in the battle area. 
Logistics vectors.. How are military infrastructure and 
support trails being reoriented? Are supplies and fuel 
being moved forward? 
Dispersal of nuclear weapons from peacetime storage 
sites. 
Are troops leaving caserns moving into areas different 
from normal maneuver zones? 
Positioning of artillery, which is usually different if 
optimized for attack rather than defense. 
Forward move~ent of air defense units. 
Repositioning 
centres. 
of 
Coverage of flanks. 
headquarters 
Ammunition loading patterns~ 
and administrative 
Mobilization of the rear and political preparation of the 
c iv:tlian population. 
A surge in reconnaissance satellites placed into orbit. 
Movement of additional aircraft to forward bases. 
Grounding of aircraft and cancellation of training 
exercises, for maintenance and readiness for coordinated 
mass operations. 
Sudden growth in naval deployments. 
Change in the volume o·f radio traffic, especially in 
command channels .. 
The appearance of special code words in dispatches. 
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In addition, intelligence information would be" gathered from out-of-
theatre by national agencies (eg with respect to events in the Middle 
East or north-east Asia, and regarding maritime issues). 
Warning time is of limited value if it is not used. In the NATO 
context use of warning time should facilitate crisis management and 
military preparation, possibly in a way that is interlinked and 
mutually reinforcing. A key component in the attempt to mesh warning 
time, crisis management) and military preparations is the NATO system 
of alerts, the details of which are classified. According to Betts 
some days are needed to get NATO's defence posture readied for a 
Soviet assault, and full readiness requires quite early political 
authorisation. 18 
The NATO crisis management/ alert system is intended to reinforce 
deterrence at critical periods. To this end a seri.es of measures 
could be taken regarding, say, the reinforcement of threatened areas .. 
Crisis management therefore makes demands on force planning. For 
example, there is a requirement that Warsaw Pact mobilisation> 
readiness and reinforcement does not race too far ahead of NATO 
counter-measures; otherwise a window of opportunity might be opened 
for an attack. This criterion would apply to both a short-warning 
attack or an attack following a prolonged and sustained Soviet 
military build-up. 
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The measures taken by NATO in a crisis could, depending on 
circumstances, be cumulative with the Alliance progressively 
implementing its plans for a transition to a war footing. To 
facilitate such a move, each stage of the NATO alert system can be 
accompanied by specific preparatory measures (such as the transfer of 
operational command to SACEUR). 
NATO has five steps in its alert system: five alert conditions -
"LERTCONs" (these LERTCONs roughly parallel the US nat1onal system of 
Defence Conditions- DEFCONs). 19 LERTCONs five and four correspond to 
the normal peaceti.me posture~ LERTCONs three, two and one reflect 
progressively higher rates of readiness. LERTCON one would be 
declared in response to an expected imminent attack. Thus most 
preparatory moves could well occur with LERTCONs three and two. The 
NATO alert system appears to be flexible; it does not follow a rigid 
schedule and is not a contemporary equivalent of the Schlieffen Plan. 
In principle, it is possible to withhold, delay or accelerate specific 
measures (such as, presumably, the dispersl of TNF 20), depending on 
circumstances. This alert system may well be kept under review during 
a crisis and may be revised as necessary, if time and circumstances 
permit. 
A mix of the following measures could be undertaken at various 
stages of alert (the measures and accompanying alert levels are 
illustrative, not predictive): 21 
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Strategic c3I and forces. 
a) DEFCON/LERTCON Three: 
Increased readiness of airborne command posts. 
In-port SSBNs readied for departure. 
Increased numbers of SAC bombers placed on airfield 
alert. 
b) DEFCON/LERTCON Two: 
Enhanced survivability of National Command 
Authorities (NCA) by dispersal of officials. 
Mustering of SlOP dedicated tanker aircraft. 
Airborne alert of some SAC bombers. 
In-port, combat ready, SSBNs put to sea. 
Establishment/testing of wartime c3r systems. 
c) DEFCON/LERTCON One: 
Reconnaissance activity maximised. 
a) LERTCON Three: 
Additional (ACE) communications nets established. 
National forces prepare to "chop" to NATO command. 
Reconnaissance and intelligence activities 
intensified. 
CINCEUR's airborne command posts alerted and 
dispersed. 
b) LERTCON Two: 
Allied national forces placed under the command of 
SACEUR/ACE, 
TNF release codes/procedures readied. 
Covert wartime communications system established. 
c) LERTCON One: 
Reconnaissance activity maximised. 
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Theatre Nuclear Forces 
a) LERTCON Three: 
Nuclear warhead custodial units alerted. 
Number of aircraft on QRA increased. 
Other LRTNF readiness measures increased at peacetime 
locations. 
b) LERTCON Two: 
LRT~F dispersed. 
Covert dispersal of (some?) SRTNF warheads. 
c) LERTCON One: 
Matching of SRT~F warheads and launchers in the field 
(e.g., nuclear shells with artillery). 
Readiness for combat completed. 
Conventional Forces 
a) LERTCON Three: 
Air bases put on increased alert. 
~aval activity intensified, in-port vessels readied 
for operations. 
Leave cancelled. 
Special security arrangements put into effect (e.g., 
guard points strengthend). 
Some initial mobilisation and reinforcement (e.g., 
forward deployment of US tactical airpower to 
Europe). 
b) LERTCON Two: 
General mobilisation and reinforcement ... 
NATO 'covering forces' (see below) in wartiree 
positions along the East German and Czechoslovakian 
borders strengthened. 
General Defence Positions (see ~elow) established. 
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c) LERTCON One: 
Special Forces readied for deployment behind enemy 
lines. 
Defence positions finalised. 
Naval activity intensified, possibly in forward areas 
(see below). 
Rules of engagement modified, readiness for combat 
completed. 
It would appear that such a system of alerts has the potential to 
either weaken or strengthen the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces, depending, in part, on specific decisions being 
made at particular moments in a crisis. Thus the alerting of nuclear 
forces may be tightly coupled to the alerting of conventional forces 
or may, in principle at least, be kept as a separate and distinct 
process. 
In terms of quickly adding firepower to the NATO defence line, the 
following moves would be most significant: West German mobilisation; 
the airlift of US troops to pre-positioned equipment on the Continent 
anrl the massive augmentation of US tactical airpower; an e1:plicit 
French commitment to a forward defence of the FRG and/or, assignment 
of French forces to SACEUR as an operational reserve; and the 
dispersal of TNF to field units. 22 
Obviously caution would have to be exercised in reaching these 
sorts of decisions; it mi.ght be a fine- line between shoring-up a 
crumbling detercent and precipitating preventive or pre-emptive 
attack by the Soviet Union. 
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A primary objective of these preparatory moves would be the 
timely implementation of a full forward defence posture. It has been 
estimated that 96 hours would be needed for NATO's active forces (not 
including many reserves) to move from peace-time deployments to their 
"General Defense Positions" with appropriate staffing and wartime 
communicatlons support- However, there does appear to be an 
"emergency" plan which would allow a defence further back than that 
called for by the "full" plan. General Rogers has stated that he 
expects warning time measured in days, if not longer. 23 
E) The Alliance's Concept of Operations 
NATO planning takes place in the context of political guidance and 
military advice which come together in the form of the Alliance's 
concept of operations~ The current concept was formalised in the late 
1960s in document MCU./3 entitled "Overall Strategic Concept for the 
De fence of the NATO area". 21+ This concept has two key elements: 
forward defence and flexible response. Forward defence is the 
Alliance com~itment to defend the territorial integrity of member 
nations as far forward as possible; flexible response is a policy of 
containing conflict, repelling attack, and threatening escalation. 
Major NATO warplans are therefore derived from a strategic framework 
which stresses the necessity to hold ground and, 
circumstances} risk escalation. 
In certain 
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The West German Defence White Paper for 1975-76 provides an 
official unclassified interpretation of MC14/3. Regarding forward 
defence, the Paper states that: 
NATO's response must be such as to preclude sustained combat 
operations in the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for such prolonged combat would end by destroying 
the substance of what was to be defended. 25 
~lexible response has been explained in terms of three types of 
options: 26 
1) Direct defence. This means that an attack could be met on 
its own terms (eg conventionally). This might face an 
invader with defeat or the risk of escalation. 
2) Deliberate Escalation. Here NATO could decide to 
inittate nuclear strikes, or otherwise increase the 
intensity or scope of military operations. 
3) General Nuclear Respo~se. This would require the massive 
use of US/NATO nuclear weapons. 
The German Whl.te Paper noted that: "To an attacker the type, scope, 
and poi of of time of each form of response must be incalculable". 27 
This would apply to the possible first-use of nuclear weapons as well. 
The doctrine for fl.rst-use has been described in the following terms: 
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"The initial tact!"cal use of nuclear weapons must be timed as 
late as possible but as early as necessary, which is to say 
that the doctrine of Forward Defence must retain its 
validity, the conventional forces of the defender must not be 
exhausted, and incalculability must be sustained so far as 
the attacker is concerned. The initial use of nuclear weapons 
is not intended so much to being about a military decision 
as to achieve political effect. The intent is to persuade 
the attacker to reconsider his intention, to desist in his 
aggression, and to withdraw. At the same time, it will be 
impressed upon him that he risks still furt~~r escalation if 
he continues to attack. (Emphasis added.) 
MC14/3 attempts to rationalise a relatl.onship between conventional, 
theatre nuclear, and straregic nuclear forces .. The public German 
version stated that: 
NATO's deterrent strategy calls for a balanced structure of 
the deterrent potential: coventional, tactical nuclear, and 
strategic nuclear, weapons. No single component in this 
triad can replace another. Its deterrent effect depends upon 
the escalatory interlinkage of all three components .•. 
Conventional defence forces alone especially in 
the light of the balance of power in Europe would 
limit the risk to an attacker. This fact must be 
taken l.nto account by preparedness and the ability 
to change from a conventional conflict to another 
quality of warfare - to nuclear war. 
The tactical nuclear component, the 
the triad, links the conventional 
nuclear components in such a way 
elements of deterrence form the 
centre~piece in 
and strategic 
that all three 
overall spectrum 
without which the full d2~errent effect would not 
be achieved. (Emphasis added.) 
The link between US central strategic systems and TNF would be 
provided by limited strategic nuclear options: 
The use of the strategic nuclear component need not be 
tantamount to all-out nuclear war) to the use of the entire 
strategic nuclear potential~ The selective use of strategic 
nuclear "'eapons keeps destruction. and risks withi.n limits 
and enhances the deterrent value of strategic nuclear 
operations. Deterrence does not end once military conflict 
has broken out; at each step of the ladder of military 
response, it retains its political and strategic 
importance. (Emphasis added.) 30 
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The Paper noted that the US nuclear umbrella was partly conditional on 
a robust conventional force posture in Europe: 
The parties to the Alliance must ensure by maintaining 
strong conventional forces in Europe that, if possible, the 
compulsion to use nuclear weapons is avoided. It is only on 
this condition that the United States can be expected to 
incur the risk of using nuclear weapons. (Emphasis 
added.) 31 
Nuclear threats and conventional defence provide the basis for NATO's 
strategic concept; as ex-SACEUR Goodpaster has noted: 
What can be assured is that any attacking force would be 
subjected to heavy, continuing and increasing losses with no 
certainty of tactical success, and with rapidly escalating 
threat to rear areas and to the aggressor's homeland. An 
aggressor would have to face the risk of his offensive 
stalling and would have to ask himself, from a very early 
stage onwards, just what there is west of the Iron Curtain 
that could justify tremendous losses of his manpower and 
rislng risk to his homeland. (Emphasis added) 32 
According to public interpretations of MC14/3, the nuclear threshold 
is partly a function of the staying power of NATO's conventional 
defences~ llut there is apparently little real Alliance agreement on 
how long a conventlonal phase would last, or should be prepared 
for.33 
The ''short-war" versus "long-war" debate obviously has important 
tmplications for the Alliance's maritime concepts~ Any dec.ision to 
prepare for a protracted war in central Europe would suggest a 
requirement for greater sea-lift capabilities, and a generous 
allowance for higher levels of naval attrition. Hundreds of merchant 
ship transits could be required to reinforce and sustain operations in 
34 Europe. In addition, naval forces might have a critical role to 
play in the fcrward defence of Norway, Greece and Turkey. Morever, 
during a conventional war tn Europe, threats to NATO might develop 
out-side of the NATO area, and naval forces may be required to counter 
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them. However, it is not clear that NATO policy documents cover 
maritime doctrine in any great detail.3S 
F) NATO Conventional Strategy 
By the m1d-l970s NATO conventional doctrine had settled into a 
pattern of "active defence". Active defence was outlined in the NATO 
Allied Tactical Publication number 35 (ATP-35). It was also reflected 
in the 1976 edition of the US Army Field ~lanual (FM) 100-5 Operations. 
Active defence was a doctrinal codification of forward defence; it 
was, therefore, in part at least, a military response to a political 
requirement. Despite interest in alternative approaches, NATO has 
remained officially committed to a forward defensive strategy 
encompassing limited barrier plans, attrition, tactical aggression, 
and limited offensive manoeuvre. 
ATP-35 stated that: 
Maximum attrition must begin as far forward and as early as 
possible to weaken the enemy, reduce his attack momentum, and 
hinder his movements. As the enemy closes, an active and 
elastic battle is fought in which combat power is repeatedly 
concentrated at the decisive points in the battlefield in 
order to unbalance, disorganise and block enemy attacks and 
to destroy his forces. In the active defence, the defender 
attempts to exploit the advantages of the terrain, optimise 
the use of his weapons. use initiative of commanders at all 
levels, use his mobility, fight the defensive battle 
offensively 3 seize the initiative and capitalise on enemy weaknesses .. 6 
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This concept was built around the inter-relationship between 
positional and manoeuvre battle: 
Although defence itself is an entity, all defence concepts 
contain two complementary elements; the static to provide the 
framework on the ground, and the dynamic, to provide the 
mobility to defeat the enemy ••• This results in two 
conceptual forms of defence the positional defence and 
defences based on mobility, t:ff extremes of which form the 
opposite ends of the spectrum. 
The use of nuclear weapons would place greater emphasis on mobility; 
there would be a requirement to minimise the number and importance of 
concentrated and static targets. 
NATO doctrine envisages three combat phases: covering force 
action, main defensive battle~ and counter-attack .. Forward defence 
requires the covering force to operate virtually on the inner-German 
border and for the main defensive battle areas to be as close to the 
border as feasible. 
In practice this means that the West German frontier region with 
the Warsaw Pact could be the manoeuvre area for covering forces to a 
depth of perhaps four to forty miles. 38 According to doctrine: 
Even before the covering force establishes contact, the 
enemy should be harassed and weakened by air attacks •.• 
Covering forces should fight with enough intensity to force 
the enemy into revealing the strength, location, and general 
direction of his main attack. 39 
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Behind this covering force action NATO's heavy combat formations would 
prepare to meet and contain Soviet penetrations. Here, ''defence must 
be conducted aggressively ••• the defence should ••• be fought with 
imagination, energy and offensive spirit ... 40 In the "main defensive 
battle", the active defence "orientates on destroying the enemy force 
.. 41 According to the doctrine: 
The defensive battle.~.constitutes a continuous cycle of 
action gradually absorbing the momentum of enemy offensive, 
destroying his forces and setting the stage for an offensive 
by the defender ... 42 
Counter-attacks should be conducted only when the gains to 
be achieved are worth the risks involved in surrendering the 
innate advantage of the defender. Limited ob~ective attacks 
should be the rule rather than the exception. 4 
SACB:t.:R, writing in 1984, suggested that NATO counter-attacks would 
only be undertaken to regain lost ground and would not penetrate 
more than about 20 miles into Warsaw Paet territory. 44 Th!.s 
limitation would clearly not apply to NATO airstrikes. 
NATO forces are supposed to tie-down a Warsaw Pact advance as 
far to the east as feasible and, by so doing, critically disrupt the 
Soviet offensive timetable. 
* * * * * 
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Given a war lasting more than a few days or weeks NATO naval 
forces would have a vital role to play in Alliance plans. The most 
powerful naval force in NATO is, of course, the United States Navy 
(USN). The USN could be backed-up by considerable British and French 
forces as well as less powerful, but nonetheless significant, allied 
maritime elements (such as "West German units covering the Baltic). 
The primary tasks of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) in wartime would 
be to protect Atlantic sea lanes and deny them to enemy forces, keep 
ports open, conduct attacks against Warsaw Pact land-based targets 
(like naval bases and airfields) with both conventional and nuclear 
forces, support SACEUR, and maintain responsibility for specific 
Atlantic islands (such as the Azores). 45 
Clearly a pivotal element of ACLANT' s role would be to keep the 
Atlantic Ocean open. To this end two overlapping types of strategies 
would be available to SACLANT: defensive and offensive. The defensive 
strategies would place heavy emphasis on stopping Soviet naval forces 
from breaking through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (the 
GIUK gap), and on convoy operations. An offensive strategy could 
attempt to destroy Soviet maritime power at or near its source on 
the Kola Peninsula; it would require naval operations forward of the 
GIUK gap. Concurrent with the objective of keeping Soviet forces out 
of the Atlantic would be a requirement to support Alliance operations 
in Norway which might well require a more ambitious strategy than a 
defence of choke points like the GIUK gap. 
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Paralleling the defence of the Atlantic and the support of 
Norway would be concerns over the central strategic balance 
involving, as it does, ballistic missile firing submarines, some of 
which may be within an area of conventional operations. However, this 
aspect of maritime strategy does not seem to figure much in Alliance 
deliberations over the role of ACLANT. 
Given these demanding missions (to which must be added naval 
support of NATO operations on the southern flank) the USN had, during 
the mid 1970s, a "Swing Strategy". That is, in the event of major 
war, the US would adopt a type of "Europe-First" policy and swing 
naval power around from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic-European 
theatre. As discussed in the previous chapter, this policy seems to 
have been qualified following the Iran-Afghanistan crises of 1979-
1980, and renewed American interest in the Pacific area~ 46 
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G) The Threshold Between Conventional And Nuclear War 
Clearly any decision to cross the nuclear threshold could well 
have enormous, and probably unpredictable, political consequences .. 
Thus, NATO attempts to maintain firm links between its political 
decision-making and the operational use of nuclear weapons. The 
Alliance method for managing this linkage is partly provided for by a 
system of political consultation among the allies. This is 
potentially reinforced by accompanying safety measures (such as locks 
on nuclear warheads) and c3 r networks. 
The details of NATO's consultation processes are classified; they 
appear to be flexible. In some situations no consultation is required 
by NATO; it all depends on "time and circumstances". Even with 
consultation, unanimity among the allies is not necessary for nuclear 
release. NATO consultation on nuclear use (presumably dealing with 
the timing, targetting and scale of possible attacks) can take a 
"comprehensive" or "abbreviated" for,. 47 One example of abbreviated 
consultation would be discussions between those allies dire.ctly 
involved in a particular limited nuclear strike: such a strike might 
J.nvolve US warheads, Belgian artillery and West German territory. 
Even more limited (Anglo-American) consultation might be possible in, 
for example} the use 1 by American aircraft) of airbases in the UK for 
interdictf.on strikes in Eastern Europe. Another example might be 
German-US consultation in the event of an American battlefield use of 
nuclear weapons on West German territory. 
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Regardless of the degree of Alliance consultation, the political 
decision-making element to nuclear relesse means that release time is 
indeterminate. A large group of allied leaders, or a small group of 
US leaders in the White House, might act very quickly, relatively 
slowly, or not at all. It all depends on circumstances. 
Nuclear use may result from a "bottom-up" request by a local 
(possibly corps) commander, or from a "top-do~ro" instruction from, 
say, the US national command authorities to SACEUR/CINCEUCOM and 
hence to lower echQlons. The "bottom-up" method would be more time 
consuming (perhaps 24 hours or so) as it would require clearances and 
communications up various levels in the command chain as well as a 
subsequent "top-do~m" release. Both forms of nuclear use obviously 
require an appropriate c 3r system. 48 
NATO planning for the nuclear threshold takes at least two basic 
forms: retaliation against a Soviet nuclear attack, and first-use of 
TNF against an impending Warsaw Pact conventional breakthrough. 
(There may also be an option for an Alliance, or at least US, pre-
emptive nuclear "first strike".) 
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Alliance guidance to SACEUR calls for him to request authority to 
release nuclear weapons in the event of an anticipated collapse of the 
"cohesiveness" of NATO's conventi.onal defence. This request .is not to 
be delayed to the point where NATO conventional forces have suffered 
an irreversible defeat. Sufficient conventional forces have to be 
available to exploit the political and military effects of Alliance 
nuclear use. It is not NATO policy to walt until the conventional 
defence line has been shattered and penetrated by massive Warsaw Pact 
assaults before resorting to first-use of TNF. Thus an anticipated 
breakthrough (projected, say, one, two or three days into the future) 
would require a request for nuclear release. 49 
A former NATO Secretary General has stated that: 
the selective and limited use of tactical nuclear weapons 
would not be deferred until our conventional defences were 
reduced to a desperate situation. [By then] it would be 
neither feasible nor effective to use them. The enemy would 
already have advanced too far and there would be a danger of 
hitting our own troo5s along with his or, worse: sti.ll, 
civilian population.S 
the 
General Starry (as Commander-in-Chief, US Readiness Command) has made 
it clear that TNF use has to be considered well before an enemy has a 
chance to breakthrough NATO lines. 
If we are to use [TNF) this [I.e 100-200 km behind enemy 
lines] is probably the best place to use them ... the delays 
that are attendant upon asking for and rece~v1 ng nuclear 
weapons release always creates a situation in which if you 
wait until they get into your territory, to ask for the use 
of nuclear weapons) it is always too late. Several thousand 
simulations i.n actual exercises suggest to us that tf you 
wait that long, i.t is too late .... 
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A review has been made of a considerable number of planning 
services in which assumed enemy penetrations were drawn with 
great care to specify that line 'beyond which an enemy 
incursion would jeopardise the integrity of the defense•. It 
was found that, if the penetration was allowed to develop as 
was customary in the defended terri tory,: it~ was always too 
late.. If for no other reason) therefore, it is of paramount 
importance that the planning process begin while follow-up 
echelon targets are still deep in enemy territory, and that 
nuclear release be requested in sufficient time to allow 
weapons employment while the target is still 24 to 60 hours 
from the [forward line of own troops, ie 24-60 hours behind 
the enemy lines]. 51 
US Army doctrine may provide some insight into how an anticipated 
enemy breakthrough can be fed into war plans. Doctrine states that: 
Commanders normally consider the battlefield in terms of the 
time and space necessary to defeat an enemy force or to 
complete an operation before an enemy can reinforce. 
Commanders should review the battlefield as having two 
distinct areas: an area of influence on which commanders 
fight the current battle and a larger area of interest in 
which commanders careful-\i2 monitor enemy forces that might 
affect future operations.) 
Army staffs could develop advance planning (including, presumably, 
nuclear planning) using the following approximate schedules: 53 
a) Areas of Influence 
~--~~~-
i) Brigade - Out to 12 hours behind en"~~y frontline 
il) Division - Out to 24 hours 
iii) Corps - Out to 72 hours 
iv) Above Corps level - Out to 96 hours 
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b) 
i) Brigade - Out to 24 bo.urs 
ii) Division - Out to 72 hours 
iii) Corps - Out to 96 hours 
iv) Above Corps level beyond 96 hours 
,, 
* * * * 
A frequently mentioned trigger to nuclear escalation is a 
threatened breakthrough by Warsaw Pact conventional forces employing 
numerical superlority and, or, surprise. Initial tactical success 
might enable the Warsaw Pact to threaten to overwhelm NATO defences 
and over-run large areas of NATO territory, leading to an Alliance 
first-use of TNF. NATO first-use would therefore be partly a function 
of weaknesses in conventional forces. In particular, first-use could, 
according to this scenario, result from an inability to cope with 
surprise and an incapacity to sustain conventional operations 
leading to a potential failure to maintain a coherent defence line. 
Estimates of how long NATO could sustain a conventional defence vary; 
ten to twenty days seems to be a common guess. 54 
The idea that Soviet armoured forces might breakthrough to the 
English Channel in 48 hours has been dismissed by a former head of 
NATO's l1ilitary Committee as a "wildly exaggerated assessment", and a 
"bizarre thesis·. 55 Mearsheimer has argued that NATO stands a 
reasonable chance of maintaining a conventional defence line for some 
time.56 Alford has related this issue to the arrival of Warsaw pact 
reinforcements; the second Soviet strategic echelon (possibly 
consisting of scores of divisions) might begin putting severe pressure 
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on NATO's defence line 30 days after mobilisation.57 General Rogers 
has suggested that NORTHAG represents a limiting factor, or weak link, 
in NATO's defence line: 
If I do not get [US] reinforcements to Northern Army Group 
in time, that will be the determinate as to hnw soon I am 
going to have to knock on the door of the political 
authorities and say 'I m~§t resort to theater nuclear 
weapons'. (Emphasis added.) 
Rogers has claimed that NATO has "a delayed tripwire strategy ... 59 The 
former SACEUR has mentioned the possibility of nuclear escalation 
after ''a few days·. 60 
According to this view of escalation, the following interlinked 
issues would be important in determining the chronological and 
geographical position of the nuclear threshold: 
l) The ability of Alliance c3r systems to negnte or manage a 
surp~ise Warsaw Pact attack. 
2) The relative size and quality of the opposing side's active, 
in-place. forces. 
3) The relative rates of mobilisation and reinforcement. 
4) The relative rates of attrition. 
5) The relative sustainability of forces. 
6) The efficacy of interdiction. 
7) The relative compatability of capabilities and objectives 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; eg, are NATO forces less 
able to defe.nd than Warsaw Pact forces are to attack? 
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8) The force-to-space ratio, especialy with respect to NATO 
defences. Do individual units (corps, divisions_, brigades, 
etc) have manageable frontages? If so a force imbalance may 
be tolerable; if not, even balanced forces may be inadequate 
to hold a line. 
9) Strategic and tactical competence, can NATO close-off a 
threatening situation on the frontline faster than the Warsaw 
Pact can exploit it? 
Underlying all of these factors would be the critical political 
dimension: how would combat operations effect the political will of 
both sides, and how would these political effects be reflected on the 
battlefield? 
An Alliance decision to use nuclear weapons first, as a counter to 
a Warsaw Pact conventional attack, would be essentially political in 
nature, however I!luch it may reflect the military situation. The 
primary objective of first-use would be to make a clear poli.tical 
statement about the risk of further escalation should the Warsaw Pact 
persist in its attack, the intention being to force a recalculation by 
Soviet leaders and a speedy termination of hostilities. NATO doctrine 
suggests that the best way to make a political impact is to ensure 
that nuclear attacks have militarily significant consequences. 61 
NATO's fi.rst-use options apparently cover a range of weapons and 
targets and vary in scale from one or a few warheads to hundreds and, 
possibly, thousands. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned example 
of first-use is the execution of a 'corps packaget of one hundred or 
so SRTNF (mostly bombs, Lance and nuclear artillery). These 
battlefield nuclear weapons could be fired directly against an 
attacking armoured force .. Given the range constraints involved, the 
enemy force might be very close - say ten mlles - to some of the 
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allied nuclear weapons systems used. The authority to fire a 
"package" would include constraints concerning the number of nuclear 
warheads used, the area to be affected by the attack, and the timespan 
available in which to conduct the attack. These constraints would be 
imposed in an attempt by higher authorities to maintain command and 
control of lower echelons and to establish clearly perceivable limits 
to nuclear use and thereby, possibly, limit escalation.62 
However, the frequently given example of hypothetical first-use 
using artillery may not be the most likely jump across the nuclear 
threshold. SACEUR General Rogers indicated that SRTNF such as 
artillery would not be the preferred weapons to be used for first-use, 
and that their main function is the deterrence of Soviet use of SRTNF 
by the threat of reprisals in kind. 63 It seems that longer range 
weapons may be ~ore suitable for first-use. 64 
There would appear to be at least five reasons for Rogers' 
reluctance to use SRTNF early. 
1) To make a decisive operational impact a nuclear attack against 
a major armoured thrust could require more nuclear warheads 
than politicians would be prepared to authorise as a first 
use. It is quite possible that they would be reluctant to 
release a hundred or so warheads to the (albeit limited) 
discretion o£ a local commander. 
2) The use of scores of nuclear warheads on 1 or very close to, a 
volatile frontli11e could cloud the clarity of the intended 
signal represented by first-use. It is here that the "fog of 
war" could be at its thickest and most confusing. 
1) The use of SRTNF may have to be against Warsaw Pact forces in 
NATO territory, thereby destroying what was supposed to be 
defended. 
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4) A situation supposedly requiring the use of SRTNF' suggests 
that the conflict has passed beyond the point at which NATO 
doctrine calls for limited first-use. Indeed, employment of 
SRTNF may be reserved for a failure of first-use by longer-
range systems.. In other words the use of nuclear artillery 
barrages could be with-held until initial, clearer, nuclear 
"signalling" had been tried and found wanting. 
5) Command and control problems might be too demanding. 
Taking NATO doctrine at its word, the planning criteria for Alliance 
first-use might include the following: 
1) The maintenance of command and control over initial nuclear 
operations. 
2) Flexibility; this would include. the provision of multiple 
first-use options for use in various circumstances. 
3) Timeliness. 
4) Clarity of intended signal. 
5) The achievement of political effect through military impact. 
6) The provision of nuclear support for conventional operations. 
7) Sensitivity to Soviet doctrine (with respect to levels of 
pre-emptio.y and attack assessment capabilities. 
8) The avoidance of urban areas. 
An alternative, and arguably more plausible, first-use scenario 
than a nuclear artillery barrage could be an attack on a few Warsaw 
Pact airfields in East Germany using nuclear anced aircraft. Such an 
attack might be easier to manage than a corps package directed against 
armoured forces- It would also have an effect on the military 
equation while, inevitably, having an enormous - if unpredictable -
political impact. Ballistic missiles might offer a more reliable and 
timely means of counter-air attack, but their use might be with-hel~ 
in the inltial stages of a conflict for fear of triggering possible 
Soviet launch-on-warning options~ 
* * * * * 
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There are, apparently, three types of "theatre nuclear options". 
They have been described, in a report to Congress, as: 
Limited nuclear options designed to destroy selectively a 
number of fixed enemy military or industrial targets and, in 
so doing, to demonstrate a determination to resist attack by 
whatever necessary means. 
Regional nuclear options intended, as one example, to destroy 
the spearheads of an attacking enemy force before they could 
disrupt the front and achieve a major breakthrough. 
Theaterwide nuclear options directed at counter-air and 
counter-missile targets J lines of communication, and troop 
concentrationg
5 
in the first and follow-on echelons of any 
enemy attack .. 
Presumably each type of option could be used in a first-use of TNF; 
however, it may be that the options represent three stages on a 
potential <'scalation ladder (moving from "Limited" to "R<'gional" and 
then to "Theatrewide" strikes). Perhaps the most definite thing that 
can be said here is that NATO has ~arious options which may or may not 
be used in various circumstances. 
This point needs to be stressed, NATO has not developed first-use 
options because it is convinced that they make military sense; these 
options exist primarily to complicate and burden the work of So~iet 
warplanrrers and thereby, it i.s hoped, strengthen deterrence. This has 
been thought to require a demonstrable ability to keep Soviet 
conventional forces at ri.sk to nuclear destruction. Such a 
requirement has implications for the allocation of TNF within NATO. 
Rogers has outlined TNF plonning as follows: 
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In the past, requirements were developed to attack each 
Forward Division, plus those of the follow-on Armies. 
Currently we are not developing requirements against each and 
every WP Division facing ACE.- Rather, we now aUocate 
,capabilities to various ACE command levels to hold elements 
of the WP at risk ••• The purpose of allocating ACE resources 
within sectors and regions is to give flexibility at these 
levels to react to major threats which exceed the capability 
of a particular corps and/or sector. This approach provides 
requirements against [deleted] targets at both short and 
medium ranges, to include artillery ••• missiles and aircraft. 
Another major category, [deleted) includes targets for attack 
with medium and long range weapon systems.66 
H) Theatre Nuclear War Doctrine 
Limited "follow-on" use of TNF by NATO would, according to 
Alliance doctrine, be intended to have the same objectives as first-
use. That is, follow-on use would be directed at altering the 
political calculations of the Warsaw Pact leadership; 67 this could be 
done (in theory) by, inter alia, favourably affecting NATO's military 
situation. This might necessarily require a meshing of nuclear and 
conventional operations. Despite the escalatory pressures inherent in 
follow-on TNF strikes, attempts might (and, according to policy, 
would) be made to contain the scope of the conflict to manageable 
levels; the objective, after all, would be war tennination short of 
either surrender or total catastrophe. 
At some stage in a war (for example, after massive Soviet use of 
TNF) NATO forces may be authorised to engage in somewhat less 
constrained nuclear operations than the limited strikes already 
outlined. At such a stage, which may correspond to the level of 
conflict referred to as the "theatrewide nuclear option", local 
commanders may more directly manage nuclear attacks, which may be more 
closely geared to using nuclear firepower as an extension of 
conventional forces. Allied operations might then more closely follow 
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the pattern outlined in United States Army manuals for fighting 
nuclear war. This would be the so-called "nuclear warfighting" 
approach. These manuals 1nc.lude doctrinal statements that Illuminate 
the way that the military is taught to think about nuclear combat and 
which indicate some of the input into nuclear planning. 
Planning for retaliation against Soviet nuclear attacks on NATO is 
less constrained by Alliance policies on consultation, or by questions 
of credibility, than is planning for Western first-use. The scale and 
coherence of any retaliatory strike will obviously be influenced by 
the number and types of surviving nuclear forces and by the 
effectiveness of any remnant command and control systen. Schlesinger 
described NATO objectives in retaliation for a Warsaw Pact theatre-
wide nuclear attacks as being to 
Blunt the WP armoured exploitation 1 to attack WP theater 
nuclear forces which continue to threaten NATO) and to attack 
or threaten WP targets of value. 6 1l 
This retaliatory task was to be carried out .. in conjunction with 
surviving conventional forces". Alliance retaliation should occur 
with "shock effect and decisiveness··. The intention would be to 
convince Warsaw Pact leaders of the cost of continuing war while 
minimising the probability of all-out nuclear holocaust. Retaliation 
would have a combination of "clearly perceivable. limits" and the 
''threat of more extensive strikes". 69 For NATO to be able to survive 
Soviet theatre nuclear strikes, 
NATO conventional focces should be able to operate 
satisfactorily in a nuclear environment. The theatre nuclear 
forces should be capable of complementing th.e co9yentional 
forces in combined conventional-nuclear operatLons. J 
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NATO's TNF should"be capable of destroying, in conjunction with other 
forces, the Warsaw Pact conventional force structure as a reprisal to 
Soviet nuclear attack. In addition, NATO would keep open the threat 
of intimidatory deep interdiction attacks against the territory of 
Soviet all1es. 71 
US Army doctrine for nuclear forces repeatedly stresses the 
linkages between conventional and nuclear operations: "nuclear weapons 
cannot be used in isolation, but must be integrated with the rest of 
the fire and maneouver on the battlefield" .7 2 Corps is the "critical 
level in planning for the enployment of nuclear weapons on the 
battlefield. "73 
A corps package is 
a discrete grouping of nuclear weapons by specific yields for 
employment tn a specified area durinry
4
a short time period to 
support a corps tactical contingency. 
Such a package would be managed as a "single entity" in terms of 
.. request, release, and control". Doctrine states that: .. At any given 
time, corps should have a preplanned nuclear weapon package to support 
each probable tactical contingency." If fired, the package should 
"positively alter the tactical situation and thus expedite 
accomplishment of the corps mission. " 75 A corps package is directed 
at an identified "threat" such as a potenti~l conventional 
breakthrough. According to doctrine, the defeat of such a threat must 
be assessed in terms of combined operations; thus: 
A threat is considered defeated by nuclear strikes when the 
resultant force ratios are such that the enemy forces are 
halted and can be cor:trolled by conventional means throughout 
a sufficient pause for political channels to he utilized to 
terminate the conflict.76 
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Package planning takes place on a rolling, continuous, basis: 
contingency planning for corps packages occurs in peacetime, during 
any conventional phase in a war (when it may have to be repeatedly up-
dated to keep pace with the tactical situation), just prior to firing, 
and in anticipation of follow-up packages. Tactical nuclear 
operations planning is therefore a "continuous dynamic effort". In 
planning corps packages intelligence operations could play a vital 
role, both in terms of target identification and "post strike 
analysis". A critical objective would be to enable commanders to 
"respond to post strike situations in the least amount of time". Such 
a "post strike situation" could include "enemy reinforcement and a 
continuation of conventional efforts .. or enemy nuclear retaliation .. 77 
A theatrewide nuclear war involving relatively free use of corps 
packages as well as interdiction strikes could mean the use of 
thousands of nuclear warheads a An enormous range of targets could 
be covered and destroyed by NATO in a theatrewide nuclear war. These 
include 90 division bases, and 170 airfields in Eastern Europe .78 
Other targets could be nuclear weapons and storage sites, command and 
control centres, conventional ammunition and fuel storage sites> 
ports, road and rail networks (including marshalling yards and 
bridges), and enemy manoeuvre forces. One hundred million civilians 
could be killed. 79 
As explained in previous chapters, NATO has had a good deal of 
trouble in atterr.pting to reach agreement on clear guidelines for how a 
war of this intensity should he fought- One obvious reason for this 
trouble is the widely hr~ld view that such a war would, almost 
inevitably, lead tn catastrophic unintent:i.onal ("collateral") 
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destruction. It is difficult to imagine a Dutch or West German 
government formally approving detailed guidelines for a massive use of 
SRTNF which could lead to the devastation of their constituencies 
(especially if there was a risk of such approval leaking to the 
media). Of course> as shown above, this does not mean that 
NATO/USEUCOM lacks contingency plans for theatre nuclear war; nor does 
it mean that general guidelines do not exist. 
I).. The Linkage Between Theatre Operations And Central Strategic War 
NATO employs the threat of escalatfon as a strategic instrument. 
This is clearly the case with the policy of possible first-use of TNF; 
it also applies to the constantly reiterated, but frequently 
qualified, linkage between central strategic ie intercontinental 
range - nuclear forces and theatre/regional contingencies. 
US strategic forces are often seen as the ultimate deterrent - the 
weapons which, in extremis) would destroy the Soviet state. Strategic 
forces also have a less-than-ultimate role. This evolved directly out 
of the requirements of extended deterrence and the suicidal/incredible 
nature of massive retaliation. The possibility of limited strategic 
strikes was to act as a potential> or at least theoretical, link 
between theatre combat operations and all-out nuclear war. It has 
been argued by successive Western governments that this linkage is 
needed for deterrent purposes. This linkage also helps consolidate US 
leadership of the Alliance. 
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In NATO the linkage, or "coupling", between US strategic weapons 
and theatre forces in Europe has been, in part, formalised. For 
example, numerous Alliance declarations proclaim US commitments to 
NATO with explicit reference to the role of American nuclear 
firepower. On another level, NATO is represented in Omaha where the 
JSTPS works on strategic warplane and their "deconfliction" 
coordination - with TNF targeting. In addition, there is the US 
commitment of 400 SLBM warheads to NATO targeting requirements. 80 
Apart from formal commitments and bureaucratic arrangements a 
degree of coupling between strategic nuclear weapons and TNF results 
from the inherently ambiguous implications of nuclear weapons given a 
'theatreJ or ttactical' role. The distinction between strategic and 
theatre weapons is of ten based on an a rbit ra ry choice of range 
(strategic ~eapons being those with intercontinental range; TNF 
accounting for the rest, especially if they are based in-theatre). 
This is a distinction which may be sharper on paper than in 
operational consequences. lt is not obvious (and some NATO, as well 
as Soviet, declarations deliberately obfuscate the issue) whether or 
not academic conceptions of "strategic" and .. theatre" nuclear war are 
reliable guides to contingency planning. 
It is clear, for example, that some NATO LRTNF, such as F-lUs, 
are capable of destroying targets deep inside the USSR in attacks that 
the Soviet Union might well consider ''strategic". As described above, 
some NATO options for limited nuclear war may be quite massive. The 
extent to ~hich Soviet territory is given a sanctuary status by NATO 
1o1arplanners is somewhat unclear from public sources; however, the 
Soviet border would be an obvious, if tenuous, candidate for a 
fire break. 
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As noted above, the United States has assigned hundreds of SLBM 
warheads to NATO for targeting purposes. These warheads may be with-
held from early use, and perhaps only fired in conjunction with a 
massive strategic strike against the USSR. That is, although they 
could be used against targets threatening Western Europe, they might 
not be used in a limited theatre war mainly out of fear of 
triggering unacceptable escalation. This fear could be real because 
SLBMs seem unsuitable for limited nuclear strikes: they might trigger 
Soviet strategic c3 I systems; poor accuracy and "footprint" 
constraints (covering an area within which all the warheads from each 
missile will fall) would make surgical strikes difficult and high 
levels of unintended damage probable; and, last but not least, the US 
may not be prepared to use its strategic striking power incrementally, 
or deple-te its potential strategic reserve forces~ ~evertheless, 
Schlesinger once suggested that SLBMs might be used in limited strikes 
-against, for example, Warsaw Pact airbases. 81 
Planning for the use of American strategic nuclear weapons is a US 
responsibility with only limited allied input. As mentioned above; 
these weapons are meshed with targets and attack plans by the JSTPS. 
The centre-piece of JSTPS activity is the SlOP. An assumption of SIOP 
development seems to be that US strategic strikes might well be 
executed within the context of a theatre wart hence a putative 
requirement for different strategic options. 82 Strategic forces 
provide the backdrop for TNF; their existence is meant to impose 
escalation control on theatre conflict. 
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J) Summary: The Pattern Of NATO Planning 
NATO is organised to mesh together Alliance political requirements 
and operational planning. The NATO bureaucracy channels different 
national politico-r.lilitary views into the same general direction and 
provides a skeleton framework for the management of operational 
matters. In peacetime NATO runs a dormant wartime command system. 
Given political authorisation this dormant system would be 
activated: national forces would be allotted to NATO command. NATO 
forces would (in theory at least) then implement operational plans 
previously sketched-out under political guidance, this guidance being 
the product of intra-Alliance consultation. 
~ATO's defence posture is an aggregate of conventional and nuclear 
planning. It is based on capabilities for conventional denial and the 
provision of nuclear strike options. The nuclear options are, in 
effect, superimposed on the element of conventional denial. There is 
some uncertainty as to what nuclear options might be implemented by 
NATO in the event of a Warsaw Pact assault. This uncertainty is 
partly intentional (to complicate Soviet planning), partly inevitable 
(who, after all, can predict what would happen in a war?), and partly 
a diplomatic device (here ambiguity over nuclear options reflects an 
ill-defined Alliance compromise between the allies). In any event, 
prudence is thought to require a range of options which may or may not 
be used. 
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The notion of operational flexibility in the NATO context largely 
turns on the concept of thresholds. NATO policy on thresholds, 
especially between conventional and nuclear conflict, is two-pronged 
and, on the surface at least, contradictory. Firstly, and largely for 
the sake of deterrence, NATO proclaims its readiness to escalate 
across thresholds, and plans accordingly. Secondly, NATO has noted 
the disadvantages of reliance on escalatory threats) and has made 
efforts towards creating/reinforcing thresholds. For example, the 
Alliance has tried to strengthen its conventional defence option and 
back away from early first-use of T~F. 
NATO has attempted to develop plans to make its TNF posture 
relevant to conventional operations and responsive to political 
direction. The potential theoretically exists for NATO to engage in 
both limited and massive combined nuclear/conventional operations. If 
political leaders refuse to authorise nuclear release, NATO 
conventional forces are supposed to be able to cope with Soviet 
conventional attacks on their own terms. But even in this case NATO 
forces would have to prepare for escalation and either a rapid or 
gradual transition to theatre-wide nuclear \Var. 
escalation is not a NATO prerogative. 
After all, nuclear 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS 
A) Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown how the United States has had a 
predominant role in, but not absolute control over, the development of 
NATO strategy. The strategic theory has been essentially American but 
the practical implementation bas been partly subject to allied 
aquiescence or qualification~ An important exception to this is the 
case of forward defence in central Europe: this is largely a European 
concept with formal US acceptance. However, the primary doctrinal 
concept underlying NATO is, as shown earlier, flexible response. Here, 
American ideas have provided the dominant theoretical input.l 
NATO's de facto strategy - as formulated at SHAPE and corps level 
tends to follow US prescriptions, not least because Ameriean 
domination over NATO's nuclear options gives that country a central 
practical role in Alliance planning. 
The pivotal US place in NATO strategy encourages a belief that 
American doctrinal prescriptions may provide a proper framework for 
strategic analysis. After-all, it might be suggested, is not the 
US strategic posture and flexible response the basis of the European 
strategic environment? As this and the followi.ng chapter show, such a 
statement is an oversimplification. Any attempt to explain the ~est's 
security posture in Europe in terms of flexible response will be 
misleading. The concept of flexible response does not adequately 
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explain what happens in the real world. Numerous extraneous political 
and operational factors severely constrain the explanatory and 
normative value of flexible response. 
Thi.s chapter examines how the three nuclear-armed European 
countries (Britain, France, and the USSR) might approach the nuclear 
conventional nexus during a crisis. It also assesses how the 
behaviour of these three states might affect American notions of 
confltct management .. But, first, some general introductory comments 
are made about how the strategic plans and assumptions underlying 
NATO's doctrine of flexible response could be upset by European 
factors. A feature of the foLlowing type of speculation is its 
unavoidably bizarre form. However, i. t does serve to highlight two 
important features of the contemporary strategic envfronment in 
Europe: its complexity and unpredictability. 
The first point to note here is that the US cannot dictate NATO's 
peacetime defence preparatfons nor, probably, the course of a European 
war .. NATO is a free and pluralistic alliance whose members tend to 
guard their sovereignty jealously. Consequently member nations can 
define their national interests, perceptions of threat, and defence 
planning priorities, differently. Indeed, in some cases member 
countries have opted for a policy of .. sem1-alignment ... 2 
Allied reluctance to fully accept US prescriptions on strategy 
may have serious implications for that strategy. Ultimately, allied 
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recalcl.trance may unravel some US/NATO defence plans. This is 
particularly true if the ally has nuclear weapons and refuses to 
accept Washington's preferences for the timing, scale and targeting of 
a first-use of nuclear weapons. 
without national nuclear forces. 
But it also applies to other allies 
For example, in a crisis, Norway may have a critical role to play 
in the implementation of flexible response and forward defence. But a 
Norwegian decision to allow forward deployment of allied forces from, 
say, the US and UK may be seriously delayed by political factors. 
Such a decision may be somewhat complicated by notions of a "Nordic 
balance", Oslo's peacetime policy of distancing itself from the 
American TNF posture, and the fact that the country neighbours the 
USSR. 
On NATO's other flank one may well speculate that Turkey will not 
necessarily identify with American policy during an intense East-West 
confrontation - whether or not this confrontation is centred in the 
north, on Berlin, on the Persian Gulf or on the frontiers of Turkey 
itself. And it seems improbable that Greek military preparations are 
primarily directed towards implementing the NATO version of flexible 
response. It is clear that the world looks very different from Athens 
and Ankara, compared to Washington. 
Belgium and the Netherlands offer another example of how allied 
differences may hinder the implementation of flexible response. 
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Both countries are supposed to contribute significant forces for the 
forward defence of West Germany during wartime~ They also provide a 
support base for the Central Front; they host major seaports, 
airfields, prepositioned US war material, and critical logistic lines. 
Po lit leal paralysis in these countries following a Soviet attack on 
West Germany could obviously have a very damaging effect on NATO's 
defence plans, especially if it was compounded by French non-
belligerency. In particular, it is difficult to see how US, British 
and German forces could sustain protracted conventional operations 
without the active support of the Low Countries (especially in the 
area of logistics). 
West Germany offers a special case. The operations of the 
Bundes'l.olehr might be decisive in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. West German 
forces may be capable of disrupting US/NATO warplans by being either 
too aggressive or too passive.. For example} future domestic political 
strife in the FRG may cripple the morale of its armec forces, which 
could leave wide avenues of attack open to the Soviet army. It seems 
unreasonable to believe that US EUCOM could defend the Central Front 
in such a situation. On the other hand, l-lest German forces may have 
the potential, depending on circumstances, to destroy attacking Soviet 
ground forces, unhinge a Soviet offensive thrust, destabilise central 
and eastern Europe and wreck American attempts at escalation control. 
In addition, the possibility of the German military being granted, or 
seizing, TNF warheads during a conventional war cannot be ruled out. 
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A critical factor in any future European war will be whether or 
not the major allies participate in the Alliance's integrated military 
structure. France has said it will not, while the others have stated 
that they will. As described in chapter five, this Alliance structure 
is skeletal in peacetime and requires national political commitments 
during a crisis or war to turn it into a unified military force. In 
particular, each ally will have to decide whether to assign its 
national military forces to SACEcR/ACE in the so-called NATO "chop". 
It is not hard to see how this "chop" could be frustrated during 
an extreme emergency; political paralysis in Belgium and the 
Netherlands has already been cited as a hypothetical example. Nor is 
it hard to in:agine how difficulties in national political decision 
making might have spill-over effects in other allied capitals or the 
North Atlantic Council, or SHAPE. 
Disagreement over threat interpretation or security objectives 
could be a real problem which might h:i.nder, or even prevent, the 
impleblentation of NATO's system of military alerts. Obviously a 
primary concern of national. decision-makers will be national survival; 
there will almost certainly be an intense interest in damage 
limitation. Pollt!.cians from small countries like Denmark or Belgim" 
will be acutely aware of their country's vulnerability. A dozen 
thermonuclear explosions on either country would be an unprecedented 
national disaster even if they were on ostensibly milital:'y targets"' 
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Given the highly stressful circumstances that would probably 
prevail in any drift or move towards armed confrontation in Europe, it 
is possible that formal NATO arrangements may be by-passed in a 
crisis. The result may be a somewhat loose, ad-hoc coalition response 
by, say, the United States, West Germany, France and Britain; the 
other allies might abstain or equivocate. This is obviously very 
speculative; the point to note, though, is that in a crisis NATO might 
not work in practice as it is supposed to in theory. 
In wartime, it might be very difficult to maintain doctrinal 
purity. In other words, peacetime planning and concepts may be very 
quickly overtaken by events. For one thing, the fog of war or 
"friction" might well handicap the smooth-running of operations. In 
addition, as already suggested, national preferences and policies 
could undermine Alliance considerations. Indeed, these two factors 
could converge to de-rail NATO/Warsaw Pact warplans. These problems 
might be compounded by European geopolitics: European geography offers 
few clear-cut natural "firebreaks .. to warplanners, while it ensures 
that national perspectives will almost certainly differ during the 
course of an unfolding war. In wartime, the European theatre of 
military operations will surely be marked by unique features, many of 
which will be unpredictable, that have escaped the notice of analysts 
more comfortable with rather abstract notions. 
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B) THE INDEPENDENT WESTERN NUCLEAR DETERRENTS 
The British and French each maintain nuclear forces capable of 
destroying Moscow and other area or soft targets within the USSR; both 
also have a limited number of nuclear warheads for tactical use on 
the battlefield. 3 Although the two countries have different force 
structures and have adopted different relations with the Alliance, 
there are some important similarities between them. 
For example, despite differences in public rationales and 
political rhetoric, both Britain and France developed and continue to 
maintain nuclear forces for comparable reason..$'. In particular_, both 
states appear to have some kind of psychological attachment to "Great 
Power .. status and tradLtions, although the French seem tt:ore explicit 
on this. Both view their nuclear weapons partly within the context of 
the Alliance. This picture is obscured and complicated by the fact 
that these two causative strands in political philosophy ("Great 
Power" and "Alliance") can seem contradictory. The important thing to 
note here is that the motives for the acqutsition and main~ce of 
these independent deterrents have significant implications for the 
nuclear-conventional nexus in Europe. They suggest a particular way 
of looking at the relationship bet..,een nuclear and conventional forces 
on the Continent, a way which differs somewhat from standard 
interpretations of flexlble response. It is therefore useful to 
briefly sketch the roots of the two stateS' deterrent policies. 
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(1) Origins 
After 1945 Britain and France saw themselves as Great Powers in 
reduced circumstances. They were without the most modern weapons 
{i.e. atomic bombs) and might be wide open to devastating atomic 
attack once the !:SSR had developed its own nuclear arsenal. In the 
post-war period they lacked any firm US commitment to their defence; 
even after NATO was established the US nuclear guarantee was 
considered questionable) especially in France. Both Britain and 
France had important stakes in Europe which were vulnerable to the 
supposed Soviet superiority in conventional forces. In addition they 
both had access to scientific knowledge relevant to the production of 
nuclear weapons~ Given these factors, together with the assumption in 
Paris and London that it was legitimate and unremarkable for them to 
acquire what was technically possible and politically expedi'llnt, it 
would have been surprising if either country had foregone the 
available option of developing own nuclear capability. A firm 
decision to eschew independent deterrents would have been symbolic of 
a psychological abandonment of Great Power values and surrender to 
second-rate status. 
In the British case a negative decision on A-bomb development may 
have been especially awkward. The British saw themselves as one of 
the wartime "llig Three" (along with the US and USSR); they had a 
critical, if transitory, role in the development of the American bomb; 
anc the national psyche had not been shattered by Nazi conquest and 
occupation~ These and other factors encouraged an erroneous 
impression of Great Power continuity. (This impression should have 
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been qualified when the British war effort was contrasted with the 
sacrifices of the Russians> or was seen as an over-extended appendage 
of the US military machine, or when it was realised that the UK was in 
dire economic trouble). This assumption of Great Power status was, 
however, tinged with a deep foreboding about possible future 
vulnerability. As Slr John Anderson, a senior British Cabinet 
Minister, noted as early as 1943: "We cannot afford after the war to 
face the future without this [atomic] weapon and rely entirely on 
America should Russia or some other power develop 1t."4 The perceived 
need for an independent UK deterrent crystallised following moves by 
the USA to cut off British access to the American nuclear weapons 
research programme at the end of the war~ 
The French also maintained Great Power pretensions, but, in 
addttion, they had a much sharper awareness of their vulnerability~ 
The Americans may have gone to Britain's aid during the Second World 
War but they also sat back and witnessed the Nazi subjugation of 
France. While Britain might debate the pros and cons of a 
continental co:nmitment, the French were faced with a long-standing 
continental vulnerability of which they were acutely consclous. 
French feelings of vulnerability were not eased by the American 
insistance on preventing allied access to US nuclear know-how. 
Morever, the unilateral American character of the early "Alliance .. 
nuclear defence plans were a special cause of concern; this was 
compounded by the initial Awerican reluctance, or incapacity, to adopt 
forward defence on the Cant inent. (As described in chapter three, 
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ea.rly US warplans envisaged an American troop withdrawal from Europe 
to be followed by mobilisation and subsequent liberation of allied 
territory.) Thus the formative phase of the Alliance only went part 
way :i.n the reassurance of France (and this reassurance was complicated 
by. for example, exclusion from the Anglo-American "Special 
Relationship" and the rearmament of Germany). More problems arose 
during the 1960s when the Americans pushed for an adoption of 
flexible response, a conventional force build-up, a raising of the 
nuclear threshold, and centralised Washington control of the West's 
nuclear options. 
The notion of French sovereignty was more important to Pari.s 
than the technical details of NATO planning. This was epitomized in 
the person of General de Gaulle. According to Grosser, de Gaulle 
believed that: 
The alliance arises from a transitory constellation, a 
conjunction, which may last for some time but is nonetheless 
merely a conjunction, a specific constellation in the life 
of the French nation. The Atlantic organisation can be 
justified by expediency. But expendiency will never justify 
trans - or supranat.ional structures which would change the 
substance of the nation as a whole, and permanently) simply 
because a particular conjunction exists~S 
If France's desti.ny was to be a great nation it was, according to 
Gaullists, absurd to believe that its physical securl.ty and political 
sovereignty could or should rest on the qualified nuclear guarantee of 
a foreign state. It was not simply that the allies n>ight abandon 
France. It was also the belief that dependence was in itself 
demeaning. This was particularly easy to believe if one had a 
condescending attitude 
American culture~ 
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to"Wards American statesmanship and, or, 
It seems reasonable to assume that similar thinking (conscious or 
otherwise) affected the British attachment to their nuclear weapons. 
Howeverl UK governments have been less explicit on this point than the 
French. There seemed little point in questioning or doubting American 
commitments especially as the British made use of US nuclear-related 
technology, and as the public voicing of doubt could rebound as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. High profile critiques of the US might be 
gratuitous and self defeating. Indeed a long-standing British 
security objective has been to tie the US to Europe's defence. The 
same is true of France but) as shown above, Paris had a more 
traditional view of the Alliance as an aggregate of national interests 
rather than as a security community. 
j The i t deterrents and the Alliance 
The British and French developed their nuclear forces as a way 
of, among other things, strengthening their positions w.ithin the 
Alliance. Another consideration was obviously that independent 
deterrents might provide some insurance against the failure or break-
up of NAT0. 6 
The French hoped that. their national nuclear weapons program 
would: (a) symbolise superiorit.y over West. Germany; (b) ensure at 
least equality with the UK; (c) i:nprove its bargaining position with 
the USA; and (d) create some diplomatic space between the superpowers, 
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thus facilitating the pursuit of French national intere.sts. The 
British, on the other hand, seem to have been more interested in an 
independent deterrent as a way of cementing the so-called Special 
Relationship with the USA. (Even so, as suggested above, the British 
may have had other, largely unstated, motives that paralleled Freneh 
concerns. London may have expe,cted greater political leverage in 
Washington, Paris and Bonn.) 
Reticence over publicly explicating an independent role for the 
independent deterrent was paralleled by the articulation of an 
Alliance function for. British nuclear weapons. The British force, it 
was argued, provided a second centre of nuclear decision making within 
NATO's mil Hary strue ture • This would complicate Soviet planning, 
.:increase Sovi.et concern over nuclear escalation, and thereby enhance 
deterrence. Despite its small size the British force bad a valuable 
deterrent role because the "separate: centre of decision-making" 
controlling l.ts use was "in Europe"7 • Such a rationale looks very much 
like an attempt to maintain some kind of independence while endorsing 
the Alliance and the principle, 
indivisibility of tiATO. 
but not the fact, of the 
The. apparent differences between Britain and France over the role 
of national deterrents within the Alliance has implications for 
defence planning. For example~ while the UK hosts an enormous 
concentration of American nuclear and conventional fire-power, France 
does not~ Aiso, whereas France refuses to rejoin NAT0 1 s integrated 
military structure, the UK has to some extent integrated its forces in 
the Alliance. For example, some British nuclear targeting is 
-285-
coordinated with US plans; and most British conventional forces are 
e.armarked for assignment to SACEUR/SACLANT during wartime. 8 Moreover, 
in contrast to France, Britain has formally endorsed NATO's strategy 
of flexible response and forward defence. But to put the matter in 
better perspective, and to illustrate the point that there is perhaps 
not as much difference between the UK and France as there might seem, 
it is not at all clear that Britain would be more willing to fight for 
the Alliance than France. Peacetime pledges are one thing, crisis 
management is another~ 
Horeover, it must be remembered that France is still a member of 
NATO and has numerous other links with the West which have direct 
strategic significance. For example, France is a member of the 
Western European Union) has bilateral agreements with West Germany 1 
stations over 40,000 troops in the FRG, and is one of the controlling 
powers in Berlin. The French have also gone along with NATO's 1979 
LRTNF deployment decision (although, of course, it was not party to 
the decision or deployment package). Paris has also let it be known 
that it welcomes a strong US military presence in West Germany. As 
Grosser has noted, in the Gaullist vision, "What was valid for France 
was not l .d . G " 9 va 1 tor ermany .... In terms of possible joint mill tary 
action~ General Mery has stated that "It is a question of independence 
of decision, not. necessarily leading to autonomy in action. ·· 10 Thus) 
for example, French army units straddling the Rhine may or may not be 
used as a de facto combat reserve for SACEUR depending on 
circumstances and dependi_ng on decisions made in Paris) not SHAPE or 
Washington. l:ltimately, similar conditions may well be applicable to 
the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). 
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(iii) Doctrine 
Both Britain (in the 1950s) and France (in the 1960s) have 
considered the idea of national versions of massive retaliation. They 
have since dra~~ back from tbe all or nothing implications associated 
with the doctrine. The British modified their position in the context 
of the Alliance move towards flexible response, while the French did 
so for unilateral reasons~ 
Both Britain and France seem to have a policy of graduated 
response based, outside of the NATO framework, on a form of ml.nimum 
deterrence. The first line of defence for both countries is the 
allied conventi.onal defence line in West Germany. The British have 
comm:.tted the BAOR to this line. The French maintain an option to 
commit the "Force d 'Action Rapide" (FAR) to fight in the forward 
battle. Behind this forward line or zone the UK has the English 
Channel; and the French naintain the First Army wi.th the First Corps 
based in He tz 1 
Corps cent red 
the Second Corps based in Baden-Baden, and the Third 
ll 
on Lille. The f'rench First Army may be employed in 
conjunction with limited tactical nuclear weapon strikes. 
Both Britain and France have only vaguely articulated their 
unilateral doctrines. British reticence is largely due to London's 
formal commitment to KATO - it would not look very loyal or reassuring 
to its allies if Britain explicitly stated a unilateral policy 
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(assuming such an option exists). French vagueness is partly 
e.xplained by its de facto rejection of massive retaliation and its 
scathing c.ritique of American notions of flexible response. French 
policy falls somewhere in the ill-defined are.a between these two 
doctrines, 
concepts" 
but i.t is not simply a response to American strategic 
Both Britain and France appear to have adopted an "existential" 
view of nuclear deterrence. 12 According to this view the details of 
warplans are secondary to the simple existence of nationally owned 
nuclear weapons. The very existence of British and French deterrent 
forces is deemed to have a stabilising influence on the security 
equation in Europe. Added to this is the feeling that uncertainty 
over pre.cise circumstances of use of nuclear weapons may have a 
deterrent effect in Moscow. 
It is therefore unclear as to what the operational strategies for 
the two independent deterrents are. One may look at British nuclear 
forces as being integrated into the NATO strategy outlined in chapter 
five and as therefore being indivisible from the collective Alliance 
defence effort. But this ~ould probably be an incomplete and 
simplistic assessment~ The reason for saying this is obvious: in an 
extreme emergency British nuclear forces (like their French 
counterparts) would most likely be employed or witheld in 
accordance with national interests which may or may not coincide with 
Alliance requirements. As the 1962 US-UK Nassau Agreement on the 
subject statt~s: 
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except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that 
supreme national interests are at stake, these British 
forces will be used for the purposes of international 
defence of the Western Alliance in all circumstances. 
(Emphasis added.) 13 
In terms of possible independent use of nuclear \Yeapons, two 
things need to be said. First, it is difficult to envisage such use. 
Second, geopolitical factors and limited capabilities constrain the 
choice of strategies open to each European nuclear armed state.. In 
effect both countries are limited to a policy of graduated minimum 
deterrence. Nuclear weapons are seen as political instruments, not 
mflitary weapons .. Neither Britain nor France has the capability for 
protracted tactical/theatre nuclear war. Such a war could well 
require massi.ve combined nuclear-conventional operations spread over 
several weeks throughout Western/Central/Eastern Europe. 
Moreover~ neither Paris nor London shows any indication of 
believing that such a large scale independent tactical nuclear warfare 
capability could have any conce.l.vable use. The idea of British or 
French forces engaging in large scale protracted combined nuclear-
conventional operations agafnst massive Soviet forces in Europe looks 
very silly. Not only would the USSE probably have a comparative 
advantage in such a conflict, but Western and Central Europe would be 
devastated. 
At the le.vel of theatre-wide nuclear war France and Britain \\l"ould 
therefore be faced with a ··no~win .. situation.. Hence, the independent 
deterrents would be, above all else, instruments of crisis managerr,ent. 
This could translate into bluff, very limited tactical usc. and/or, 
rapid escalation to strategic attacks. 
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In the first instance national nuclear forces hold out the hope 
of enforcing a sanctuary for British and French territory. 
Coneeivably they may also provide a kind of extended sanetuary for 
vital interests (e.g. by covering a withdrawal of BAOR, or deterring a 
Soviet move into the Low Countries, or in providing a shield over the 
French First Army). In this secondary role tactical nuclear weapons 
may have a special function. However, all this is very speculative. 
For example, it is not publicly known if any independent doctrine even 
exists for British tactical nuclear weapons~ 
However, unlike the British, the French have openly considered 
the potential role of their tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis and 
they have developed a strategic concept for their use .. 14 This 
concept outlines a readiness to fire a nuclear warning shot against a 
hostile army approaching French territory. This threat of escalation 
had important implications for French conventional force planning. As 
De Gaulle noted in 1968: 
[The] basic role of the air and land forces does not consist 
in joining a battle that they have no chance of winning in 
view of the balance of forces, but of obliting the adversary 
to face the risks of our nuclear response. 5 
French conventional forces would therefore be used to test Sov~et 
intentlons and demonstrate French resolve, if necessary in conjunction 
with French tactical nuclear weapon strlkes. In short, the French 
First Army and tactical nuclear weapons would engage in the "national 
deterrent manoeuvre. " 16 Tactical nuclear weapons would be used as 
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"pre-strategic"17 symbols to halt, not necessarily defeat, an 
approaching enemy army. 
As one defence ministry official has noted, use of tactical 
nuclear weapons ''is more oriented to the political management of 
crisis than to military effectiveness." 18 But, in addition, according 
to General Lacaze, 
•.. the possible employment of tactical nuclear weapons as 
the ultimate warning which would be addressed to the 
aggressor before the use of strategic weapons, in order to 
1 ea d him to renouncing his enterprise •.• must have a 
military effect, which is to say that it QUSt be effective 
and brutal, whlch means a relatively massive employment and 
therefore limited in time and space. But above all this 
warning must be well integrated in the general deterrent 
manoever. 19 
This, according to Hernu, was to amount to a "militarily significant 
tactical nuclear stopping blow". 20 Such a blow would have to be 
carried out in conjunc.tlon loiith conventional forces; as Chi rae has 
noted, 
putting into operation a nuclear weapon 
[tactical nuclear weapons] - re~uires 
suitable conventional environment. 2 
an 
in particular 
adequate and 
Two types of tactical nuclear targets have been identified by a 
forner French Chief of Staff: 
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~ •• on the one handt so-called targets of opportunity that 
concentrations of enemy units would form--acquiring these 
concentrations would necessitate a prior conventional 
maneouver--and) on the other hand, interdiction targets 
which are fixed infrastructure targets: crossing points, 
airfields, radars, etc. This second category of targets 
would be aimed at by our air-delivered tactical nuclear 
weapons~ whose range clearly surpasses the territory of the 
Federal Republic [of Germany]. 22 
But, as indicated above> battlefield use of nuclear weapons would be a 
means to an end, and would not be judged merely in terms of it's 
tactical effect. 
In 1977 the then French Prime Minister Barre summed up the role 
of tactical nuclear weapons as follows: 
In other words, by denying the adversary in advance all hope 
of keeping the battle's violence on the conventional level, 
through which he could progressively liquidate our 
conventional forces almost with irnpuni_ty, and by thus 
forbidding him from starting such a battle, the tactical 
nuclear weapon considerably reinforces through i.ts very 
existence our deterrent 1 s effectiveness at all levels. 
Moreover, if in some extraordinary case the adversary were 
to face all these threats and decide to attack us, the 
tactical nuclear weapons would quickly give him the last and 
appropriately solemn warning before the apocalypse. 
It is evident therefore that for us the tactical nuclear 
weapon is firstly and above all a weapon of deterrence just 
like all the others, from our strategic missiles to the 
rifles of our infantrymen; and that it would secondarily 
serve as a weapon of ultimate warning, in a case of 
extraordinary necessity. Its existence in our arsenal does 
not signify in any way that we would accept a prolonged 
conventional or tactical nuclear battle. On the contrary, 
we totally reject this possiblity. That is why the number 
of our tactical nuclear weapons is and will remain 
Hmited. 23 
If pre-strategic (or ttactical 1 ) nuclear strikes failed to stop 
an enemy, British and/or French strategic forces mlght be unleashed 
aeainst centres of Soviet power. Such an attack would probably be 
directed pri~arily, but not necessarily exclusively, against Soviet 
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cities, especially Hoscow. 24 Alternatively, fear of probably 
catastrophic Soviet reprisals may induce London and Paris (assuming 
they still existed) to hold back. The independent deterrents could be 
threatened, but not used,. in an attempt to keep either Britain or 
France out of a European war. As the British analyst, Professor 
Nailor, has noted: 
I think that the possession 
gives us the ability to rat on 
want to. This is a 
Sovereignty. 25 
of nuclear weapons ••• still 
some of our obligations if we 
significant attribute of 
(iv) Implications for the .nuclear-convelltional nexus 
The operational implications of the independent deterrents for 
the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces can be grouped 
under five related headings: (a) crisis management; (b) conventional 
war; (c) pre-strategic nuclear signalling; (d) effect on the USSR; and 
(e) effect on the USA. 
(a) Crisis Management 
In a confrontation Britain and France may well attach great 
importance to the potential crisis management role of their nuclear 
weapons .. This would probably stem fr:om the belief that alternative 
centres of nuclear decision making in NATO might have a stabilising 
effect on European security developments. Although, depending on the 
circumstances, London might not consider the French nuclear arsenal 
stabilising~ and vice versa~ Given a disintegrating security 
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situation in Europe such as a Soviet move against Berlin and 
political erisi.s in West Germany accompanied by perceived weakness in 
American political· leadership - the independent European deterrents 
may or may not have a dampening effect on Soviet adventurism. This 
type of crisi_s management function is perhaps best seen in terms of 
the independent deterrents providing insurance against a break-up of 
NATO. 
British/French crisis management can also be seen in terms of 
possible unilateral diplomatic manoeuvering in a NATO-Warsaw Pact 
conventional war, or even as a way of establishing sanctuaries during 
a limited theatre nuclear war. This conceptfon of crisis management 
seems closer to French, rather than British, public speculation on the 
role of nuclear weapons. There are two reasons for this apparent 
difference. The first is diplomatic. Britain is formally committed 
to collective and integrated Alliance defence; France is not. Paris 
therefore has more political room within which to rationalise a 
national crisis management role for its military. The second reason 
for the more explicit crisis management role of the French nuclear 
weapons is historical and geopolitical. The French do not have the 
English Channel to shelter behind. Nor do the French have the history 
of half-hearted attachment to the Continent characteristic of the 
British experience. On the contraryJ the French experience is one of 
vulnerability to land power and of shifting frontiers. Exc.ept perhaps 
for the Rhine, which only covers a portion of the French frontier, 
there is no substantial physical barrier between Soviet tanks and 
Paris .. Thus French efforts to control events during a European war 
and prevent an advance on its terri tory have tc rely he<Jvi ly on 
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declarations and psychological pressure combined with whatever denial 
(or conventional) force is available. The preservation of homeland 
sanctuaries in the UK and France would ultimately depend on national 
will and the successful manipulation of Soviet perceptions, as well as 
the survivability of c3r. 
This manipulation of Soviet perceptions may be more or less 
subtle: it may rest on existential deterrence (whereby the existence 
of British/ French nuclear warheads suffices) or direct military 
action such as conventional denial, possibly followed by pre-
strategic nuclear signalling. Thus both explicit and tacit nuclear 
threats may be used by Parl.s and London in efforts to contain conflict 
in Europe. Here crisis management could pervade the entire course of 
an armed struggle up to general release of nuclear weapons against 
major cities. This does not mean that crisis management 'Would be 
easy, only that it would be ioperative. It is a truism to say that 
this imperative could only be exercised in a limited war. The rest of 
this section will look at the possible impact of the independent 
deterrents during such a hypothetical conflict. 
(b) Conventional War 
The e>::istence of independent European deterrents may severely 
constrain conventional operations on the Continent by inducing caution 
on political leaders anxious not to trigger nuclear escalation. The 
possibllity of British or French battletield use of nuclear weapons 
may also discourage Warsaw Pact conventional force concentration 
thereby inhibiting any offensive momentuf'l that the Pact might 
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otherwise achieve. 
However, the limited number of independent battlefield nuclear 
weapons (a few hundred) would not be able to offer the same level of 
threat to the Warsaw Pact conventional forces and infrastructure as 
the American TNF arsenal. Moreover, the implementation of an 
independent battlefield nuclear threat could invite a massive Soviet 
reprisal capable of destroying BAOR or the French First Army. 
worst case a British or French attempt at first use of a fe~ 
battlefield nuclear weapons could trigger massive Soviet tactical and 
strategic preemption. 
Perhaps the most plausible role for the independent deterrents 
during a conventional war may be the provision of .. sancturies for the 
~ 
support of the forward battle in West Germany. The UK/ France may thus 
be able to provide a relatively sheltered mobilisation, logistic, 
maritime, and airstrike base~ Such sanctuaries could be critical in 
terms of (for example) enabling a build-up of US Air Force unlts in 
the UK and in allowing SACEUR to direct ground-force reserves through 
France and around the rear of threatened NATO positions. In short, 
British and French sanctuaries may help provide more depth to NATO's 
conventfonal defence. However this is speculation. Would British 
nuclear weapons really act as a deterrent against Soviet conventional 
air attacks dire.cted at USAF or RAF bases in the VK or the British 
Channel ports; and t..iould French nuclear weapons deter attacks against 
the French raill-•ay system? Nobody really knows. 
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It: is conceivable (but:, I think, unlikely) that the independent 
deterrents may be used to extend a nuclear umbrella over national 
conventional forces in, say, West Germany. This could be a role for 
RAF Tornad(><;l:S armed with British nuclear bombs. The Warsaw Pact may 
be told, or might fear, that an attack on British troops in the FRG 
(or an attack too deep into the Federal ,Republic) would accelerate 
unwelcome pressures to escalate. Needless to say, such thresholds may 
be exceedingly tenuous and transitory. 
It is unlikely that Paris or London would ever view their 
deterrent forces in narrow military terms. However, on-going 
assessments of unfolding conventional conflict may well be critical in 
determining the nature of any nuclear threats that might be made. 
This could be particularly true of French act:ions. A NATO collapse in 
the initial forward defence of Germany might bring powerful Soviet 
forces very close to French territory. 
In such a crisis, French policy calls for the first Army to act 
as part of the "national deterrent manoeuvre." This would require 
French conventional forces to test Soviet intentions and demonstrate 
French resolve; the focus would be on covering the approaches to the 
French border. In this case the First Army would not have a primarily 
war-fighting function their role would be to impress upon the 
Russians the dangers of provoking French strategic strikes against the 
l!SSR. According to doctrine, this would not indicate a conventional 
option in the sense used by NATO; French conventional forces are, in 
this case, supposed to be indivisible from the national deterrent 
ma:noeuvre and therefore inseparable from French nuclear threats~ 
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(c) Pre-strategic nuclear signalling 
Tactical nuclear weapons provide a link between conventional 
testing and strategic nuclear risk. As discussed above, French 
doctrine gives these weapons a warning-shot role. In an emergency 
Britain may adopt a similar posture. A decision to use these nuclear 
weapons (such as French Pluton missiles or RAF bombs) would almost 
certainly be taken only in extremely stressful circumstances and in 
the full knowledge that the intended signal may well have suicidal 
consequences. 
The chances for crisis management may turn on two related 
factors. First, there would be a requirement to stop Soviet ground 
forces before they had over-run vital interests (such as French 
frontier forces or the Low Countries). Second, there may be a 
.. competion in risk taking·:26 Decision makers may he involved in a 
test of nerves at the nuclear level and, on the primarily conventional 
level, a frantic effort to maintain a denial capability against Soviet 
armoured penetrations. The hope would be that the USSR would decline 
to pre-empt at the strategic level, hold back from tactical nuclear 
reprisals, and stop its ground forces. 
than wishful thinking. 
This hope may be little more 
On the other hand, however, the Soviets may well halt an 
offensive in such circumstances. It would, after-all, have strong 
incentives to de-escalate given the enormous stakes involved. In 
terll'.S of the French concept of .. proportional deterrence .. 27 the Soviet 
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Union may not be prepared to risk the destruction of Moscow, or even 
the Soviet state itself, for the prize of a war ravaged France. 
(d) Possible effects on the USSR 
Soviet military doctrine is the subject of the second part of 
this chapter, so only a few brief comments will be made here. In a 
crisis Soviet responses to the independent deterrents will depend on 
the circumstances prevailing at the time. 
It may be useful to discuss two broad categories of possible war 
and then draw--out their relevance to this subject. Firstly there is 
total war. The USSR might resolve to treat a hypothetical future war 
as a critical geopolitical and ideological turning point in world 
history wherein compromise and limitations would be unacceptable or 
even impossible .. Such a war would face the Soviet Union with a life 
or death struggle which could well approach genocidal proportions, if 
not intent. In this case British and French nuclear weapons may he 
seen as part of an indivisible Western threat. The independent 
deterrents would then have a distracting but not uniquely decisive 
role. If such a cataclysmic war eventuated the USSR would probably 
seek to employ massive preemptive nuclear strikes and very large scale 
combined conventional-nuclear operations to seize control of all 
Europe. Here the independent deterrents may have a marginal, 
redundant, role: Western targeting might overlap and be duplicated (eg 
a British ;;arhead might hit a target already covered by French/US 
weapons). 
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The second category of war is limited war confined to somewhat 
narrower objectives than those just sketched. For example, the Soviet 
objective may he the conquest of West Germany, and/or, the 
neutralisation of NATO. This would suggest a good deal of 
recklessness but not necessarily suicidal fanaticism. In this case 
British and French nuclear forces may greatly complicate and constrain 
Soviet planning. Ultimately these independent deterrents have the 
potential to transform politically meaningful limited war into a 
senseless total war., Thus the West European deterrents may figure 
prominently in Soviet ideas of crisis management. Soviet crisis 
management would have two critical roles in this regard. First it 
would have to work at preventing unintended nuclear escalation 
(resulting fro:n, say, overzealous Soviet field commanders or inept 
diplomacy). Second, it would have to decide if and when particular 
forms of escalation were probably inevitable; this assessment would 
affect Soviet incentives for various levels of preemption .. In thi.s 
type of conflict the independent deterrents could have two 
contradictory effects; stabilising or destabilising they might 
encourage either caution or assertiveness in Soviet actions at various 
stages in a crisis~ An important element in British, French and 
Soviet calculations of risks and interests would probably be US 
policy. 
(e) Possible effects on the USA 
American reaction to the use, or threatened usel of British or 
French nuclear weapons uould depend on circumstances. But one thing 
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can be said with some confidence: a unilateral British or French 
first-use of nuclear weapons would probably be contrary to US policy 
~nd vital national interests. It could be seen as a reckless European 
move to escalate a conflict faster than Washington considered 
desirable. 
Far from triggering massive US nuclear strikes against the USSR, 
independent use might provoke a speedy and radical reappraisal of 
American national interests, possibly leading to a sharp reversal of 
Alliance commitments. US crisis management might refocus away from 
the Soviet threat to America's erstwhile allies and towards con-taining 
its erring "friend". In extreme circumstances this mi.ght be done by 
the attempted elimination of British/French nuclear capabilities. On 
the other hand the US might get dragged into an escalating conflict 
with the Soviet Union as it tried to stay one step ahead of a widening 
crisis .. 
* * * * * 
The practical consequence of Br! tish/French action may be 
catalytic superpower strategic war. On the other hand, use of 
British/French nuclear weapons might provoke sharp Soviet/American 
politi.cal, para-military, and military action to contain or eliminate 
independent, nuclear armed, states perceived to be behaving in a 
reckless manner~ Alternatively, of course, neither of these events 
might occur. It is conceivable thnt: a limited British or French 
nuclear strike could help frame the politico-military context for a 
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continuation of conventional East-West conflict, it might even prompt 
a ceasefire---
C) THE SOVIET FACTOR 
It is clear that the West may not be able to dominate the threat 
or process of escalation in any future European war.. Nor is it able 
to unilaterally determine the precise relationship between nuclear and 
conventional military power on the Continent - whether it be in the 
context of peacetime diplomacy, crisis management, or combat. The 
rest of this chapter examines Moscowts perspectives on the nexus 
between nuclear and conventional forces .. 
£_i)_32viet Security and Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe has a central role in the security concerns of the 
USSR. This fact has profound implications for Russian perceptions of 
the utility of conventional ground forces, Soviet troop deployments, 
and the strategic environment in Europe. No account of the 
relationship between nuclear and conventional forces would be complete 
without an awareness of the Soviet stake in Eastern Europe. 
Soviet security interests in the region have at least three 
elements: historical, geopolitical and ideologicaL These elements 
converge and encourage the Soviet suppression of independent and 
politically hostile developments in Eastern Europe. Soviet control 
over the region has many dimensions, .including po\~Ltical 1 economic 
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and military. The security aspects of this control are manpower 
intensive - as illustrated by the intervention against relatively 
liberal forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the more subtle form of 
intimidation used against dissident pressures in Poland in the early 
1980s. A strong Soviet posit ion in the region provides Hoscow with an 
idO'Ologically sound "commonwealth" and a ma,Jor strategic asset. 
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe gives the Socialist heartland 
a buffer against invasion from the West and a base for forward 
military action against NATO. The area between the Soviet frontier 
and Berlin/Prague/Vienna is thus of immense strategic and political 
importance to the USSR. In their study of Soviet strategic forces, 
Berman and Baker state, quite simply, that "Europe is undoubtedly the 
most important regional theatre of milt tary operations for the Soviet 
Union." 28 This is important in broader, global, security terms 
because the USSR attaches an importance to Europe that US analysts 
might consider "strategic". 
The geopolitical features of this potential theatre of war 
suggest the need for large ground forces. Some writers have offered 
almost primaeval motives for the Russian interest in European 
geopolitics. Arthur Schlesinger has described the Russian border as 
"crossed so often and so bloodily in the dark course of [Russian] 
history" he states that: ''The history of Russia has been the history 
of invasion". 29 According to Kennan, behind Russian policy is "the 
age-old sense of insecurity of a sedentary people reared on an exposed 
plain in the neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples." 30 
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The Western approaches to the USSR are dominated by the North 
European Plain. These approaches have offered opportunities ·for 
sweeping military manoeuvres covering vast areas and employing massive 
armies. One example is the 23 day Soviet Vistula-Oder campaign of 
1945. Here the front of advance and depth of operations were both 
500km; Soviet forces consisting of two and ,a half million troops with 
7,000 tanks and self-propelled guns advanced at an average of 20-25km 
per day. 31 This operation was conducted directly on the lines of 
communications to Moscow and followed similarly large campaigns on 
Soviet territory. These sorts of experiences have encouraged in 
Moscow a perspective on strategy, and the nuclear-conventional nexus, 
that is somewhat different to that prevalent in Washington. 
These perspectives on strategy will be detailed below. First, 
though, more needs to be said about the geopolitical basis of Soviet 
perspectives on security. The Soviet Union would almost certainly 
interpret a forceful attempt to change Moscow's status in Eastern 
Europe as a threat to its vital national interests. Indeed, threats 
to what is loosely called the .. Yalta.. system may well provide the 
focus of any Soviet military action during a European war. This is 
important to bear in mind as the USSR has apparently adopted a 
Clausewitzian approach to strategy in which military operations are 
supposed to be tailored to specific political objectives. 
The form and scope of a Soviet campaign against NATO could vary 
considerably depending on, among other things, the political stakes 
involved and their relationship to the Yalta framework. Obviously, 
Soviet strategy might not be simply defensive. It might be directed 
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more at extending Soviet power than preserving it (or it might start 
as the latter and develop into the former). Here geopolitical 
considerations might appear to dictate an attempt to seize NATO and 
neutral territory. A Soviet military push in Europe could well be 
accompanied by an attempt to establish a clearly demarcated frontline 
well inside Western Europe. According to Berman and Baker: 
Tbe Soviet interest in occupying certain portions of Europe 
probably results from a belief that conventional warfare 
would be important in ending regional conflicts in a 
prolonged worldwide nuclear war. 32 
The Soviet geopolitical position makes it seem unlikely that Moscow 
would view a major war in terms of nuclear "signalling" which was 
unrelated to the conduct of ground warfare. Control over territory 
appears to be central to Soviet strategy. 
(Ii~)~The Soviet Conceptual. Framework For Hilitary Planning 
In the USSR the primacy of the political leadership over the 
military is stressed. However, Soviet military writings do not seem 
to explore the possibilities for civilian "fine.-tuning" of military 
operations - at least not to the same extent as in the West. This 
apparent contradiction can perhaps be explained in terms of Soviet 
cultural patterns and the Soviet conception of the nature of war .. 
This conception appears to be essentially Clausewitizian. modified to 
incorporate Harxist-Len_J.nist dogma. Thus, war is '"the continuation 
of class politics •.. Any and every war is inextricably bound up with 
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that political order out of which it flows ••• It is a well known fact 
that politics is a relationship between classes. •· 33 According to 
the Soviet view, military operations are to be matched to specific 
political objectives insofar aa their nature allows. That is, 
military means are, in theory, to be kept in line with political ends; 
but war may be a somewhat blunt instrument of policy. Moreover it is 
recognised that war in Europe would be a very risky option with 
immense escalatory potential. An acute awareness of the possibility 
of damaging escalation appears to breed caution in peacetime and, 
according to most interpretations of Soviet doctrine, assertiveness in 
wartime in an attempt to reduce. the scope of NATO nuclear attacks. 
Soviet writings suggest that Moscow would opt for war in Europe 
only in very grave circumstances; but, if war broke out, these 
writings indicate that it would probably be fought savagely. Even a 
politically successful war in Europe (assuming it was possible) could 
be extremely bloody, involve a vast range of military operations, and 
stess offensive action. In such a conflict political control at the 
frontline might be more theoretical than practical. Political control 
could have more to do with general objectives and the general line of 
offensive operations than with relatively tactical considerations. 
Soviet criticisms of US ideas of flexible response may have a lot to 
do with the notion that the nature of war is simply too dynamic, 
uncertain, complex, stressful and brutal to be susceptible to detailed 
political control of battle management. 
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As a way of integrating the imperative of political control with 
the operational requirements of warplanning and combat readiness (and, 
no doubt, as a consequence of domestic political factors) the USSR has 
developed an overarchingt centralised framework for war preparations. 
(see chart) 
Within this framework34 military doctrine provides "both the 
accepted view on the nature of future conflicts} as well as guidance 
for the military to follow in preparing the armed forces for war". 35 
Doctrine is the politically endorsed element of Soviet military 
science (which is essentially a diverse assortment of military 
thinking). Strategy concerns the implementation of doctrine as 
modified by the particular circumstances of the conflict at hand: 
compared to doctrine, strategy is more about actual, rather than 
hypothetical, fighting. Strategy is a subset of military art; 
military art is defined as "the theory and practice of preparing for 
and conducting military operations. " 36 Within military art, 
strategy has a key role: it provides the link between the Soviet 
understanding of the nature of war and the execution of military 
operations. 
According to Soviet doctrine war is about the "complex system of 
interrelated 
operations." 37 
large simultaneous and successive strategic 
The connection between strategy and tactics is 
provided by operational art. Within the framework of a particular 
strategy; Soviet army operations would, ln theory, be conducted 
according to the principles outlined by operational art (which, like 
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strategy and tactics, is also a subset of military art.) According to 
Petersen: 
The conceptual framework created by the Soviet theory of 
military art is applicable to the waging of war regardless 
of whether the weapons of concern are non-nuclear or 
primarily nuclear. The impact of this framework is evident 
in the extensive body of written material discussing both 
weapon systems and force deployment. Thus combat activities 
are categorized as one or another of the following: (l) 
tactical, (2) operational, or (3) strategic. These terms, 
along with the terms operational-tactical and operational-
strategic, cover the full spectrum of military objectives or 
goals as well as the scale of organizational form or the 
spectrum of weapon systems of means.. Their utilization 
allows the Soviets to be comparatively precise in their 
discussions of force employment in any conflict and, again, 
may have a clarifylng cognitive effect upon Soviet 
decisionmakers. 38 
The different levels of Soviet combat - strategic, operational and 
tactical - correspond to different scales of effort, both in te.rms of 
territorial extent and the size of forces committed (each of the three 
levels can cover nuclear and, or, conventional operations)& 
In Soviet military science, ••the broadest conce.pt in military 
geography seems to be that of the theatre of war ••. ( teatr voiny or 
TV)." A TV would cover the area of hostilities engaged in by, for 
example, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It might therefore be relatively 
small at the start of hostilities and then rapidly grow. For the 
purposes of peacetime planning there appears to bt~ three Eurasian TVs: 
Western (covering Europe); Southern (covering the middle r:ast); and 
Far Eastern (covering the rest of Asia and including China, Korea and 
Japan).3 9 
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TVs would incorporate one or more ...-theatre of military action ... 
(teatr voennykh deistvii or TVD). The TVD could cover a distinct 
geographical area with a more-or-less integrated poll tico-economi.c 
framework and with specific strategic objectives capable of seizure by 
Soviet forces. Thus within the Western (i.e. European) theatre of war 
there are, reportedly, three TVDs - one covering potential operations 
against Scandinavia) one covering NATO's Central Front, and one 
oriented against the Balkans. 
Hajor warplans at TVD level would focus on the development of one 
or more strategic directions. A strategic direction essentially 
describes or outlines the path to be followed by the primary offensive 
thrusts of Soviet forces. Thus, within the TVD covering NATO's 
Central Front .. one strategic direction might outline a massive assault 
towards the Channel ports through West Germany. Within a strategic 
direction would be one or more operational directions. 40 So, in the 
above example of a strategic direction focused on the Channel ports, 
there may be two operational directions: one describing an attack 
across the North German Plain via Bremen, and the other outlining 
operations to pin-down US forces in the central region of the Federal 
German Republic. 
The control of these hypothetical operations would) in theory, be 
relatively centralised. 1\t the highest level the Soviet Defence 
Council integrates political guidance and military advice. Below this 
is the Supreme High Command (VGK); the VGK directs the Gt?neral Staff. 
Accord:_ng to Petersenl ln wartime it is likely that separate, 
suhord inate, High Cow.mands would be established at TVD level. These 
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TVD commands would manage offensives along strategic directions (e.g. 
a drive to the Channel ports). Lower down, commands would also be 
established at the level of fronts. Front commands control one or 
more multi-division armies; fronts would be expected to move along the 
operational directions described above41 (e.g. against Bremen). 
The possibility of theatre war in Europe has had a cental role in 
the development of Soviet military concepts, force development, 
command and control, and (presumably) detailed warplanning. Over the 
years this has led to an enormous investment in conventional forces 
largely configured for rapid offensives against, among other things, 
Western nuclear forces based in Europe which are capable of 
devastating the USSR. The emphasis on theatre war in Soviet military 
doctrine is reflected in Russian perceptions of nuclear conflict. 
For example, Lee has noted that: 
Soviet strategic targeting applies to both Eurasia and the 
United States ••• To the Soviets, Europe and adjacent areas in 
Asia are strategic dimensions of equal, if not greater, 
importance 
42 
than the "transoceanic" [i.e. intercontinental) 
dimension. 
Views On The Relat Between Nuclear And 
Conventional Forces 
Soviet military thinking is neither static nor entirely 
inflexible. Indeed, Soviet views of the relative roles of nuclear and 
conventional forces have shifted over the years. 43 The need for 
changing perspectives was outlined in the last words of Sokolovskiy's 
Soviet Military Strategy: 
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It is necessary to take into account that the theories 
expressed in this work were cited in each individual case by 
relying on an evaluation of the political and economic 
conditions of today. Therefore, it is impossible to 
consider them as final and unchanging data. Only a creative 
approach from the position of Marxist-Leninist dialectics 
will enable Soviet cowmanding cadres to understand properly 
and u!T. the various conclusions and recommendations of this 
work. q 
It was clear that "military affairs do not 'mark time, but continuously 
develop under the action of various conditions, •• " Moreover, 
according to Sokolovskiy: 
War always was an extremely complex and varied phenomenon. 
This is even more true of a future nuclear war. In 
working out the forms and methods for condueting a future 
war, an entire number of questions should be 
considered: how will the war be unleashed, what 
character will it assume, who will be the main enemy, will 
nuclear weapons be employed at the very start of the war or 
in the course of the war, which nuclear weapons -strategic 
or only operational tactical -where, in what area or in 
what: theatre will the main events unfold, etc ••• 
Some forms of strategic operations may take place in a 
nuclear war on a world-wide scale which arose as a result 
of a surprise enemy attack; other forms of operations may 
take place in a world nuclear war which arose as the result 
of the expansion of a local war into a world l.'ar, and a 
completely gifferent form of operations will take place in 
local war. 4 
Meyer has outlined three different possible Soviet views of paths 
to nuclear war that it might be useful to identify here. These are: 
surprise strategic attack or a "bolt from the blue"; anticipated 
strategic attack arising directly out of a crisis (over, for example, 
Cuba) and leading to massive nuclear preemption; and escalation from 
46 
conventional war. The last of these paths to nuclear war is the 
most relevant in terms of the treatment of the nuclear-conventional 
nexus in Soviet doctrine~ 
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Russian assessments of the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces have probably been influenced by their changing 
views as to the probability of war between the superpowers in which 
some restraint is exercised. From at least the 1960s Soviet doctrine 
has recognised a requirement for escalation control in some 
circumstances. For example, Sokolovskiy has stated that: 
Simultaneously with preparing for a decisive battle with the 
aggressor during a world war, the armed forces of the 
socialist camp must also be prepared for small-scale loca 1 
wars >~hich might be unleashed by the imperialists. The 
experience of such wars which have repeatedly arisen during 
the postwar period shows that they are conducted by ways and 
means which di.ffer from those used in world wars. Therefore, 
Soviet military strategy calls for the study of the means 
for conducting such wars. in order to prevent them from 
developing into a world war and to bring quick victory over 
the enemy. 47 
As described below, some analysts believe that Soviet military 
developments are intended to give Moscow a conventional war opti.on in 
Europe. Indeed, this view is becoming the orthodox interpretation of 
Soviet doctrine. Soviet TNF, it is argued, are meant to deter NATO 
first-use of nuclear weapons while Soviet conventional superiority is 
to be used to destroy Western defences. Why else invest vast sums in 
large, modern, armoured forces and associated support? 48 
However, Douglass and Roeber are skeptical of this conventional 
war proposition. They point out that Soviet doctrine attaches great 
importance to conventlonal forces in nuclear war; they also argue that 
Soviet doctrine emphasises the very high probability of a European war 
escalating to nuclear strikes~ Douglass and lfoeber have summarised 
their interpretation ot SoviE:t views of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
as follows: 
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Should a war in Europe ••• begin with a conventional phase, 
Soviet operations planning would be conducted with the 
possible sudden transition to nuclear operations as the 
primary considerstion ••• and it is probable that the nuclear 
phase will be decisive and will determine the course and 
outcome of the conflict ••• 
In the Soviet view, the main advantages of an opening 
conventional phase lie in the fact that it permits the more 
effective implementation of a surprise nuclear strike if 
NATO forces already have been alerted and dispersed ••. An 
intitial conventional phase is seen as a mechanism that 
provides the opportunity a) to solve problems of 
mobilization, force deployment and readiness 1 force 
dispersal, target acquisition, and air-bourne unit 
inserti.on, and b) to degrade NATO nuclear capabilities. 
In general, the Soviet approach seems to be focused on 
determining the "most favorable time" to make the transition 
to nuclear operations. As identified in the Soviet 
literature, that time appears to be when a Soviet 
breakthrough first appears irnrninent ••. The commitment of 
second echelon and reserve units, itself a "culminating .. 
moment of the offensive, is often linked to the initiation 
of nuclear operations,. Surprise, a dominant factor in 
modern Soviet strategy, is especially important. and the 
drive to successfully achieve surprise tends to advance the 
timing of the nuclear decision. With these factors in mind, 
and making every effort to anticipate NATO moves, the 
Soviets would aim to preempt with an initial nuclear 
strike. 49 (Emphasis added.) 
Thoughout their study Douglass and Roeber emphasise the combined-arms 
approach of Soviet doctrine. They stress that nuclear and 
conventional operations would be coordinated so as to achieve a 
synergistic effect (although they do not use this term). Thus they 
state that: 
the Soviets have concluded that conducting a nuclear strike 
without a rapidly following exploitation by ground and air 
forces is the wrong approach. The heart of the Soviet 
approach to war is the use of combined arms, which relies 
most importantly on the combination of nuclear strikes plus 
explottat ion .•• 
If, .. ground and 
nuclear st.rike, 
optional.SO 
air units are not 
then the timing 
prepared to exploit 
for that strike is 
the 
not 
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It appears that conventional forces .. cannot exploit a nuclear strike 
properly from their day-to-day postures ••• " A conventional phase 
would the ref ore be necessary for preparation of post strike 
operations. 51 
According to Meyer, Soviet views of nuclear escalation from 
conventional war in Europe have moved from seeing such escalation as 
"inevitable" to "most likely" and then "probable". "By the mid 1970s", 
Meyer states, 
Soviet military doctrine held out the possibility that wars 
might even be fought with conventional weapons only. Yet 
the odds were still ~reat that conventional war would 
escalate to nuclear war .. 2 
Some analysts suggest that the USSR has a preference for, and 
expectation of, conventional war in Europe that would not escalate to 
nuclear strikes. Petersen and Hines state that: "The Soviets would 
prefer to achieve a quick victory at the lowest possible level of 
i i .. 53 ntens ty .... From this unremarkable prem:i.sst and their 
interpretation of Soviet thinking, Petersen and Hines construct a view 
of Soviet strategy that stresses preperation for conventional 
conflict. These analysts think that the Russians would prefer 
conventional war, rather than nuclear war, because geography "would 
work to the Soviet advantage in a conventional conflict but to their 
disadvantage in nuclear war." 54 In a conventional war the Soviet 
Union may be able to bring more reinforcements to bear in central 
Europe than the ~s. but i.n a theatre nuclear war the USSR may be more 
vulnerable to unintended nuclear escalation than (he USA* An 
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additional reason for Soviet restraint in war is that the devastation 
of Western Europe does not appear to be a Soviet objective. 
Meyer, Petersen and Hines (like Douglass and Hoeber) stress that 
Soviet perceptions of conventional war in Europe are profoundly 
affected by the existence of nuclear weapons. The ever present threat 
of nuclear strikes erupting out of a conventional war rules out a 
traditional form of ground war of the World War Two type. For 
example, the nuclear revolution has modified views of conventional 
force concentration. Soviet doctrine does, however) stress some 
traditional military values; it calls for surprise, shock actlon, 
speed of advance, and destruction of critical military facilities. 
According to doctrine, Soviet conventional forces should be capable of 
rapid concentration (for a breakthrough offensive) and speedy 
dispersal (to deny the West lucrative targets for nuclear attack). 
Soviet conventional forces are expected to smash or manoeuvre their 
way past NATO's forward defences as early as possible. Once into NATO 
te-rritory a primary missi.on for Soviet conventional forces is the 
reduction of KATOl> nuclear options; this is to be done by the 
destruction/disruption/capture of Western c3 1 systems and nuclear 
weapons .. Throughout the conventional phase of operations Soviet 
conventional forces would, in theory, be prepared for a sharp 
transition to nuclear war. 
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In line with this last objective of being able to quickly 
transform operations, "each level of command [e.g. front, army, 
division] would maintain a nuclear strike plan against the same target 
set attacked under their respective conventional fire plans • .. 55 
Ideally, from the perspective of Soviet doctrine, the transition to 
nuclear war would take the form of surprise Soviet preemption of 
antici.pated NATO escalation: the USSR would try to beat NATO to the 
nuclear punch. 
Not surprisingly, it is unclear pred.sely when the Soviet Union 
would initiate attacks. It would probably be if and when Soviet 
readiness to strike coincided with evidence of a Western move to 
escalate~ As suggested above, conventional force readiness may be a 
consideration here. Except perhaps for retaliation, the primary 
objective of Soviet nuclear attacks would be to destroy NATO nuclear 
forces on the ground. 
Just what Moscow would see as warning of an impending NATO 
nuclear offensive in the context of conventional war is uncertain. It 
may be one or more of the following indicators, some of which will be 
associated with the NATO alert levels already outlined in chapter 
five: 
L Open US/::.IATO nuclear threats. 
2. US preparation for strategic nuclear war and the raising of US 
strategic alert levels (eg the withdrawal of tanker aircraft froru 
theatre conventional roles and the airborne alert of bombers). 
3. Intensified NATO anti-submarine warfare. 
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4. A NATO "demonstration shot" with a few warheads using two or 
three F-Ills. 
5. The widespread dispersal of TNF warheads from storage sites to 
allied (especially German) battlefield units. 
6. The limited dispersal of TNF warheads to US EUCOM units. 
7. Precise, unequivocal, signals intelligence like interception of 
NATO/EcCOM firing orders and confirmation of a firm western 
political decision to escalate. 
8. Ambiguous signals intelligence (eg interception of messages 
raising TNF alert levels). 
9. Human intelligence from well placed agents. 
10. The standing-down of increasing numbers of aircraft from 
conventional missions and their arming with nuclear bombs. 
11. A sharp change in the pattern of NATO electronic warfare. 
12. NATO conventional force dispersal and limited troop withdrawals. 
13. Cessation of the US airlift into major European airbases, and the 
holding back of Atlantic convoys from docking. 
14. The diversion of US reinforcements from the Continent to the UK. 
15. The initiation of anti-sateJlite warfare/intensified attacks 
against c31. 
16. The increased deployment of NATO special forces behind the front 
line. 
1.7. The dispersal of Western political leaders and administrative 
staffs. 
18. British/French preparation for independent nuclear strikes. 
It is worth noting here that a Soviet preemptive attack against 
NATO TNF may be considerably easier if undertaken before, rather than 
after, a NATO dispersal of nuclear warheads and missiles. Gornley has 
estimated that NATO TNF dispersal would increase the number of nuclear 
targets for Soviet planners "from 80 fixed installations to well over 
300 mobile (and thus more survivable) field units." 56 NATO TNF 
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dispersal, or any of the other indicators, may be especially salient 
if it appeared that NATO's conventional defence line was on the verge 
of collapsing. 
It appears that Soviet doctrine concerns itself more with the 
first decisive (or mass) use of nuclear weapons than with the first-
use of nuclear weapons per se. 57 According to Douglass and Roeber: 
"It is difficult to define what constitutes a 'mass use' in terms of 
numbers of weapons.$ .... These two analysts guess at a threshold of 
between 50 and 100 weapons; below this level an attack might be more 
demonstrative than militarily decis1ve. 58 Whether or not Soviet 
authorities 'Would. in a crisis, agree with this assessment of the 
threshold to decisive nuclear operations ls a moot point. 
Neyer has described Soviet views of theatre nuclear warfare in 
sone detail. He makes the important point that considerable political 
and military incentives exist for the USSR to try and maintain 
limitations on the destructiveness of even nuclear war. For examplet 
he states that, 
Soviet military planners reveal strong awareness and 
sensitivity to the disruptive effect that sgarge-scale 
theatre nuclear use could have on troop contro14 
Neyer goes on to say that: 
In the end, for all their studies and analyses (or perhaps, 
because of them), Soviet military writers do not appear to 
der.tons trate confidence_ that they know how to manage a full-
scale theatre nuclear war.60 
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There is, then, good reason for keeping war limited (over and above 
ethical concerns or the need to maintain political control of the home 
front). There is also a concomitant need to maintain central control 
over nuclear attacks - at least in the early stages of a war. The 
USSR appears to approach these issues by (a) attempting to establish a 
homeland sanctuary for Soviet territory; (b) focussing in-itial Soviet 
preemptive strikes at a limited number of targets - in particular NATO 
TNF, especially if they are capable of hitting Soviet territory; and 
(c) by assigning this primary preemptive mission to the Strategic 
Rocket Forces under the VGK - rather than to the fronts. As Meyer 
notes, this type of operation is considered "strategic" by Soviet 
military planners. As such, it could be conducted by Strategic 
TNF; 61 these currently include SS20 LRTNF and SS11/SS19 ICBMs. 62 No 
doubt aircraft could also be used, albeit with less assurance of 
success. 
Such a preemptive strike might be followed-up very quickly by 
Soviet use of so-called "operational-tactical" and battlefield nuclear 
weapons deployed with forward based ground forces. Thus Soviet 
nuclear attacks might commence with large-scale long-range attacks 
against NATO's LRTNF and supporting infrastructure, with shorter 
range missiles being used in selective follow-up strikes.63 
As discussed above, according to Soviet doctrine Soviet 
conventional forces would, in theory, engage in rapid, well co-
ordinated offensive operations to exploit the shock and military 
effects of nuclear at tacks. This attachment to combined (nuclear-
conventional) arms operations (and the apparent Soviet objective of 
wanting to occupy, rather than destroy, Western Europe) places limits 
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on the level of nuclear attacks deemed acceptable to Soviet 
warplanners. 64 As already noted, massive indiscriminate nuclear 
warfare is considered inimical to the conduct of combined arms 
operations and the achievement of Soviet objectives. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of rapid escalation is supposed to 
determine the nature of Soviet conventional operations during any 
conventional phase of war. As Douglass argues: 
In effect, the Soviet approach can be viewed as learning how 
to fight a conventional war from a nuclear war posture, in 
contrast to the Western approach of fighting an initial 
phase of a nuclear war from a conventional posture.65 
Whether or not such theoretical perspectives can be translated into 
practical military operations is an open question. 
A key determinant of the Soviet ability to ioplement its 
doctrine will be the leadership qualities of its officers and the 
efficacy of its connnand and control system. Soviet command and 
control is relatively centralised down to regiment level. 66 This 
could be advantagous in so far as coordination may be relatively easy, 
and in so far as flexible, decisive, decision making at the top is 
effectively channelled to lower echelons. On the other hand, 
centralised control might hamper the conduct of war. The chain of 
command might be disrupted or broken; rigidities in warplans might 
lead to paralysis or stupidity on the battlefield. 
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(iv) Implications for NATO strategy 
Soviet perspectives on future war may have serious implications 
for NATO strategy and Western attempts at escalation controL For 
example, Soviet doctrine apparently does not endorse the notion of 
nuclear signalling characteristic of some ~estern ideas. Nor does it 
seem to give much attention to the concept of fine-tuning nuclear 
"options .. ~ While Soviet doctrine eschews gratuitously large and 
deliberately indiscriminate nuclear barrages, it does call for 
militarily decisive nuclear strikes. Militarily decisive nuclear 
attacks would probably have to be quite large - perhaps involving 
nearly 160 targets in the theatre67 and, possibly, many hundreds more. 
To call such attacks a form of nuclear "bargaining" would be pushing 
language too far. The apparent Soviet emphasis on militarily 
effective -or war winning- nuclear operations would seero to cast doubt 
on the efficacy of any NATO attempts to treat war as an exe~cise in 
For example, while NATO's limited first-use of 
nuclear weapons option is intended to be a tool of crisis mangeme.nt, 
i.t may well act: as a trigger to large scale Soviet nuclear attacks and 
the strbsequent breakdown of any constraints. 
NATO plans may also be unraveled at the conventional level. This 
is primarily because of the apparently offensive orientation of the 
Soviet military. It is largely this putative offensive orientation 
that roakes the prospect of Soviet mobilisation seem so daunting, and 
which gives Soviet special forces and chemical weapons a potentially 
de-stabilising role. Wide-ranging efforts to seize tactical and 
strategic advantages within the framework of an offensive concept of 
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conventional operations will put enormous strain on the political and 
military structures that would also be tasked with managing nuclear 
weapons. 
One aspect of Soviet conventional doctrine that has attracted 
particular concern is the concept of "Operational Manoeuvre Groups" 
(OMGs). 68 A primary task of OMGs is to rapidly throw the main wei.ght 
of battle onto the enemy's rear areas, in a contemporary equivalent of 
Blitzekrieg. OHGs would be employed with associated raiding groups 
directed against NATO TNF and command posts. In theory OMGs would be 
used to side-step the Alliance • s doc trines of forward defence and 
flexible response. If the. OMG concept worked, it would obviously 
undermine NATO strategy. Forward defence would be sliced open, and 
the chances of NATO effectively implementing a considered first-use of 
TNF might be drastically reduced. The consequences of such a Soviet 
offensive might be political paralysis in NATO leading to a collapse 
of the Alliance, or the desperate launch of all available TNF to no 
particular purpose. 
Lebow has described Soviet doctrine for war in Europe as a 
contemporary 
reckless. 69 
equivalent of 
Soviet doctrine 
the Schlieffen Plan: 
seems very escalatory. 
flawed and 
It apparently 
calls for massive offensive sweeps deep into NATO territo<y, possibly 
using chemical weapons, and the prompt destruction of NATO's Tl\f 
together with the widespread dis<uption of the Alliance's systen: of 
command and control~ 
* * 
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During a European conflict Soviet forces may exert two 
contradictory pressures on the battlefield. On the one hand, the 
enormous nuclear firepot.~er at the command of Hoscow could have a 
profoundly stabilising (or even paralysing) effect in a crisis. On 
the other hand, the apparent emphasis on pre-emption, and the stress 
on decisive offensive conventional combat, could be catastrophically 
de-stabilising. As the next chapter shows, the linkage between 
nuclear and conventional operations could well be a critical factor in 
the balancing of combat instabilities and more stabilising deterrent 
pressures. 
Wartime interactions between stabilising deterrent pressures and 
destabilising attempts to gain operational advantage may turn on the 
collaborative management (by Washington, London, Paris, and ~!oscow) of 
the linkage between nuclear and conventional military power. Since 
this "management" would have to operate in a climate of armed 
antagonism, the prospects are unpromising. States that could not 
decide to keep the peace may be unlikely to agree to a wartime code of 
conduct. This problem could be compounded because each of the four 
nuclear armed states has its own perspective on the nexus between 
nuclear and conventional military power. Each of these perspectives 
is rooted in history and geopolitical considerations. 
-323-
NOTES 
1 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the Alliance form of flexible 
response is a vague, watered down version of the original 
American concept. 
2 The term "semialignment" 
Semialignment and Western 
argues that (p. 6.): 
is taken from Nils 
Security (Croom Helm, 
Orvik 
1986). 
Fully aligned states are those that accept the major 
commitments implied in the [NATO] treaty, act 
accordingly, and to the best of their ability try to 
meet the obligations. A member which can accept only 
some of the commitments and rejects others would come 
in the category of "semialigned". 
(ed~, 
Orvik 
3 See WilHam Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, ~~ar.B.t.ttlefields: 
4 
Global Links in the Arms Race (Ballinger, Massachusetts, 1985), 
chapter three; John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State 
(Macmillan, 1986); Shaun Gregory, The Command and Control of 
British Nuclear Weapons (Peace Research Report Number 13, 
Bradford University, 1986); Duncan Campbell, "Too Few Bombs to Go 
Round", New Statesman, 29 November 1985. 
The British arsenal has been estimated at between 225 and 689 
warheads. Simpson suggests that the UK has about 280 gravity 
bombs and 290 warheads for submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(op. cit., p. 254). UK tactical weapons may be delivered by 
naval helicopters 1 and Tornado 1 Buccaneer, Jaguar and Harrier 
aircraft. The British have four ballistic missile submarines, 
each equiped to fire 16 Polaris missiles (probably with two 
warheads each). During wartime the UK may be granted US warheads 
for British artillery and Lance missiles, they may also receive 
US gravity bombs. 
"'ranee has six ballistic missile firing submarines with a total 
of 96 missiles. They have 18 land-based ballistic missiles 
c.;J.pablc of striking the USSR, and four squadrons of Mirage 
bombers capable of strategic nuclear missions. The French also 
have 120 tactical Pluton missiles, and about 120 tactical nuclear 
bombs assigned to five squadrons. The total French arsenal has 
been estimated at about 514 warheads. 
Cited in Margret Gowing, Britain and Atomic .Energy 1939-1945 
(Hacmillan, 1964), p, 168; also, see M. Gowing, Independence and 
Deterrence, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1974). 
5 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations 
since~ (Macmillan/Papermac, 1980), p. 184. 
6 For further information on the background to the independent 
deterrents see, for example, Lawrence Freedman, ~in and 
Nuclear .. Weapons (Macmillan, 1980); Wolfe Mendl, Deterrence and 
· Persuas;LQn. (Praeger, 1970). 
-324-
7 Ministry of Defence Memorandum, cited in Freedman, op. cit., P• 
127; also, see p. 127-135. 
8 See S. Gregory, o p. cit. 
9 A. Grosser, op. cit., p. 216. 
10 General Mery, "Comments", reprinted in Survival, September/ 
October 1976, p. 227. 
11 David Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: 
Part 1: Capabilities and Doctrine", Adelphi Paper 194 (IISS, 
Winter 1945/5), p. 60. Also, see David Yost, France and 
(.:Qnventional Defense i(lCentral Europe (Westview, 1985). 
12 McGeorge Bundy has discussed the concept of "existential 
deterrence" in terms of US policy and European defence in, "The 
Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy", in Gwyn Prins (ed~, .IIla 
Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security ( Cha tto and 
Windus/Hogarth Press, 1984). The concept of existential 
deterrence is implicit in some of Jervis' work; see The Illo2ic 
of American Nuclear Strategy (Carnell University Press, 1984). 
13 L. Freedman in D. Ball and J, Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear 
TargetiJYt (Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 331, f.n. 46. 
14 D .. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part 
1: Capabilities and Doctrine", op. cit .• 
15 Cited in Pierre Gallais, ''French Defence Planning", International 
Security, Fall 1976 p. 18. 
16 D .. Yost, .. France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part 
1~··"• op .. cit., p .. 3. 
17 Ibid., P· 55. 
18 Ibid., p. 52. 
19 Ibid., p. 52. 
20 Ibid., P· 52. 
21 Jacques Chirac, "Address", reprinted in Survival, September 
/October 1975, p. 243. 
22 D .. Yost .. France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part 
1 •.• ", op. cit., p. 53. 
23 Raymond Barre~ comments reprinted in SurvivaL September 
/October 1977. 
24 See chapters by D. Yost, and L. fr~edman in Ball and Richelson, 
op. cit ... 
-325-
25 Peter Nailor, comments reprinted in RUSI Jourpal, September 1980, 
P• 25. 
26 The term "competition in risk taking" comes from Thomas 
Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), P• 
94; in addition, see p. 110-111, and T. Schelling, The Strategy 
of Conflict (Oxford University Press, 1960). 
27 D. Yost "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe: Part 
1 ••• ", op. cit., p. 14. 
28 Robert Berman and John 
Requirements_ and Responses 
P• 28. 
Baker, Soviet 
(The Brookings 
Q.tratedc 
Institution, 
Forces; 
1982), 
29 Arthur Schlesinger, "Origins of the Cold War", Foreign Mfairs, 
October 1967, p. 29. 
30 George Kennan, cited in ibid., p. 30. 
31 Philip Peterson, "The Soviet Conceptual Framework for the 
Development and Application of Military Power" in H. Tromp (ed.) 
Non-Nuclear War In Europe (Groningen University Press, 1985). 
For a detailed account of Soviet operations during the Second 
World War, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad and fhe Road 
to Berlin (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975 and 1983). 
32 R. Berman, and J. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, op. cit., 
p. 29. 
33 V. Sokolovskl.y, Sovie~_Jiilitary 
Institute, 1975), p. 178; also, see 
Strategy (Stanford Research 
p. 14 ff, and P• 172 ff. 
34 This section is partly based on the account given by P. Peterson, 
"The Soviet Conceptual Framework for the Development and 
Application of Military Power", op. clt. 
35 Ibid., P• 32. 
36 Ibid. , P· 37. 
37 Ibid., P· 37. 
38 Ibid., P· 39. 
39 Ibid. , P· 41. 
40 Ibid., P· 44) 48. 
41 Ibid- • P· 48 f£. 
42 lL L-::e "Scviet ~~ucle-ar Targeting Strategy.,, D~ Ball and 
J. Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, op. cit., p. 85. 
43 See Michael ~lccGwire, Military Obie.ctives in Sgvie.t Foreign 
rolicy (Ihe Brookings Institution, 1987). 
-326-
44 v. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. 386. 
45 Ibid., p. 288. 
46 Stephen Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to Nuclear War", 
in G. Allison, A. Carnesale, J. Nye (eds.), J!!uiks, Doves and Owls 
(W. Norton, 1985). Meyer also discusses accidental and catalytic 
war. 
47 v. Sokolovskiy, op. cit., p. 188. 
48 See M. MccG~o~ire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 
op. cit.; and Mary Fitzgerald, "The Strategic Revolution Behind 
Soviet Arms Control", Arms Control Today, June 1987. 
49 J. Douglass and A. Roeber, Conventional War and Escalation: The 
Soviet View (Crane, Russak, 1981), p. 7; and J. Douglass, Soviet 
Military Strategy in Europe {Pergamon, 1980). 
50 Douglass and Hoeber, Conventiqnal War and Escalation: The Soviet 
View, op. cit., P· 21. 
51 Ibid., p. 22. 
52 S. Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to Nuclear War", op. 
cit., P• 183. 
53 Philip Peterson and John Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in 
Soviet Theater Strategy", Orbis, Fall, 1983, p. 695. 
54 Ibid., p. 697. 
55 Ibid., p. 730. 
56 Dennis Gormley, '"The Impact of NATO Doctrinal Choices on the 
Policies and Strategic Choices of Warsaw Pact States: Part Two"', 
in "Po~o~er and Policy ... ", Ad~lphi Paper 206 (IISS, 1986), p. 31. 
57 Stephen Meyer, "Soviet 
Development of Doctrine and 
Winter 1983/84), p. 28. 
Theatre Nuclear Forces: Part 1: 
Objectives", Adelphi Paper 187 {IISS, 
58 J. Douglass and A. Roeber, Conventional War and Escalation: The 
Soviet View, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
59 S~ Meyer "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces: Part 1. ~ •. , , op, cit~) 
p. 22. 
60 Ibid., P• 22. 
61 Ibid., p. 29. 
62 s. Meyer 1 ''Sovif~t Theatre i-luclear Forces: Part 2: Capabilities 
and Implications", Adelphi Paper 188 (IISS, Winter 1983/84). 
p. 25; and R. Berman and J. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, op. 
cit .. ., p. 136. 
-327-
63 s. Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces: Part 1. •. ", op. cit., 
P• 30-31. 
64 Ibid., P• 30-33. 
65 J. Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy io Europe, op. cit., 
P· lll. 
66 Ibid., p. 1l7 ff, 
6 7 Dennis Gormley has outlined the foll?wing target structure for 
Soviet planners; it consists of "critical NATO installations in 
the Central Region": TNF related ( 80), air defence ( 45), major 
eommand and control posts (9), and reinforcement related (25). 
Gormley believes that these facilities may be vulnerable to 
Soviet conventional ballistic missile attack. It is reasonable 
to assume that these targets are also covered by Soviet TNF. See 
D. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy", Orbis, 
Fall 1985, p. 560. S. Meyer refers to about 280 NATO facUlties 
in the Soviet planners "primary target array"; see "Soviet 
Theatre Forces, part 2 ... •·, op. cit., pp. 24, 25. 
68 See the Report of the European Security Study, Strengthening 
~C:),lo~nL!v'-Ee~n!.!tc!i!.!o!.!n.,al.,.__D""e.,t_,e-"r_,r_,e"'n"'c"'e'-'i"o"---"E"'u"r'"'o,.p,..e (Macmillan, 1 9 8 3) , e s pee i.a 11 y 
·christopher Donnelly, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 
1980s". 
69 Richard Lebow, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe", International 
Security, Spring 1985, p. 144 ff. In addition, see D. Ball, 
"Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War", in R. 
Kolkowicz, E. Mickiewicz (eds), The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear 
~ (Lexington Books, 1986). Soviet warplanning may be locked-in 
to counter c3r strikes with potentially catastrophic 
consequences. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
STRATEGY AND THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL NEXUS 
A) Introduction 
This chapter outlines the nature of strategy within the Atlantic 
Alliance. Following the classical dictum that strategy is the use of 
military means for political ends, the first part of the chapter 
describes what NATO's political objectives are. Next, five levels of 
strategy are identified. These are: 
(a) Psychological 
(b) Philosophical 
(c) Political 
(d) Doctrinal 
(e) Operational 
The chapter then describes how the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces now occupies an important place in each of these 
five levels of strategy. 
!lL!Jefining strategy in the NATO context 
In strategy the connection between military capabilities and 
political objectives is central. The particular form taken by 
strategy is dependent on specific political circumstances and on 
decisions regarding the appropriateness of particular deployments and 
applicatiOriS of military po>~er. Identifying 'strategy' in Western 
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Europe is a complex and awkward task. The ends of policy (e.g. 
stability) are often poorly articulated and can be implicit witbin 
relations between Western states. Morever, strategy j.n Europe works 
on different organisational levels: national, SHAPE and corps for 
example. The result is as much an aggregrate of different ideas as a 
single strategy. 
The political arena for the formulation of strategy in NATO is 
dominated by domestic political pressures, intra-Alliance diplomacy, 
and issues of East-West stability. For instance, in NATO debate over 
force structuring (e.g. regarding ERW and LRTNF), political questions 
concerning possible effects on Alliance cohesion and detente are often 
raised. Doctrinal initiatives (such as the introduction of flexible 
response duri.ng the ;960s) help feed controversy over such matters as 
US leadership of NATO and the role of the FRG. In such debates 
military logic can often take second place to political 
considerations. 
Within NATO, strategy is as much about peacetime Alliance 
diplomacy as about fighting, or even deterring:. war. Alarmist 
perceptions of the Soviet threat do not dominate Western politics~ 
There is no widespread expectation of Soviet attack. nor does there 
seem to be a serious, pervasive) fe.eling that the USSR wants to take-
over Western Europe. Defenr:e budgets, to use one illustrationt rarely 
have unqualified prio-rity over welfare payments in West European 
states. (Even so, the West hedges against a conflict with the USSR by 
maintaining a large defence effort~) Politically persuasive questions 
-330-
about the wisdom, or lack of it, of (say) TNF modernisation simply do 
not turn on their contribution to Western defence in the event of 
war. 
Within NATO, nuclear and conventional forces have acquired 
overlapping poUtical and deterrent roles. As already stated, their 
political functions seem paramount. Politically, NATO's nuclear forces 
help symbolise America's leadership of, and commitment to, the 
Alliance. Paralleling thl.s US nuclear symbolism is the substantial 
European contribution to collective c_onventional forces and its 
exposure to nuclear risk) both seen as aspects of burden sharing 
within the Alliance. The military missions of NATO defence forces 
have been superimposed on this political framework. 
As far as Western Europe is concerned; strategy consists of a 
unique blend of political and military factors. Current NATO 
strategy may be understood as the juxtaposition of nuclear strike 
options and conventional denial capabilities for the purpose of 
maintaining international political stability, East-West deterrence, 
and defence against Soviet attack. 
It is now necessary to explore the various different levels of 
NATO strategy (psychological, philosophical, political, doctrinal, and 
operational). As the defence debates in Europe have shown, questions 
of Continental security are frequently approached, by different 
people, from different di.rections, and on different levels. Only 
rarely do these debates follow the lines of academic strategic 
analysis; even then the connection between debate and analysi.s may be 
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tenuous. At the heart of many defence debates are personal political 
beliefs and intuitive reactions to the risk of nuclear war. Intuition 
seems to be at least as important in framing attitudes towards 
strategy - and thus in framing strategy itself - as logical argument 
or academic speculation. 
C) The psychological and philosophical aspects of the nuclear-
conventional nexus in 
The psychological dimension of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
refers to general feelings about how-, and with what consequencesj 
nuclear and conventi-onal for-Ces are linked .. The philosophical 
dimension refers to how these rather general feelings are translated 
into relatively coherent ideas concerning the nature of strategy. 
An example of this inter-relationship is found in the proposition 
that war in Europe is 'Unthinkable• .. This view may be based on a 
personal feeling that conventional war on the Continent would 
inevitably escalate to massive nuclear war with inconceivably horrific 
consequences. The details of this hypothetical chain of events may be 
literally inconceivable for many, or too painful or awkward to dwell 
on, or it may be considered too distasteful to think through 
sys tema t ic.ally. This view of linkage may be central to one's 
understanding o~ contemporary deterrence; and it may very much colour 
onets commttment to either nuclear disarmament or to the maintenance 
of nuclear stalemate. Either way, a psychological disposition to see 
war as unthinkable probably encourages or reflects a philosophical 
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opinion that the exercise of strategy (or the politically purposeful 
use of military force) is, in the contemporary European context, 
impossible. Such thinking can have an important effect on political 
decision-making on defence matters. For instance, it may undermine 
popular or party political support for particular programmes (such as 
ERW) and constrain the policy options of politicians. Incredulity 
regarding the feasibility of the exercise of strategy might breed 
either panic or paralysis during a crisis; and it could encourage 
appeasement (as in "better red then dead"). 
As far as attitudes to the nuclear-conventional nexus are 
concerned. perceptions of the nuclear revolution are probably salient. 
In other words, the effect of the nuclear revolution on notions of 
defence probably has an averiding influence on perceptions of the 
linkage between nuclear and conventional forces. The nuclear 
component of the nuclear/conventional equation is often seen to 
dominate. 
At least three broad types of strategically relevant responses to 
the invention of nuclear weapons can be identified. Firstly, there is 
the belief that the nuclear revolution represents a sharp break in 
world history, that classical strategic thinking offers us no guidance 
whatsoever to contemporary problems, and that war .is unthinkable. 
According to this view the idea of •nuclear strategy' is a 
contradiction in terms. Secondly, there is the idea that some kind of 
nuclear strategy is neeessary (since war is, after all, possible) but 
that this strategy should not follow the pattern of co~ventional forms 
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of warfare. In particular, according to this view, nuclear strategy 
should not be concerned with war-winning in the traditional sense of 
defeating the opponentst armies.. Here the domi.nant concern is how to 
devise a nuclear posture in the context of de facto mutually assured 
destruction .. The emphasis is on signalling intent to resist 
aggression, rather than on destroying the aggressors' forces. A third 
response to the nuclear revolution has been to deny it, or to down-
play its significance. According to this view the so-called nuclear 
revolution can be incorporated within a framework of classical 
strategic theory; here nuclear weapons are seen as essentially 
enhanced forms of military firepower~ 
The central premise of so-called hawks is that, as nuclear war is 
possible, and may perhaps be necessary, it is important to plan for 
it so that the chances of hostilities bursting the bounds of policy or 
sense are minimised. The best way of doing this, they argue, is to 
adopt a posture based on warfighting - rather than MAD or militarily 
irrelevant 'signalling'. Moreover, they suggest, such a posture 
provides a sound basis for deterrence; who, after-all, would dare 
attack a country or an all lance with the capabilities, doctrine and 
plans to win a nuclear war? Within this 'hawkish' perspective nuclear 
weapons can be understood as an extension of conventional forces. In 
thjs case the firebreak between nuclear and conventional forces is not 
seen as an unbridgeable chasm between traditional, conventional, war 
and senseless nuclear destruction. Rather it is viewed as a step on a 
potentially ~anageable escalation lad~er. Some analysts clearly feel 
the need to claim that nuclear \..'ar might not be suicidal and that 
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risking it might, indeed, be preferable to (say) Soviet expansionism. 
Thus while the deterrent value of visions of nuclear disaster is to be 
harnessed to contain the USSR, these visions are not supposed to 
paralyse the efforts of Western warplanners. 
But, generally speaking, the nuclear revolution in military 
technology has had a profound impact on perceptions of military power 
and has engendered scepticism regarding the whole idea of strategy. 
Nowhere has this impact been greater tban in Europe. The spectre of 
nuclear catastrophe has reinforced a deep distaste for war on a 
continent with a long history of murderous conflict which culminated, 
during the 1940s, in attempted genocide. 
The nuclear revolution threatened, or promised, to at last push 
the classical or Clausewitzian view of war into obsolescence~ It 
seemed that the connection between military means and poli.tical ends 
might be broken; no war between nuclear-armed states could now 
realistically be expected to hold military means and risks in balance 
with sensible political objectives - or so it appeared. As to whether 
or not this state of affairs is 'good', opinions seem to differ. It 
appears that many people in European establishments are content to 
live within a framework of de facto mutually assured destruction; for 
these people nuclear weapons in Europe have banished war from the 
Continent. On the other hand, some hawks find a psychological 
attachment to MAD unsettling and inimical to sensible policy. Yet a 
third group loosely labelled the peace movement - appears to be 
ambivalent on the matter.. They see in MAD .a target for protest; it is 
described as immoral and stupi.d. On the other hand, some members of 
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the peace movement seem to take comfort in MAD and defend it against 
so-called 'warfighters'. 
* * * * * 
NATO strategy is based on a blend of perspectives. These 
perspectives can be equated with three groups central to the 
formulation of NATO policy. These groups will be given the short-hand 
labels of "military planners", "political leaders", and "public 
opinion". Obviously these groups are not monolithic or fixed in their 
views; they are pluralistic, with a considerable overlap of opinion 
be tween them. These three groups can, with due qualification, be 
identified with the following attitudes: 
l) Military Planners who view potential European war in 
semi-traditional terffis. This appears to be reflected in 
some corps level planr:ing. Such attitudes encourage 
calls for options to l.ntegrate nuclear weapons into the 
fire-and-manoeuvre plans for combat unl.ts (such as 
corps, divisions, and aircraft carrier battle groups). 
2) Political Leaders who view nuclear weapons primarily as 
political symbols. 
NATO/NPG guidelines. 
This perspective is echoed in 
3) Public Opinion, a significant part of which seems to 
view military planning sceptically an<' believes that the 
idea of limited nuclear war is absurd and dangerous. 
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This mix of perspectives results in a compromise defence posture. 
Political leaders have allowed the military to develop partially 
integrated nuclear/conventional "fire-and-manoeuvre" plans. But 
guidelines for the use of TNF have apparently been kept vague with no 
delegation of authority to fire nuclear weapons being given to 
military commanders. Moreover, an optimum combined 
{nuclear I conventional) operations force structure has not been 
developed. Not only is the feasibility of such a military posture 
subject to intense doubt, but it seems electorally insupportable. 
D) The political aspects of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
It has been a long-standing, and highly politicised, self-
appointed task of Alliance elites to stress the importance and 
desirability of the 'coupling' of American nuclear strikepower and 
regional defences in Europe. This coupling has been condemned by 
members of the Peace Movement and critically assessed by defence 
analysts. It has also been periodically qualified by some officials. 
The political character of the nuclear-conventional nexus springs 
partly from Alliance diversity. Differences between and within 
numerous European political parties over perceptions of the Soviet 
threat, the sizing of defence budgets, and the desirability of US T~T 
deployments on the Continent are examples here. Controversy over 
these sorts of issues has led to a politicisation of the linkage 
between nuclear and conventional forces. With nuclear weapons around 
the stakes are too high for sovereign states (such as the Netherlands, 
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for example) to readily abrogate all responsibility for military 
planning, defence analysis, and strategic/political debate to a senior 
ally such as the US. The fact that Europe may provide the battlefield 
for nuclear war periodically sharpens allied consciousness of their 
vulnerability and responsibilities. This awareness is one reason why 
efforts have been made to introduce allied input into the planning for 
US TNF. It is also a reason for the evolution of agreements for 
limited nuclear sharing and consultation within the Alliance, and for 
allied input into the development of guidelines for the use of TNF 
during wartime. (Another reason for promoting allied access to TNF 
planning seems to be American efforts to head-off potential European 
pressures for nuclear proliferation.) 
Since NATO represents an aggregate of national comproreises 
(themselves a mixture of different domestic concerns), it o:ight be 
useful to briefly outline the differing perspectives of two key 
Alliance members - the llni ted States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. American advocacy of flexible response is anchored on 
unilateral lnterpretations of US natlonal interests. Flexible 
response can be seen as part of an attempt to project US diplomatic 
and military power into Europe in the pursuit of national objectives. 
In peacetime this effort has been remarkably successful. But the 
policy clearly has risks and the possibility of a catastrophic failure 
of policy -leading to massive intercontinental nuclear war - needs to 
be guarded .1gainst. Tbis has .led many in the US to develop the concept 
of firebreaks which mighr be used in a crisis as a way of allowing 
Washington ro c.ur its losses. 
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Thus the US has tempered its nuclear guarantee to Europe. This 
promise of extended deterrence has been qualified so that it 
theoretically eliminates the automatic tripwire to nHclear reta:llation 
in the event of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe 7 and 
to the extent that some of the allies have been irritated or 
unsettled. But the qualification has not b~en pushed so far that NATO 
breaks-up or that deterrence collapses. Preserving NATO as an 
American led bloc, while maintaining unilateral US national security 
interests, has involved a diplomatic balancing act: US unilateralism 
has had to be traded against Alliance solidarity. This political 
balancing act has direct operational implications for the linkage 
between nuclear and conventi.onal forces .. For example, US policy calls 
for the deployment of American TNF to Europe but the maint 41! nance of 
Washington's veto over their use (even though many of these weapons 
have been "assigned" to NATO). 
The meshing of nuclear and conventional warplans arguably helps 
to cement the Alliance, reinforce Washington's leadership role, and 
deter the USSR. Another consequence may be that it provides a 
significant increment to US diplomatic and military power. Indeed, 
the perceived dependence of European military forces on US nuclear 
warplanning (as well as on American conventional reinforcement) 
strengthens the impression that European forces are in some sense 
appendages of the United States. This may be one reason why anti-
nuclear/anti-war/anti-NATO sentiments often CJerge into anti-
Amt\ricanism; at any rate, the American-nuclear connection has been a 
controversial issue among European publics. 
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Another example of how the nuclear-conventional linkage has 
direct political ramifications is the fact that the defence effort of 
the FRG has been largely tied to GS diplomatic and military policies. 
West German security policy operates in a NATO framework heavily 
influenced by Washington and coloured by the GS nuclear guarantee. A 
formal American abandonment o( this guarantee would surely result in 
an altered form of CS influence over Bonn and the Bundeswehr. 
But, as stated above" it may be in America's interests to back 
away from this pledge of extended deterrence. National interests 
suggest that Washington would want to restrict the destruction arising 
out of a European war to below the level of attacks against the US. 
This) in turn, also suggests an American interest in restricting 
attacks against Soviet territory. This requires the establishment of 
firebreaks. From Washington's perspective the two most salient 
wartime firebreaks; or thresholds, are the one betwt.,en conventional 
and nuclear war, and the one somewhere between tactical/battlefield 
use of nuclear weapons on or near the front line (in, say, Germany) 
and nuclear attacks against the USA/USSR. 
The attempt, by Washington, to translate the concept of 
firebreaks into practical planning has put a premium on the 
development of more efficacious and robust command and control systems 
and procedures. This is because wartime firebreaks could partly be a 
function of the efficacy of battle-management. This requirement for 
firebreaks has also encouraged a belated r;;;duction in the numbers of 
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TNF deployed in Europe 
control. 
partly to ease problems of command and 
US se.curity policy has therefore called for a policy of flexible 
linkage between nuclear and conventional forces. There are stategic 
requirements for both promises (or threats) of extended deterrence and 
for escape routes from such promises. Washington requires 'switches• 
1n the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces that it can 
'turn-off' if necessary. In short, the US has developed a system of 
linkages and breaks in an attempt to manage the nuclear-conventional 
nexus. This system consists of the following: 
1. A web of declatory policy reiterating the strength and value of 
extended deterrence. 
2. SlOP planning for NATO-related contingencies. 
3. Deployment of US 'niF to Europe. 
4. Deployment of US conventional forces to Europe. 
5- 'rhe provision of TNF weapons systems - without their warheads -
to allied forces (e.g., Lance to the Germans). 
6. The partial integration of TNF· and conventional forces. 
7. US control over the deployment, dispersal and use of its nuclear 
warheads amounting to an ~~erican power of veto~ 
8. A system of military alerts that apparently allows for the 
separation of conventional and nuclear levels of readiness .. 
9.. Superimposed on the above aspects of Washington 1 s commitment to 
European security Is the KATO/EUCOM/LANTCOM command system. This 
system gives US officers key positions in the command and control 
of Alliance TNF via "dual hat" arrangements (see chapter five). 
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All this should be seen in the context of American efforts to build-up 
a viable collective conventional defence for NATO. The United States 
has approached the nuclear-conventional nexus in Europe by 
endeavouring to develop options for the use and non-use of strategic 
weapons/TNF in the event of a theatre conventional war~ It has been 
assumed that stronger conventional defences will enhance Washington's 
control over pressures for nuclear escalation. From Washington's 
perspective, the alternative to this form of flexible response is 
inflexible response - and that is deemed reckless and politically 
insupportable. 
Generally speaking the European allies have gone along wi. th 
American prescriptions, albeit with some reluctance on occasion. 
Presumably they have believed that they had more to gain than to lose 
by doing so. But, as outlined in the previous chapter, France has 
voiced its concerns over American attitudes to the nuclear-
conventional nexus and) partly as a consequences of these concerns, 
developed its own nuclear deterrent and withdrew from NATO's 
integrated command. Britain also created a national deterrent as a 
hedge against a collapse of US commitments. 
For historical and geopolitical reasons, the FRG has not found 
its way out of this vulnerability by developing a German, nationally 
owned and operated, nuclear strike-force. The Federal Republic 
operates in an internati.onal political and strategic environment 
largely created by others - and created. moreover. partly for the 
purpose o [ keeplng che German nat:ton (or Geru::.an 'Prob leo') 
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under control. Being spawned by the Nazi inheritance and the Cold War 
has, so far, circumscribed the FRG's room for manoeuvre~ 
However. West Germany has been very sensitive. to its diplomatic 
position within the Alliance and its role in NA1'0 strategy and 
planning. Thus trends in US strategic thinking that have a bearing on 
the nuclear-conventional nexus (eg considerations of the timing, 
scale, and targeting of first-use of TNF) are automatically relevant 
to West German security concerns; they also have the potential to 
cause a considerable trans-Atlantic political stir and party political 
unease in Bonn. The simple point here is that the question of how to 
balance or mesh nuclear and conventional forces is seen, by the FRG, 
as a life or death issue, not merely as a matter of abstract academic 
debate. 
German interpretations of strategic issues are not exclusively 
focused on military quest:i.ons .. One element of German strategic 
thinking has focused on assessing the political effects of defence 
questions.. Political consequences are seen on three levels: domestic 
Ge.rman 1 intra-Alliance) and East-West. These political factors make 
the Federal Republic sensitive to changes in American deployments of 
troops and TNF in Europe. 
Attempts to break the US/nuclear-German/conventional nexus would 
undermioe an important element of Bonn's diplomacy and defences~ Such 
a break in the. nexus might result from, for example, the de·--
nuclearisation of central Europe. On the other hand~ attempts to cast 
this nexus tn terms of plans to fight nuclear war on German soil are 
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also politically damaging. Hence German unease at the prospect of a 
tacit East-West agreement to restrict nuclear strikes. arising out of 
a regional conventional war, to central European targets. Apart from 
being disastrous in wartime, such a policy might seem to be 
diplomatically humiliating, or at least unhelpful, during peacetime. 
llonn could view this sort of attempt to establish firebreaks over its 
head as harmful to future German interests and therefore as inimical 
to future European stability. 
American interests in damage limitation and thresholdst and 
German concern over these US interests, have been managed by 
compromise and ambiguity~ As discussed earlier, NATO declaratory 
strategy calls for the graduated use of nuclear weapons "as late as 
{Eece:_:;~ but G:"' as possibl~'. Thus flexible response is 
capable of interpretation in terms of both escalation (or coupling) 
and dae1age limitation/fire breaks (some times viewed as de-coupling). 
Any radical transfor~ation of NATO's TNF deployment/doctrine 
could well be paralleled by an evolution of East-West, intra-Alliance, 
and party politics. The linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces in Europe reflects the political basis of both the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Cold War. A weakening of the linkage between nuclear 
and conventional forces could indicate a loosening of trans-Atlantic 
ties and a re-shaping of the East-West confrontation~ 
As attitudes to the nuclear-conventional nexus are politically 
loaded in peacetime, dtaring an East-West confrontation such attitudes 
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could be very consequential indeed, possibly leading to various 
attempts at political realignment. 
E) The doctrinal dimension of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
The doctrinal dimension refers to the concepts used to prescribe 
how nuclear and conventional forces should be linked during wartime. 
This doctrinal dimension is partly derived from what I have termed the 
psychological, philosophical and political aspects of strategy. The 
principal difference between doctrine and these other matters is that 
doctrine is more directly oriented toward the development of specific 
strategies .. This section will now describe how, in doctrinal terms, 
nuclear and conventional forces are linked by NATO. 
Flexible response, as adopted by NATO, describes a military 
posture based on sizeable conventional forces and a range of nuclear 
options. The primary wartime tole of Western conventional forces is 
to maintain the territorial integrity of the Alliance and thereby 
support the political cohesion of NATO. They are tasked with doing 
this without the active support of nuclear weapons for as long as 
practicable. If the conventional defence line appears to be in danger 
of collapsing, conventional forces must be prepared to operate in 
conjunction with lirr.ited nuclear strikes. Combined conventional-
nuclear operations have to protect the territorial integrity of the 
AllJance while, on a related but different level. nuclear 'signalling' 
proceeds. NATO conventional forces also have to be prepared to absorb 
large~scale, but possibly llmlted, Soviet nuclear attacks, probably 
made in conjunction with a massive Warsaw Pact conventional assault .. 
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NATO's nuclear weapons have three principal wartime roles. 
First, they have a part to play in intra-war deterrence; they are 
supposed to dampen down pressure for Warsaw Pact escalation. In 
particular they are to help deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons. 
Second, NATO nuclear weapons have to be able to support an otherwise 
conventional defence line; they are to be used in ways that can be 
exploited by conventional forces. Third. nuclear weapons have the 
task of signalling both a willingness to escalate to catastrophic 
levels of damage and a desire to bring hostilities to a rapid halt. 
The purpose of limited NATO first-use of nuc1ear weapons would be to 
demonstrate resolve while showing restraint~ The Soviet Union would 
be given the option of withdrawal or of running into rapidly 
e_scalating costs culminating, sooner or later, in the destruction of 
the USSR. 
Flexible response is therefore based on a mix of two 
propositions. The first is that nuclear strategy is partly a form of 
classical strategy geared to essentially traditional notions of 
warfighting. The second is that nuclear strategy is primarily a form 
of signalling and bargaining in a novel politico-military environment. 
F:acb of these propositions suggest different ways of looking at the 
nexus between nuclear and conventional forces .. 
The first propos! tion, premised on classical or traditional ideas 
of strategy. suggests that nuclear weapons provide conventional forces 
with added firepower for the purposes of fighting the opponents armed 
forces. The second, novel~ rationale suggests that the use of nuclear 
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weapons would transcend conventional combat, radically altering the 
nature of the conflict. Thus, in the minds of decision-makers, 
conventional war may provide the context for initial nuclear attacks; 
but consideration of the ground war may quickly take second place to 
calculations of nuclear effects. 
Some tension exists between these two ways of looking at nuclear 
strategy. The Alliance concept of flexible response reflects an 
attempt to manage this tension. Flexible response provides doctrine 
with a rickety bridge between the traditional and novel 
interpretations of strategy. In NATO doctrine and planning both the 
novel and traditional interpretations are taken as complementary 
elements in an untidy defence posture. 
Doctrine for combined nuclear-conventional operations provides a 
pivotal, if poorly articulated, element to NATO strategy. It helps 
frame planning for operations below, on, and above the theatre nuclear 
threshold. 
* * * * * 
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In the early stages of a conflict NATO policy (as reflected in 
MC14/3 and NPG guidelines for TNF) may be closely followed. However, 
given a continuation of conflict beyond a few days or weeks, military 
exigencies, command and control problems, and political fragmentation 
could lead to a collapse of pre-war thinking -especially regarding 
escalation control, nuclear signalling, and the manipulation of 
thresholds. It seems reasonable to believe that some Western planning 
at fleet and corps level accepts that Alliance concepts of flexible 
response might be overtaken by events. Thus, unilateral or even 
service doctrine might provide a more influential input into the 
execution of plans than NATO policy statements. In other words, 
refinements of NATO doctrine might be useful for political reasons and 
for crisis management, but they might be less relevant in a protracted 
war .. 
Maybe the biggest single question mark here is Soviet military 
planning. Will NATO have the 'luxury' of picking the time and scale 
of first-use of nuclear weapons? Will the USSR be setting the pace 
for escalation and dictating the terms of nuclear 'signalling'? Would 
it make any sense at all to see a Third World War in terms of signals 
and bargaining and thresholds? Another complicating factor would be 
the response of allies in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In 
particular, the nuclear weapons employment decisions of Britain and 
France could be critical. But the actions of large conventional 
armies deployed in strategically sensitive regions, such as East and 
West Germany, might also be significant in terms of the relationship 
between nuclear threats and risks on the one hand, and conventional 
confrontation on the other. 
F) The operational dimension of the nexus between nuclear and 
conventional mil~.tary forces 
The operational dimension of strategy refers here to military 
preparations for war and their implications for the nature and course 
of armed conflict. This aspect of the nuclear-conventional nexus 
rests, to some extent, on the layers of thought represented by the 
various levels of strategy (psychological, philosophical, political, 
and doctrinal) just discussed. The focus here is on how conventional 
and nuclear forces might inter-act in a NATo-warsaw Pact 
confrontation. Chapters five and six have already discussed some 
aspects of this issue with regard to NATO's policy of flexible 
response, Soviet doctrine, and possible British and French operat:i.ons .. 
This section examines the nuclear-conventional nexus in terms of a 
broad overv:i.ew; it discusses how this nexus might operate during 
crisis management, conventional war, the transition to nuclear 
conflict, and theatre nuclear war. A central question here is how 
are conventional operations likely to affect nuclear operations and 
vice versa? 
Crisis and the nexus between nuclear and conventional 
forces 
In a political crisis that threatened to errupt into war, 
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political leaders will be very conscious of the ease with which Europe 
could be destroyed by military action. There will be a keen interest 
in, and a sharpened focus on, the relationship between the Soviet/NATO 
nuclear postures and the behaviour of conventional combat units. For 
one thing, political leaders will want to control the ways in which 
nuclear risks are balanced against conventional readiness for war. 
Fear is likely to be a significant element in the deliberations 
of decision makers during a crisis. One aspect of this fear might be 
a deep mutual concern over the potential for surprise military action 
by opposing forces. Both sides could then try to cover themselves 
against this contingency by raising the readiness levels of their own 
military units, thus reinforcing the concern of the opponent. This 
pattern of escalating and mutually reinforcing alert levels could be 
underpinned by psychological a'f~litical pressures to demonstrate 
resolve in the face of perceived attertpts at intimidation. Alert 
levels of opposing armed forces could become interlocked, leading to 
increasing readiness for war and the build-up of pressures for pre-
emption.1 
The most salient categories, or levels, of pre-emption and 
surprise attack are the following: central strategic counterforce; 
theatre nuclear counterforce (probably including attacks against 
conventional military targets); conventional ground attack; 
conventional air attack; and maritime strike. None of these 
categories is likely to be considered in isolation, and all of them 
may include high priority attacks against c3r targets (indeed, c3r 
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might be considered a specific target category for the purposes of 
planning pre-emptive attacks). 
Depending on the intensity of the crisis -including its cause, 
the stakes involved, and the speed of developments- efforts might be 
made at national and Alliance levels to reassess and revise military 
doctrine and planning. Such re-evaluation might not be practical 
during a spontaneous and rapidly escalating emergency (for example in 
the case of a crisis that exploded out of an unpredicted civil war in 
East Germany). In such a contingency decision makers might be forced 
to rely on established doctrine, guidelines and warplans. However, a 
slowly unfolding confrontation would probably encourage a reappraisal 
of strategy. A hypothetical example here would be a crisis which 
started in the Persian Gulf, spread to the Turkish/Iraqi/Iranian 
frontiers, spilled over into the eastern Mediterranean, and then 
precipitated armed clashes in the Balkans. 
whether or not either side's command and control systems have 
sufficient flexibility to allow quick and fine-tuned adaption to 
shifting circumstances is uncertain. Nevertheless, Washington and 
Moscow (and SHAPE, Bonn, Paris, Rome, et al) might decide to modify 
chains of command and rules of engagement as an emergency developed. 
The consequences of these modifications for the management of the 
nuclear-conventional nexus could be either positive or negative; last 
oinute changes might either muddle or tighten-up arrangements for 
controlling the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces. 
Chains of command might be altered to more sharply segregate or 
coinpartmentalise nuclear and conventional operations2 (for instance, 
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nuclear artillery and Lance miss!.les could conceivably be removed from 
the authority of corps commanders). On the other hand, changes to 
established arrangements might, in practice, confuse lines of 
authority and lead to different, contradictory, strategies being 
employed by different commanders. 
Morever, effective crisis management is not simply a matter of 
good planning. Lebow has made the following point: 
To emphasize unduly the act.ions of leaders and their 
policies during the crisis is to look only at the tip of the 
proverbial iceberg. Of greater importance for <>nderstanding 
crisis behaviour is the process by which such decisions are 
reached and implemented~ for this process ultimately decides 
the substance of actual policy. Successful crisis 
management is therefore a function of cultural, 
organizationall and personal behavioral patterns established 
long before the onset of any crlSlS· These patterns and tl1e 
expectat:tons they creat~ largely determine the performance 
of a syste~ in a crisis. 
Whatever the practical consequences of polittcal intervention in 
military planning during a crisis, one intention would surely be to 
strengthen political control over the deployment, readiness, and 
targeting of nuclear w,Jeapons.. One motive for this may be to regulate 
the salience of nuclear threats or risks; leaders may want to give the 
nuclear dimension a higher or lower profile than that suggested in 
pre-existing continge.ncy plans. For example, politicians might be 
dissatisfied t.~ith the military's plans for the deployment of nuclear 
armed marine un:tts (or nuclear-armed aircraft/ships). Consequently, 
count:e.r-orders Ir,ight be issued, or spec1.al command nrrangements might 
he authorised. 
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During a crisis decision-makers might have to choose between a 
range of military options produced by commanders and their staffs. Or 
these decision makers might insist on a military plan devised by 
themselves or other civilians,. The option chosen will depend on 
circumstances and the attitudes of leaders, but an important criterion 
in making the choice could be (to repeat the point) the degree to 
which the juxtaposi tioni ng of nuclear risk and conventional ope rations 
was deemed appropriate. 
The following list illustrates thl.s point. The list outlines 
some options that might present themselves to an .t\merican president 
faced with a hypothetical crisis involving the deployment of US troops 
to Turkey in response to a major Soviet conventional attack on 
that country~ This list is not exhaustive, the purpose here is simply 
to illumi.nate ways in which considerations of the nexus between 
nuclear and conventional forces might impinge ln crisis management. 
l) The opening of special consultations within NATO. 
2) The implementation of a specific NATO alert level (e.g. 
LERTCON ONE). 
3) The unilateral chatlging of the proportion of US aircraft held 
on nuclear ''Combat Alert Status"~ 
L,) ·::ne issuance of a warning to Moscow not to dlsperse its 
TNF warheads. 
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5) The early dispersal of TNF warheads throughout Western 
Europe. 
6) The limited dispersal of TNF warheads to US conventional 
forces deployed to Turkey. 
7) The restricteC dispersal of some TNF warheads to selected 
Turkish units. 
8) The airlift of additional TNF warheads (such as !<;RW for 
artillery/Lance) to Europe. 
9) The declaration of a willingness to contain nuclear conflict 
to the battlefield (i.e. Turkey) and recognise a Soviet 
sanctuary~ 
10) The declaration of a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear 
weapons. 
11) The cessation of all TNF related activities. 
12) The issuance of nuclear threats to Moscow (perhaps using the 
"hotlir:e'' J public statemer..ts, or press "leaks"). 
13) The assertive use of naval forces to prevent the isolation of 
allies. 
14) Preperatlons tor: n ~enera1 blockade of Soviet waters, world-
wich~ .a!:ti-subr:~artne \Mrfare, ar:d convoy operations. 
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15) The repudiation of Alliance understandings, possibly 
including a statement that US nuclear warheads will not be 
assigned tn NATO commands. 
16) The withdrawal of nuclear warheads from allied airrases, the 
airlift of warheads from vulnerable locations, and the 
reinforcement of US custodial forces guarding nuclear units 
stationed in areas of allied control. 
17) The establishment of a spe.cial ad-hoe c3r system dedicated to 
TNF and tailored to the partieular crisis at hand. 
18) The refinement of limited strategic nuclear options oriented 
to the theatre/crisis. 
19) The raising of strategic nuclear alert levels (such as 
ordering an airborne alert for SAC bombers). 
The_ USSR would have to consider its own options. Command and 
control arrangereents might be tightend-up. Rules of engagement for 
maritime forces and air defences could be reviewed. Levels of 
conventional mobilisation and nuclear dispersal would be up for 
discussion. A key question in Moscow could be the degree to which a 
regional conflict within the NATO area (in Turkey, for example) could 
be uncoupled from thP Central Front and global maritime operations .. 
Whether Mosco~ and Washington have the mutually cornpatable flexibility 
to compartmentalise a regional ~ATO war is moot. 
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During this sort of crisis, NATO frontline states would come 
under pressure to reevaluate their position. They might reject armed 
support from the US or selectively accept it. American troops could 
be welcomed while the deployment of land-based TNF was opposed. This 
might result in prominence being attached to (say) UK-based American 
bombers, off-shore TNF (carrier aircraft/ sea launched cruise missiles) 
and limited strategic nuclear options. 
(ii) Conventional war and the nuclear-conventional nexus 
Once fighting between Soviet and American troops had actually 
started, the sort of issues raised above would, no doubt) be 
reconsidered. As Kaufmann (among others) has noted, conflict could 
become inherently escalatory: 
(A ]tti tudes based on prewar estimates and calc.ulations can 
change very rapidly once a conflict has begun. War, in 
fact, Is a process so dynamic that it posi.tively invites the 
resort to increasingly destructive expedients. Even where 
the parties to a conflict may want to limit the struggle, 
events can occur which will alter radically their 
calculations.~ .As the belligerents strive to gain a 
co~parative advantage, the conflict undergoes an expansion. 
In Coing so it mixes up means with ends. brings more values 
into jeopardy, and cha£ges the very character of the 
participating societies. 
To temper this "resort to increasingly destructive expedients .. 
both sides will want to maintain a powerful intra-·war deterrent,. In 
particular they will obviously want to prevent their ppponent from 
being able to dictate the terms of any nuclear escalation that might 
occur. In a conventional war both sides will therefore want to 
presc~rve as full a range of nuclear options as practicable. But this 
might not be an absolute consideration. Under sorne circumstances it 
rrighr be thought appropriate to sacrifice some nuclear options. 1t 
may be preferable to streng[hen conventional strike power at the cost 
of·,running down some rather implausible TNF options. For example, some 
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aircraft may be withdrawn from thetr nuclear missions and thrown 1.nto 
conventional combat. Or some nuclear warheads deployed near the 
frontline, such as nuclear artillery shells, could be withdrawn or 
destroyed to facilitate a conventional defence in depth. 
Reinforcing a critical point in the conventional battle (by, for 
example, diverting some nuclear assigned artillery units and releasing 
them for conver:tional combat) • might seem more sensible than holding 
dual capable forces back, waiting for the conventional line to 
cru~t.ble) and then firing a nuclear barrage to retr1eve the situation. 
On the other hand, battlefield com"'.anders may want to employ a degree 
of nuclear threat ~uring a conventional battle to deter Soviet 
escalation and to handicap Soviet conventional operations by, for 
example, induc:i:tg them to disperse their forces and eschew heavy 
concentrations of armour and artilJ_ery. 
During the conventional phase) decisions will also have to be 
made regarding both the conventional defence of TNF and the offensive 
use of conventional forces against the enemy 1 s nuclear weapons. Here 
the focus could be on the attack and defence of major atrbases, 
missile launchers, submarines. aircraft carriers, nuclear scorage 
sites, and c3 r facilities. The primary means of preserving TNF during 
a conflict will include pre-emptive air attack, point defence. and the 
maintenance of a conventional defence line as far forward as 
practicable. A conventior.al offensive against TNF would probably be 
condticted hy airrraft. special forces. and submarines. The purpose of 
such an offe~sive during a convention~! ccnflict would presumably be 
, 
to restrict the opponents flexibility as well as n:-duce the number of 
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his warheads. This might make the opponent less confident of being 
able to conduct a theatre nuclear war and thus less likely to 
escalate.5 On the other hand, a side which saw its TNF posture being 
decimated and disrupted might decide to escalate while it still had 
the option. 
Quite apart from the existence of any plans to deliberately 
destroy TNF with conventional forces, nuclear weapons are bound to get 
caught-up in a large European conventional campaign. This could 
happen both on land and at sea. Overlapping deployments of nuclear 
and conventional forces, and their partially integrated organisation, 
would probably make the segregation of conflict into two separate and 
sharply defined categories almost impossible. 6 The dynamics of 
conflict, including the ubiquitous "fog of war"', are not conducive to 
compartmentalisation in the use of armed force. Operations in Europe 
might also impinge on the capabilities needed to conduct central 
strategic warfare. For instance, tanker aircraft might suffer 
considerable attrition rates; and attacks against in-theatre c3r 
systems might also degrade the co-ordination of strategic attacks 
intended to support NATO operations. 
(iii) Nuclear escalation and the nuclear-conventional nexus 
Conventional war might well provide the context, or even the 
catalyst, for nuclear escalation. The effect of conventional 
operations on political assessments of the nature of the conflict 
could underpin a move across the nuclear threshold. The following 
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eight categories of escalation from conventional operations covers the 
most likely contingencies. 
l) The flexible response mod_~. Here a l:tmited number of nuclear 
weapons is used to stave-off an impending conventional defeat. 
Nuclear escalation is seen as a function of projections of 
conventional combat) based partly on an assessment of conventional 
force rat:i.os. The potential for a decisive enemy breakthrough on the 
convent1onal level is anticipated. leading to Alliance consultations 
and the use of TNF to (a) complement the conventional defence, {b) 
demonstrate determination to resist and, if necessary, escalate 
futher, and (c) signal a willingness to terminate hostilities. 
Chapter five has covered this pattern of escalation in some detail. 
(It should be noted that not every one accepts the notion of an 
overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional weapons~ 7 It 
should also be noted that the side with the largest forces might not 
be the side that breaks through the opponents defence lines in the 
most decisive way.) 
The offensive combined-arms modeL In this case nuclear weapons 
are used on a large scale to help blast a path through opposing 
defences and ellminate enemy TNF to allow a massive conventional 
breakthrough by armoured forces equipped and trained to fight in a 
nuclear environment. This approach is often ascribed to the Soviet 
Union (see chapter six). 
~. __ _:Tl.:lh:"eEC__;;s..:Ll}i~dl_<e:__J:.t0".__110t_':U~c0,ll~e:ca't. r:r_j1~~,:~'11Jp_tt . .ici_<OO_r:Jn_:· Her P mutua .lly rein f o rc i ng fears 
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of surprise attack - aggravated by conventional conflict - triggers 
pre-emptive nuclear counterforee attacks. Conventional attacks 
against, for example, c3 r and air-defence targets might be interpreted 
as precursor operations for nuclear strikes, thus precipitating pre-
emption. As noted in chapter six, beating the enemy to the "nuclear 
punch" figures prominantly in Soviet doctrine; there is little reason 
to doubt that such pressures would also influence Western behaviour. 
4 Unauthorised fir of nuclear In this case 
conventional war leads to a break-down of the command and control of 
some TNF. Consequently (according to some arguments) the power to arm 
and fire TNF is likely to be devolved to relatively low ranking 
offi_cers who, under the pressures of conventional battle) may act 
contrary to orders and initiate nuclear war .. Such a breakdown of 
control might follow the dispersal of TNF warheads to field units. 8 
The ''use-them-or-lose-them" dilemma~ It has been suggested that 
Alliance and/or, Soviet leaders might prefer to cross the threshold 
to nuclear war rather than allow their TNF to he captured or destroyed 
during a conventional conflict~ They would have to "use them or lose 
them". However, it is not very clear just why nuclear war v:ould be 
prefered to the loss of a percentage of either side's nuclear arsenal. 
Nevertheless, "use-or~ lose" sorts of pressures might compound other 
motives for escalation (such as fears. of an imminent surprise TNF 
attack, or conventional breakthrough). 
6) Here nuclear weapons Bre used to signal 
resolve and warn-off the opponent (to an extent this overlaps wtth the 
-360-
flexible response model outlined above). An example of this is the 
French concept of "pre-strategic" use of TNF. As already noted (see 
chapter six), French doctrine envisages TNF use primarily in terms of 
"warning shots", not as an extension of conventional conflict or as a 
means to destroy opposing nuclear weapons. Another example would be a 
Russian nuclear warning shot in responst; to Western conventional 
attacks against Soviet territory. Moscow might employ such a policy 
(or threat) in an attempt to contain the spill-over effects of 
conventional conflict to, say, Germany, Turkey or the North Atlantic. 
7) *'Inadvertent nuclear war". This is a term used by Posen to 
describe nuclear escalation as "the unintended consequence of a 
d i 1 fi h i 1 .. 9 ec s on to g t a convent ona war • An example offered by 
Posen is nuclear escalation resulting from Western maritime activity 
against Soviet naval forces in the area around NATO's, and Russia's, 
northern flank; Posen points out that such activity could involve 
Soviet nuclear missile firing submarines. This "inadvertent" path to 
nuclear war could take the form of scenarios three, five or six 
sketched above ("the slide to nuclear pre-emption", "the use-them-or-
lose-them dillemma", or nuclear "signalling"). 
8 Suicidal reaction. This would be the use of nuclear weapons as 
an act of revenge that invited retaliation, rather than as a way of 
winning or stopping a war. It could follow a collapse of conventional 
defence efforts. 
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iv) Theatre Nuclear War and the nuclear-conventional nexus. 
In a European war interest in the course of the conventional 
campaign could, sooner or later, take second place to prospect of 
nuclear catastrophe. This dominance of the nuclear dimension in the 
minds of decision makers could have one of at least four possible 
consequences. First, it could encourage massive nuclear counterforce 
attacks in a desperate bid to minimise enemy retaliation. Second, it 
could lead to a form of limited nuclear bargaining in which each side 
attempted to intimidate and bluff the other. This bargaining with 
limited nuclear strikes may or may not be link€d to the conduct of 
conventional combat* It is a moot point whether or not c31 systems 
could withstand much of this sort of nuclear poker. Moreover, as 
Clark has noted; 
the limitationist has the unenviable task of ey.plaining why 
belligerents have lnterests in cowmon at that very moment 
when they attempt, by violent means, to prevail over each 
other.. It is this uneasy juxtaposition, of a sophisticated 
perception of mutuality with the crass physical realities of 
combat) which provides the teasing paradoxes and 
contradictions in which the limitation of warfare abounds, 
especially when it is recalled that limitation requires a 
level of co-operation with the enemy in war that proveC 
unattainable in averting recourse to hostilities .. 10 
Third, both sides might be so scared of the thought of nuclear ruin 
that they are deterred from nuclear escalation, but are unable (or 
unwilling) to halt conventional warfare; "conventional" war might 
con-cinue under extra-ordinary pressures in which nuclear rtsks and 
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threats might dominate. Fourth, leaders could be sufficiently 
terrified to bring all hostilities to a rapid halt, assuming they had 
the command and control capabilities to translate their wishes into 
action. As Schilling has written: 
in the age of parity~ once a nuclear war starts, the es and 
Soviet Union will limit damage, if at all, by the exercise 
of political, not nuclear. inittatives. 11 
As discussed in previous chapters, the targeting of TNF (as well 
as some strategic weapons) is largely geared to the perceived 
requirements of combined conventional-nuclear operations., TNF can 
cover an enormous range of targets related to conventional combat: 
frontline ut1its (such as armoured divisions); reinforcement assembly 
points; airbases; naval bases; logistic networks (including fuel 
supplies and lines of communication); communications facilities; and 
cities~ 
Beyond a limited first use of nuclear weapons it is not clear 
that follow-on strikes could be clearly defined, limited, controlled, 
and used in a positive way~ Bracken has pointed out some of the 
dynar:dcs that may be involved once military imperatives are seen to 
take over: 
We can illustrate this by recalling the plans for blunting a 
Soviet ground attack on Western Europe. There the problem 
was not to destroy a number at bridges, ports, railyards, 
airfields, and stockpiles, it was rather to stop a Soviet 
ground invaston ht":'fore it cuuld penetrate deeply i.nto 
Western Europe. Targeting for. this purpose depends upon 
detailed understanding of the Soviet military organisation, 
of how lts logisti,c branch supplies forward units, of 
whether rail or truck transportation would be selected for 
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moving tanks into staging areas 1 of how ground armies co~ 
ordinate. with airforces, of whether tank armies advance with 
mechanised infantry, of how long before second echelon units 
exploit the breakthroughs achieved by advance units, and of 
hundreds of other similar issues. 
The mill tary services alone can undertake targeting 
decisions about these matters, because they alone understand 
the details of military organisation. And they alone have 
heen given the task of stopping a Soviet offensive into 
Europe. Targeting is not an e.xercise in killing individual 
Soviet nissile silos and military units in some sort of 
Vietnan-style body count; it is instead an intelligence-
based activity that seeks to turn an understanding of combat 
dynamics into a plan that breaks up the attack into 
manag~able pieces. If this influences the Soviet leadership 
to change its behaviour then so much the better. But at the 
military-intelligence .level where targets are selected, this 
is not likely to be an overriding concern. 12 
The scale of nuclear attacks chose,n could depend on many factors. One 
of these factors would be the degree to which it was believed (or 
hoped) that nuclear conflict could be kept limited. Doubts about the 
controllability of nuclear war could easily turn into a self-
fulfilling prophecy once the nuclear threshold has been crossed. If 
limited nuclear strikes are considered dangerous (in teres of offering 
the opponent tbe initiati.ve) or naively hopeful (in terms of the 
confidence placed in c3 r systeos) then, once the nuclear threshold had 
been crossed~ there could be considerable pressure for launching 
massive nuclear attacks to reduce the weight of expected enemy nuclear 
retaliation and to tear apart tbe enemy's conventional military 
posture. 
Enthoven and Smith have refErred to studies which indicate that 
between two mllli.on And one hundred ~illion Europeans could be 
slaughtered [n a nuclear war 00 t~~e Continent. They state that: 
ln a tactical nuclear war, the proble-ms of target 
acquisi~ion and location are particularly difficult because 
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of the probable damage to friendly target-acquisltl.on and 
communication systems and the need to maintain safe 
distances from friendly troops. Most of the major systems 
used in tactical nuclear warfare are highly vulnerable~ 
particularly ground forces, aircraft, short-range nuclear 
delivery systems, target-acquisition capabilities, command 
and eontrol facilities, lines of communication, and logistic 
support systems. Moreover, these systems tend to be highly 
interdependent •.. 
One implication of these vulnerabilities and inter-
pendencies is that the duration of any kind of controlled 
tactical nuclear battle is likely to be~ at rnostt a few 
days. Another is that thl.s vulnerability produces immense 
pressures for further escalation. The tendency toward area 
or terrain - rather than discrete - fire) higher yields, and 
deeper strikes would be reinforced by the desl.re to take out 
the enemy's delivery systems before he could use them .. 
Where both sides have soft and concentrated forces) as is 
the case in Europe, enormous advantages accrue to the side 
that strikes first. Tbe side that is losing at one level of 
conflict may thus be tempted to preempt to higher level in 
order to improve his prospects) especially if he fears a 
sudden escalation on the part of the opponent* Even under 
the best circumstances, the potential for escalatlon and 
large-scale collateral damage is enormous ••• l3 
At son1e point in a conflict the "nuclear-conventional nexus 
might describe little more than a bloody, rubble-covered, and chaotic 
landscape. On the one hand might be groups of demoralised troops; on 
the other hand could be the mindless and sporadic firing of remnant 
nuclear weapons. Any fighting would probably be devoid of strategy: 
it may not be politically purposeful l.n tbe normal sense. 
* * * 
It should be clear from the above that any future European war 
would follow a pattern set by interactions between political 
circumstances, military capabilities, and human reactions. Within 
such a three-sided strategic framework 1 the nuclear-conventional nexus 
might have a crltl.cal place. This nexus might help to rr.ould political 
developmer:ts) define military capabilities~ and sharpen psychological 
factors. 
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During a European conflict the choices available to decision-
makers may be framed by the ways conventional operations are thought 
to affect nuclear options and vice versa. This issue will be 
superimposed on to traditional diplomatic and geopolitical concerns9 
The convergence of geography and poli.tics will shape the nature of 
conventional military action taken. If this action releases political 
pressures for escalation, a momentum towards uncontrolled war could 
build up, compounded by those aspects of military doctrine and 
capabilities that encourage a widening of conflict to secure tactical 
advantage. Doctrine based on an assertive interpretation of forward 
defence, to be implemented by conventional combat units that act as 
platforms for TNF, might well aggravate matters. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
~) Descriptive Conclusions 
The linkage between nuclear and convent.fonal military forces has 
a special place in the contemporary strategic environment in Europe. 
As previously described, this linkage works on many different levels -
psychological, philosophical, political, doctrinal, and operational. 
Poorly defined perceptions of the nuclear-conventional nexus seem to 
act as a reference point in thinking on defence related issues~ As 
discussed above, images of the relationship between nuclear and 
conventional military power can affect attitudes towards the 
the concept of strategy, the nature of trans-Atlantic relations, the 
future of European security, and the pattern of defence planning. 
The connections between nuclear and conventional forces (in terms 
of doctrine 1 deployments, and likely strategies) may also provide a 
powerful impulse to the breakdown of control over military operations 
and the rapid escalation of conflict to high levels of nuclear 
destruction. On the other hand) these connections may breed extreme 
caution. At the very least, considerations of nuclear strategy may 
Qffect the conduct of conventional operat:f.ons and vice versa~ 
• * * * 
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Both KATO and the Soviet Union have tried to subsume the linkage 
between nuclear and conventional forces within their respective 
military doctrines. For example, comventional war is often believed 
tit« 
to be, most likely contingency for the use of nuclear weapons; and 
.f., 
nuclear threats are commonly thought to be relevant in moulding the 
strategic landscape for conventional operations. Nuclear forces have 
also been given an intra-war deterrent role; they are supposed to 
deter escalation by the opponent. TNF have been tasked wl th both 
constraining enemy flexibility and helping to shape the 
conventional wartime environment~ 
In current NATO doctrine there is a presumption of strategic 
synergism between nuclear and conventional forces .. In other words, 
the meshing of nuclear and conventional warplans is assumed to provide 
a more powerful fighting machine, and a better deterrent, than having 
each type of military force managed in isolation. Thls is paralleled 
by the partly integrated deployment and organisation of theatre 
nuclear and conventional military units, particularly at fleet and 
corps leve 1. This posture is supposed to allow for the exercise of 
various nuclear options at different levels of conventional conflict. 
The Soviet Union also appears to have the doctrine and (it is 
often argued) the capabilities for different warfighting options -
conventional only, and various levels of combined nuclear-conventional 
conflict. Russian leaders seem to believe in strategic synergism 
between nuclear and conventional planning. However, Moscow seems to 
be very skeptical of any one's ability to fine-tune this synergism. 
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The link between nuclear and conventional military power in a 
large~scale European war appears to have been widely accepted as a 
harsh fact) not as something that can nece.ssarily be altered by 
changes to warplans, or at least not easily altered. This seems to be 
especially true of Soviet attitudes. It is reckoned that a bloody 
struggle ove.r vital national interests in Europe will necessarily 
carry enormous risks of rapid nuclear escalation - however urgent it 
is to plan on the basis that escalation might not be automatic. 
Soviet thinking appears to be more explicit than NATO doctrine 
in recognising a critical threshold to the decisive use of nuclear 
~eapons~ This threshold could be aoy_yhere between, say, ten ar:d a 
hundred nuclear detonations. depending on the targets destroyed and 
the psychological context of use (eg a counter c3r strike with ten 
missiles might be considered more threatening than the firi_ng of a 
corps "package" of one hundred battlefield nuclear warheads on the 
inner-German border). lt appears that) according to Soviet doctrine, 
the notion of nuclear signalling becomes vacuous once this threshold 
has been crossed~ and the need for rapid decisive action then becomes 
urgent. In theory) large, but selective and carefully co-ordinated) 
nuclear strikes would then be used in conjunction with a sweeping 
conventional 
objectives. 
offensive 
* 
designed 
* * 
to seize prir.tary political 
* 
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One should not read too much coherence into the military postures 
of East and West, not-withstanding their statements of doctrine. 
Doctrine has been stretched to cover the ambigui.ty and awkwardness 
that naturally accompany attempts to rationalise the use of nuclear 
weapons as a sensible act of policy. This false coherence may be 
especially pertinent to the nuclear-convef!-tional nexus: attempts to 
bring nuclear and conventional forces together, in terms of an over-
arching doctrine, are almost bound to suffer a degree of 
inapplicability. (As previously described, Alliance doc trine on the 
nuclear-conventional nexus could be undermined in wartime by failures 
in command and control, recalcitrant French and British behaviour, 
contrary Soviet perspectives, and the stresses of armed conflict.) 
In any case, mlli cary planning in Europe should not be explained 
slrnply in terms of military doctrine. Various extraneous and ad-hoc 
factors have had important consequences for this linkage. For 
example, the proliferation of US TNF in Europe during the 1950s and 
1960s had as much to do with the fact that the production of these 
weapons was possible, as with any fine diplomatic or military 
calculations. In addition, it seems that the efforts made in 1987 to 
reduce the number of NATO's long range TNF were not simply the 
consequence of perceived diplomatic or military needs; the impetus 
seems to have come primarily from internal Washington pol Hies, US 
unUateralism, media interest, and the resulting political momentum. 
The conjectural and political character of contemporary strategy 
feeds animated debate. Ever since the 1940s this debate has often 
turned on the linkage between US nuclear forces and regional 
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conventional defences. As described in chapter four, this issue was 
raised during the late 1970s with European concern over SALT, ERW, 
LRTNF and the LTDP. A more recent example of this controversy 
surfaced in 1987 following the apparent keenR~ of Moscow and 
Washington to eliminate land-based LRTNF. Another instance of the 
salience and controversy attached to the nuclear-conventional nexus 
has been illustrated by recent NATO attempts to raise the nuclear 
threshold.l Part ot this effort, noted previously. requires 
conventional force improvements to enable more powerful conventional 
air attacks behind Warsaw Pact li_nes, thus lessening a supposed NATO 
dependence on early f1 rst-use of TNF. This has been associated with 
calls to raise defence expenditures (sufficient in itself to encourage 
lively polemics). 
Si.nce at least the early 1960s successive American adminstrations 
have recognised a qualitative difference be tweet; nuclear and 
conventional military forces. 1'hey have tri.ed to establish a clear 
fire-break between plans for nuclear a'nd conventional warfare. Yet 
they have been compelled to assume that nuclear war :nay erupt out of a 
conventional conflict. Consequently they have adopted strategies 
that, to an extent, "conventionalise .. 2 nuclear weapons.. That is, 
Ae:terican planners have decided that nuclear weapons might be used in 
ways which conform to semi-traditional strategic criteria~ Th:fs 
implies a perceptjon of nuclear weapons, especially TNF, as potential 
extensions of conventional firepower. This perception seems easier to 
maintain when the likely battlefield is thousands of ~iles from home, 
rather than onets neighbourhood; hence a co::nmonly noteci difference of 
view between many Europeans and some Amerlcaos. 
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NATO· planning is rooted in a blend of different conceptions of 
strategy. Alliance doctrine allows some accommodation between a 
belief that nuclear weapons are essentially symbols of deterrence, and 
a view that TNF provide a possible extension of conventional 
firepower. This arrangement has been complicated because an 
alternative strand of opinion, which is essentially ~strategic) doubts 
the wisdom and morality of nuclear deterrence~ This rejectionist 
perspective is not a peripheral matter. Such beliefs form part of the 
basis of European security. These !strategic (or even anti-strategic) 
attitudes are obstacles to larger defence budgets and the 
implementation of a more coherent doctrine meshing nuclear and 
conventional forces. 
* * * 
East-West deterrence, together with the diplomacy and geopolitics 
of the Cold War, has provided an overarch1ng framework for the linkage 
between nuclear and conventional military power. But this situation 
is changing - and largely for reasons which lie outside of Europe. 
The most far-reaching source of change is probably nuclear 
proliferation. This prol iteration is creating new linkages between 
nuclear threats and conventional war. Developments in (for example) 
South Asia and the Middle East may, in time, recast the notion of 
strategy in such a way that the nuclear-conventional nexus acquires a 
widening and more ominous sfgniftcance~ Horeover, if and when nuclear 
weapons are ever used in modern war (by Israel or Iran for example) it 
seems very likely that America:1 and Edropean views of the nuclear-
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conventional nexus in Europe will be radically affected, one way or 
another. The Cold War, as traditlonally viewed, may then no longer 
provide the main perspective on linking nuclear and conventional 
forces. 
For example, European states may eventually feel a requirement 
for a nuclear deterrent against certain north African/Middle Eastern 
countries; they might also develop special conventional intervention 
forces for use against hostile, nuclear-armed, third world countries. 
Nuclear proliferation could affect traditional notions of military 
presence and gunboat diplomacy with repercussions for \\!estern and 
Soviet milftary activity in and around the Mediterranean. In 
addition, ~lATO military doctrine (and much else besides) might be 
revised i.n the light of any operational experience of nuclear war 
gained by "developing'' countries. 
Political developments may alter the character of the nuclear-
conventional nexus in Europe~ An American withdrawal from the 
Continent may give greater prominence to Anglo-French nuclear forces 
and Franco,-German collaboration~ The defence of central Europe might 
then hi.nge on the territorial defence of Germany, covered by a fe-,;..y 
hundred French and British TNF- to tie existential nuclear risk to 
any attack on the FRG. Norway and Turkey (to take just two examples) 
might then attempt some kind of realignment~ Alternatively, Europe 
might become a strategic backwater, it might gradually become 
partially disarmed. European military forces might be restricted to 
policing operations in regions adjacent co tlte Continent. A minimum 
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deterrent might be retained to discourage nuclear blackmail. Another 
possibility is the Balkanisation of Europe. This could encourage 
New linkages between nuclear proliferation and militarisation. 
nuclear and conventional forces would then be created. The nature of 
these linkages would depend on the character of shifting coalitions, 
and a web of nationally determined military doctrines and 
deployments. 
However, changes to European security are likely to be 
evolutionary t rather than radical. More of a defence burden may 
gradually fall on regional efforts, and less emphasis may be placed on 
large numbers of US TNF and troops. 
following proposal.s. 
This assumption underlies the 
Jl) Implications .. For Policy 
In the social sciences the urge to connect present reality with 
long-term goals is common .. 
strategic/peace studies~ 
inherently pol icy-oriented. 
This urge can be especially acute in 
Strategic analysis is often seen as 
After all, it Is largely the exigencies 
of the nuclear age that have encouraged the growth of academic 
interest in strategy. Anything less than policy advice ~y specialists 
in strategtc analysis has the aura of procrastination. But what> to 
an analyst, might sC>t~m lil.;:e sensible policy advjce, might also be 
politically unattainable. And a statement of the desirable (eg ''the 
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peaceful resolution of all international conflict") might appear 
somewhat vacuous. On the other hand, second-best or provisional 
solutions, like those suggested below, may seem like a compromise with 
evil, or distasteful, and overly conservati.ve. 
Bridging the gap between security problems and political ideals 
(or even mere strategic goals) is essentially a political process. 
Building this bridge is not primarily a scholarly task; however its 
construction might benefit from some analytical and strategic 
insights. 
What follows is an attempt to illuminate ways in which one 
particular strategic problem (Le. the dangerous juxtapositioning of 
nuclear and conventional military forces) might be ~arginally reduced 
(to the slightly less dangerous juxtapositionirog oE these forces). 
* * * * * 
Suggestions for changing NATO's defence posture should take on 
board Freedman's observatfoc that the idea of "a nuclear strategy that 
uniquely favours the West" is fundamentally "misguided" .. J Holst has 
offered additional guidance for aspiring reformers of Western military 
doctrine: 
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In discussing doctrine, it is common to assume greater 
coherence and consistency than prevails in the real world of 
basic contradiction and tension between competing 
requirements and considerations. Doctrine cannot be 
approached as an abstract exercise in logic 1 nor does it 
constitute the product of a simple problem of maximizaoon. 
Risks in several dimensions have to be traded off against 
each other in a world of political, economic and 
technological constraints. NATO does not face a straight 
choice between conventional denial and nuclear deterrence) 
but rather a task of orchestrating a credible doctrine and 
posture embracing both elements~ There is an urgent and 
recognizable need to improve the capacity for sustainable 
conventional denial and to build down the forces for nuclear 
deterrence, particularly those elements of the nuclear 
posture which increase the danger of inadvertent 
escalation. 4 
Many analysts have suggested ways of improving the West's management 
of nuclear risks in Europe~ These proposals have Included the 
following: 5 
1) The reduction of the numbers of TNF deployed to Europe. Short 
range battlefield weapons have frequently been singled out for 
special criticism. It has been argued that the presence of 
numerous short range TNF near a conventional battlefield will 
make control more difficult and nuclear escalation more 
likely. 
2) The improved survivability of TNF. This is to be achieved by, 
for example; the hardening of aircraft ,and missile bases; 
improved mobility for land based missiles; less reliance on a 
few fixed bases for both operations and storage; and greater 
reliance on seahorite weapons (such as cruise missiles carried 
by submarines). This is intended to lessen Soviet incentives 
for pre-errptive nuclear attack and reduce the chances of ''use-
them-or-lose-them'' pressures developing. 
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3) The improved command and control of TNF. This could require 
better, more robust and redundant; command organisation and 
systems which are dedicated to the control of TNF. Among 
other things this is intended to enhance control over nuclear 
weapons during conventional warfare~ Calls for the use. of 
safety locks (similar to those used with, say, GLCM) on 
maritime nuclear weapons would also fit into this category. 
4) The reduction, or even elimination, of overlapping nuclear/ 
conventional missions for certafn dual-capable weapon systems 
(such as F-111 bombers, and artillery). One purpose of such a 
change would be to ease command and control problems whilst 
adding to conventional firepower. 
5) The improvement of conventional defences, to reduce reliance 
on TNF. 
6) The modification of doctrine; in particular, the adoption of a 
policy of no-first/early-use of nuclear weapons in response to 
a conventional attack. 
7) The creation of nuclear weapons-free zones (covering, for 
example, central Europe). 
In making these suggestions, analysts have wanted to eLiminate the 
conventional trip-wire to uncontrolled nuclear war. 
* * 
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NATO strategy ought to facilitate long-term security and crisis 
stability. Three criteria need to be incorporated into ACE and ACLANT 
planning. First, Alliance strategy should be seen as helping to 
provide a secure basis for the development of detente. Second, NATO 
should do what it can to make Soviet offensive doc trine seen:.t to 
Moscow, ineffective and anachronistic. Third, force structuring 
should allow more room for diplomacy in the event of an armed 
confrontation in Europe .. In short, NATO should adopt a strategy of 
non-provocative barrier operations. These operations should not 
require the incorporation of SRTNF into the conventional front-line. 
Political and military control over the nexus between nuclear and 
conventional military forces should be maximised. Sensible management 
of this linkage requires firm political contr-ol over nuclear weapons 
doctrine and deployments, and a system of continuous assessment 
regarcing the effect of nuclear deployments/policies on conventional 
operations and vice versa. This sholald lessen the chances of the 
inadvertent application of military power and unintended escalation. 
Howevert no command and control arrangements can guarantee the 
eff€ctive regulation of the linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces; this linkage is not simply a function of command and control. 
The nature of the relationship between nuclear and conventional 
military forces is just as much a product of international and 
domestic politics as of military organisation. In any case, the mere 
existence of nuclear ~eapons carries a degree of threat and a sort of 
linkage with conventional force (on the psychological and diplomatic 
levels at the very lc•ast). Nonetheless. de-spite th0se COPlplicating 
factors, it is incumhen~ or1 the Alliance to improve its control over 
the coupling between TNP and conventional forces. 
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This improvement might require a politically acceptable mix of 
some of the seven measures listed above. Without access to classified 
information it would not be sensible to make detailed suggestions on 
(for example) nuclear weapons numbers, ranges, types, yields, 
targeting, safety locks, and locations; nor would it be prudent to 
pronounce, in detail, on particular mo,difications to chains of 
military command. 
However, it is possible to offer some general ideas on how 
defence planning could be re-oriented to better manage the nuclear-
conventional nexus. Firstly, though, it needs to be recognised both 
that we are in a condition of de facto Mutually Assured Destruction, 
and that it may be impossible to break the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional forces simply by altering military plans and deployments, 
or by public declarations on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, some attempts to cut the linkage between nuclear and 
conventional military power may be dangerous, especially if they 
produce the appearance, rather than the substance, of ••de-
nuclearisation··. Europe can, perhaps, be de-nuclearised in the 
limited sense of, for example, not hosting nuclear weapons; but it 
cannot be removed from nuclear danger. 
The problem is how to minimise and manage risk, it is not to 
pretend to make these risks disappear. Military power should be 
directed towards the requirements of crisis management. Adopting 
crisis management, including wartime crisis management, as a criterion 
for d0fence planning reinforces the argument for improving command and 
control, and calls for a continued focus on limited war planning. In 
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practice this probably means that some aspects of the current doctrine 
of flexible response should be taken more seriously rather than simply 
rejected. While images of total disaster may strengthen deterrence, 
the automatic translati_on of these images into reality is not the role 
of responsible military planners. In any case, the prospect of 
catastrophe which underpins deterrence will continue to confront any 
potential attacker, regardless of changes to warplans that might 
lessen the probability of escalation. 
A strategy based on conventional denial, firebreaks, and a form 
of nuclear warning shots seems more prudent than either attempting to 
de-nuclearise Europe, or in accepting the alleged feasibility of 
large-seale theatre combined (nuclear/conventional) operations. 
"Signalling .. \o.'ith a few nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve or 
recklessness in the face of an attack would certainly be very 
dangerous; but any attempt to engage in theatre-wide nuclear war with 
thousands of warheads -'. would raise the level of destruction 
exponl!ntially while adding little or nothing to the efficacy of 
defence efforts. A strategy of warning shots is less silly than 
treating nuclear weapons as an extension of conventional firepower, 
and is more prudent than assuming that nuclear weapons will never be 
tlsed or threatened. 
Planning for the nuclEar-conventional nexus should emphasise 
restraining deliberate escalation, and minimising unintended 
destruction. A robust conventional defence line and a secure nuclear 
deterrent may be necessary 1:0 achieve these objectives~ Within the 
context of conventional denial, nuclear weapons could deter enemy 
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first-use and threaten to shatter the political context in which an 
aggressor hoped to win. An attac.ker' s frame-of-reference would be the 
the target, not merely his military power. The intention is to make 
war look like a dangerous and stupid option, not to fight battles on 
terms set by an attacker. 
To implement such a strategy could require some of the measures 
discussed earlier, -better command, control, and survivability of TNF; 
and some improvements to conventional defences. The establishment of 
circumscribed nuclear weapons-free zones might also be useful; they 
could be restricted to particular areas east of the rivers Rhine-Ems, 
or Weser, to reduce the probability of unintended escalation near the 
frontline. SRTNF could be removed for the same reason. Remaining TNF 
warheads could be replaced with ERW, if such a move could ever be made 
politically palatable, this might lower the level of destruction 
resulting from limited nuclear 01ar and marginally enhance prospects 
for control (tbe idea that ERW make nuclear war more likely is hard to 
believe, and the argument that they are more evil than "ordinary" 
nuclear warheads is questionable). To keep Soviet armoured forces 
exposed to the risk of nuclear destruction it might be useful to 
deploy some relatively survivable TNF dedicated to "tactical" 
missions; such a force might discourage Soviet conventional force 
concentration, 
operations. 
thus facilitating NATO's conventional defence 
TNF and conventional weapons may bave comparable targets but they 
are not similar things. Hawkish and liberal assumptions about the 
interchangeability of nuclear and conventional forces are 
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unconvincing. The Hawks • view that TNF be seen as extensions of 
conventional firepower is politically naive and militari/yguestionable; 
the liberal argument for replacing TNF with conventional forces misses 
the point of Alliance policy. NATO's objective is to manage the 
promise/risk of deterrence within a specific historical framework. 
Within this framework nuclear and conventipnal forces have acquired 
overlapping> but not coterminous, functions. The deterrent/defence 
role of conventional forces parallels, but is not equivalent to, the 
role of TNF. 
This raises the vexing issue of possible first-use of nuclear 
weapons in response to a conventional invasion. Peacetime 
declarations on this (such as proclaiming a policy of no-first-use) 
can not Celimit wartime dangers~ Perhaps the most honest statement 
that leaders can roake is that: 
No one in their right mind will want to 
conflagration, even if a conventional 
Howevr~r, who knows what would happen in 
Europ(::an conflict? Nuclear weapons might 
used. 
start a nuclear 
war breaks-out. 
the midst of a 
or might not be 
The question of how planners should deal with this uncertainty is 
awkward. It would be foolish to have plans that turned escalation to 
nuclear strikes into a self-fulfilling prophecy. But it !NOuld be 
imprudent to encourage the delusion that conventional war in Europe 
can he divorced from nuclear danger .. Perhaps there is a requirement 
for weapons that symbolise the possibility of nuclear escalation from 
convPnttonnl ~ar. but which do not add to pressures for sucl1 
escalAtion. Once again) this would reinforce the need for as good a 
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c3r system as practicable. In short, current NATO strategy with 
respect to possible first-use needs modifying, rather than discarding; 
and NATO's capabilities should more closely reflect the needs of the 
strategy. 
On the conventional level, NAT\) should retain its much 
criticised policy of holding a defence line as far forward as is 
deemed militarily practical. The political need for this is over-
riding. Another reason has to do with crisis management. Few things 
are. more likely to de-stabilise a wartime crisis than the prospect of 
fluid and fast moving armoured battles moving back-and-forth across 
the Continent. The West should be wary of following a strategy that 
increases the likelihood of opening-up avenues of advance for rapid 
offensive operations deep into either side's territory. These avenues 
could turn into lightning rods for escalation. 
Similarly, the Alliance should reduce the chances of being 
locked-in to excessively de-stabilising offensive maritime operations. 
Posen has examined the potential dangers of such operations, and has 
made some suggestions for a more considered defensive posture.6 
Alliance concepts of maritime thresholds should be formulated. 
Within, and around, the European theatre there is a requirement for 
politically acceptable plans and strategies for coordinated land/sea 
barrier operations. Maintaining geographical limits to conventional 
conflict may be critical 'in preventing unwanted nuclear escalation. 
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Strengthened conventional forces might help close-off avenues of 
escalation and thus "raise the nuclear threshold'' (that ls, lower the 
probability of escalation to nuclear war). This does not necessarily 
mean that more money should be poured into the conventional force 
structure. Willams and Wallace have warned of the dangerous "illusion 
that new conventional systems will provide options that are somehow 
safe and non-escalatory•. 7 In any case, improved conventional 
defences might be leap-frogged by Soviet nuclear strikes. }1oreover, 
any political decision to face nuclear war might have more to do with 
political circumstances than with assessments of the conventional 
military balance. 
There is no theoretical limit to what can be spent to improve 
conventional defences. Even in the unlikely event of massive 
increases in defence expenditure, it could still be argued that extra 
funding might help raise the nuclear threshold. Fortunately, 
strategic ''logic" does not dictate Western political economy. 
Political constraints will probably keep defence budgets to about 
their present levels. This should place the burden for improvement on 
to deployment/mobilisat.ion plans, sustainability, and refinements to 
doctrine. 
Hanging over these theatre forces, strategic weapons (belonging 
to Britain, France, America and Russia) provide a further threat of 
Hutually Assure.d Destruction. It seems unlikely that this threat will 
be removed. Ln practice~ :-1AD may take the form of escalating nuclear 
interdiction or ''bargaining''. The relevance of MAD here LB 
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that it may occur in the context of a theatre campaign, or as a 
consequence of a series of inter-locking theatre campaigns. To 
paraphrase Jervis: one must build a strategy on the risks and 
uncertainties inherent in nuclear bargaining, but this will not 
necessarily 
policy. 8 It 
produce a sensible relationship between force and 
is therefore imperative that the burden of security is 
carried, to the greatest extent feasible, by foreign policy rather 
than by military planning. 
Strategic analysis should move away from isolated considerations 
of abstract force categories (such as the central strategic balance, 
or the conventional force balance in Europe) towards more focussed 
examination of the relationships between the forces and strategies 
represented by these categories. In particular, analysis should seek 
to describe, explain, and assess the nexus betw-een nuclear and 
conventional forces. Ideally this analysis should apply to both the 
political context of defence decision making as it affects the linkage 
between nuclear threats and conventional defence, and to the 
operational dimensions of such strategies. 
The intention here is to advocate a broadening of strategic 
assessments which, at the same time, prDvldes depth to such analyses. 
Narrow~ unqualified exarrinat:on of such abstractions as the 'central 
strategic bala;1ce.' can be very sha:low. The full meaning of such 
balances or force categories is not to be found in their own terms 
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(for example, the major significance of the central strategic balance 
does not 1 ie primarily in ICBM vulnerability, throw-weight, mobility 
etc). Rather, such meaning or significance lies primarily within the 
wider context of political role and possible use of military power. 
It seems obvious that the strategic framework for the threat and 
initial use of nuclear weapons may well be set by domestic political 
pressures, foreign policy considerations, and conventional military 
operations~ 
Analysts might examine the ways in which contingency planning for 
regional war between the superpowers (eg in north, central or southern 
Europe, eastern Turkey, Iran, Pakistan or Korea) reflect, and 
contribute towards, the linkage between nuclear and conventional 
forces. No doubt this will include assessments of how nuclear risks 
are likely to be intertwined with the conduct of conventional 
operations. This, in turn, suggests a need for disciplined 
speculation over how awareness of, and control over, the nuclear-
conventional nexus might work during crises and war. An extra, and 
unfortunate, twist to this type of examination may be provfded by 
continued nuclear proliferation~ The creation of new linkages between 
conventional (or even unconventional) conflict and nuclear weapons as 
a result of proliferation is likely to greatly complicate strategic 
analysis just at the time when such studies may be required urgently. 
The issues raised above - superpower contingency planning, and 
nuclear prollferatio~ shotdd he exan•ined in political context. 
Strategic analysis which has been abstracted out of international 
relations has also been gutted of meaning. Analysts should be aware 
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of how and why underlying political interests and developments might 
translate into military threats and action. This suggests the need 
for theatre-oriented case studies of how nuclear and conventional 
military power are linked. 
D) Summary of Conclusions 
Strategic developments in Europe may be partly understood in terms of 
how evolving political and operational factors affect the 
juxtapositioning of nuclear and conventional forces. The current 
linkage between these two types of military capability harbours some 
unnecessary dangers which can be reduced without diminishing 
deterrence. In particular, the command and control of nuclear units 
in and around Europe should ~e improved within the context of a change 
in military doctrine which stresses, to a greater extent than is 
currently the case, crisis management as a primary crfterion for 
planning both nuclear and conventional forces. For this to occur 
strategic analysis needs to illuminate ways that nuclear warplanning 
acquires relevance from the conventional military and geopolitical 
milieu. 
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NOTES 
1 A succinct survey of NATO's approach towards raising the nuclear 
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North Atlantic Assembly Report by the Sub-Committee QU 
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Press, 1984). 
J Lawrence Freedman, "NATO Myths", Foreign Policy, Winter 1981-82, 
p. 56. 
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NATO's Dilemma", in Adelphi Paper 206 (IISS, 1986), p. 77. 
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a) J. Steinbruner and L. Sigal (eds.) Alliance Security and the 
No-First-Use Questioq (The Brookings Institution, 1983). 
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(Taylor and Francis/SlPRI, 1984). 
c) W. Heisenberg, "The Alliance and Europe: Part 1: 
Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons" 
Paper 96, (IISS, 1973). 
Crisis 
Adelphi 
d) D. Cotter, "NATO Theatre Nuclear Forces: An Enveloping 
Military Concept", Strategic Review, Spring 1981. 
e) A. Frye, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: No Exit from 
Ambivalence", Survival, May/June 1980. 
f) Francois De Rose, "Updating Deterrence in Europe: Inflexible 
Response?" Survival, January/February 191l2. 
g) L. Hartin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Europe", Suryiyal, 
November/December 1974. 
h) J. Thomson, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Planning for NATO's 
Nuclear Deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s", Survival, May/June 
1983. 
i) D. Ball et al, 
publ !shed under 
and Sciences. 
Program, 1987. 
Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, a Report 
the auspices of the American Academy of Arts 
and the Cornell University Peace Studies 
j) J. Dtan, "Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front 
Problems'!", International Affairs, Winter 1987-88. 
k) J. 3aylis, "NATO Strategy: The Case for a ~ew Strategic 
Concept", International Affairs, I.Jinter 1987-88. 
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6 B-. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" op .. cit .. 
7 P. Williams and W. Wallace, "Emerging Technologies and European 
Security ", Survival, March/April 1984; also see P. Williams, 
"The Nuclear Threshold in Europe and Emerging Technologies" in 
Bellany and Huxley (eds.) New Conventional Weapons and Western 
Defence (Frank Cass, 1987). 
8 R. Jervis, ]'he Illogic of American .. Nuclear Strategy, op. cit., p. 
170. 
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